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1 Introduction
Several ﬁnancial crises have shown that our ﬁnancial system might be fragile and
not as eﬃcient as claimed by many ﬁnancial economist and practitioners and a lot of
policy questions have arosen from this crisis, e.g. : Are ﬁnancial markets ineﬃcient
and which regulations increase the eﬃciency of ﬁnancial markets?
Academic questions as well emerged from the ﬁnancial crisis, e.g.: Which economic
models are able to explain ﬁnancial instabilities and stylized facts of ﬁnancial market
data? Which are the building blocks a model of ﬁnancial fragility should consist of?
Which behavioral trading rules destabilize ﬁnancial markets? How should we build
econometric models for modeling and forecasting ﬁnancial instabilities? Do we need
new methodologies, e.g. nonlinear models?
The advocates of agent-based ﬁnancial market models began in the 1990’s with the
construction of models for addressing questions about ﬁnancial instability. This
branch of the ﬁnance literature is inspired by (i) questionnaire surveys among ﬁnan-
cial market experts about their trading behavior (Taylor and Allen 1992; Menkhoﬀ
and Taylor 2007), and (ii) by the empirical ﬁnance literature (De Vries 1994; Pagan
1996) which has found a catalogue of stylized fact of daily ﬁnancial market data,
which are robust to diﬀerent asset classes, markets and time periods (Lux 2009a,
1
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2009b). Important contributions to agent-based ﬁnancial market models are Brock
and Hommes (1997, 1998), Kirman (1991, 1993), Lux (1995, 2009a, 2009b), and
Lux and Marchesi (1999, 2000). They are surveyed in Westerhoﬀ (2008b), Hommes
(2006), LeBaron (2006) and Lux (2009a, 2009b). Figure 1.1 contains a ﬂow chart
which represents the integration of this dissertation project into the literature on
agent-based models, the literature on regulations of ﬁnancial markets and the litera-
ture on econometric modeling of ﬁnancial market instabilities. All of these branches
of the literature have in common, that multiple equilibria lead to ﬁnancial market
instabilities, which is also claimed by the literature on the second generation of
currency crisis models (Jeanne 1997).
Financial Instability
Heterogeneity of 
Trading Rules
Empirical Finance: Stylized Facts 
(e.g. DeVries 1994, Pagan 1996)
Survey Studies among 
Market Participants 
(e.g. Taylor and Allen 1992)
Agent-Based Models,
Heterogeneous 
Interacting Agents
Effectiveness of Regulations, 
e.g. Transaction Taxes
Nonlinear Econometric
Models
Multiple Equilibria
Forecasting
Speculative Bubbles, 
Excess Volatility,
e.g. LeRoy and Porter (1981), 
Shiller (1981)
Fat-Tailness, 
Non-Gaussianity
of Returns
Stylized Facts as Emergent Properties
Assumption
Empirical Evidence
Affection of Modelling of
Time-Varying Volatility,
e.g. GARCH
Figure 1.1: Integration of the Dissertation Project into the Literature
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Agent-based ﬁnancial market models base their assumptions on agents’ behavior on
the empirical evidence of the heterogeneity of trading rules in real ﬁnancial mar-
kets. The ﬁrst survey among ﬁnancial market experts is Taylor and Allen (1992)
who ﬁnd that market practitioners use trading rules which are based on economic
fundamentals as well as so called technical trading rules or chartist trading rules,
which extrapolate past trends and trend reversals into the future, and which ignore
economic fundamentals. Taylor and Allen (1992) ﬁnd that 42 percent of surveyed
experts rely on chartist trading rules on short-term investment horizons. This het-
erogeneity is neglected by classical ﬁnancial theory.
Agent-based ﬁnancial market models aim to explain the empirical stylized facts of
daily ﬁnancial market data by the evolution and interaction of competing trading
rules. In these models agents switch to the trading strategies, which were most
successful in the recent past (Brock and Hommes 1997) or they are inﬂuenced by
social interactions (Kirman 1991, 1993; Lux 2005; Lux and Marchesi 1999, 2000).
The empirical stylized facts emerge from the coordination of the individual trading
rules (Lux 2009a). Empirical stylized facts are following Lux (2009a), Westerhoﬀ
(2008) and Lux and Marchesi (2000) (i) the absence of autocorrelations in daily
asset returns, (ii) the long-lasting autocorrelations in the magnitude of asset returns
which lead to the emergence of volatility clusters, (iii) the deviation of the return
distribution from a normal distribution with more probability mass in the vicinity
of the mean and in the tails compared to the Gaussian distribution, and (iv) the
frequent emergence and bursts of speculative bubbles, which lead to the observation
that asset prices are more volatile compared to their fundamental values (LeRoy
and Porter 1981; Shiller 1981). Classical ﬁnancial theory which concentrates on the
optimizing behavior of one representative agent is unable to explain these empirical
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stylized facts.
Colander et al. (2009) criticize the neglect ion of the evolution of heterogeneous
trading rules and their contribution to the emergence of stylized facts in classical
ﬁnancial theory. These authors state, that neoclassical ﬁnancial theory is incapable
of addressing questions about the coordination of economic agents and the possibility
of coordination failures by neglecting these factors. Hence, Colander et al. (2009)
demand the following requirements for theoretical model building and empirical
analysis:
∙ Theoretical and empirical soundness of models applied to economic policy anal-
ysis. Models should be based on sound empirical assumptions about traders
behavior and they should ﬁnd support in the data by replicating the empirical
stylized facts.
∙ New time series models should be developed for detecting speculative bub-
bles and the emergence of non-fundamental equilibria for forecasting future
ﬁnancial instabilities.
Within this dissertation work I try to meet both goals. This cumulative dissertation
work consists of four essays, which all possess an abstract, the Journal of Literature
Classiﬁcation and their own bibliography. Two of them are already published, while
one is under review and one is still a working paper up to now. The ﬁrst three papers
apply agent-based ﬁnancial market models to questions about sound regulations of
ﬁnancial markets, here the example of Tobin-type transaction taxes. In the last
paper I introduce a simple nonlinear empirical model, which is shown to be a reduced
form of the agent-based model of Lux (1995), which I apply for modeling multiple
equilibria in real exchange rates and for forecasting ﬁnancial instabilities.
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The ﬁrst essay (Demary 2008) is based on my earliest research on agent-based ﬁ-
nancial market models. Its title is ”Who Does a Currency Transaction Transaction
Tax Harm More: Short-Term Traders or Long-Term Investors?”, which is published
in Jahrbu¨cher fu¨r Nationalo¨konomie und Statistik, Vol. 228, pp. 228-250 in the
year 2008. Here, I propose a novel model of the foreign exchange market with het-
erogeneous interacting agents. Traders place their buy or sell orders in response
to the interest rate diﬀerential between two countries. They are allowed to select
endogenously between two diﬀerent forecasting models and are moreover allowed
to be short-term speculators or long-term investors.1 Within this model framework
I study the eﬀectiveness of currency transaction taxes on exchange rate volatility
and traders’ behavior. The numerical analysis yields the result that these taxes
reduce the volatility of exchange rate returns, but increase their kurtosis. More-
over, taxation does not reduce the misalignment. The second result is that the
tax harms short-term speculation in favor of longer term investments, while it also
harms trading rules based on economic fundamentals in favor of trend-extrapolating
trading rules. However, these results are only valid when agents trade aggressively.
Otherwise, taxation is not necessary.
The second essay (Demary 2010) is entitled ”Transaction Taxes and Traders with
Heterogeneous Investment Horizons in an Agent-Based Financial Market Model”. It
is published in Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal, Vol. 4,
2010-8 in the year 2010. This agent-based ﬁnancial market model is a generalization
of the model of Westerhoﬀ (2008a) by traders who are allowed to have diﬀerent in-
1Arnoufriev and Botazzi (2004) is an earlier attempt of modeling heterogeneous investment hori-
zons in an agent-based stock market model. However, their model diﬀers from my model in
several aspects, e.g. the diﬀerent formulation of the long-term chartist trading rule. Moreover,
it concentrates on the stability properties of the fundamental equilibrium and not onto the
working of regulations.
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vestment horizons similar to Demary (2008).2 My research goals are, ﬁrst, to study
what consequences the introduction of heterogeneous investment horizons has for
agent-based ﬁnancial market models, and second, how eﬀective transaction taxes
are in stabilizing ﬁnancial markets. Numerical simulations reveal that under suf-
ﬁciently small tax rates traders abstain from short-term trading in favor of longer
term investment horizons. This change in behavior leads to less volatility and less
mispricings. When the tax rate exceeds a certain threshold, however, mispricings
increase as also found in Westerhoﬀ (2003, 2008). This emergent property is due
to the fact that taxation reduces short-term ﬂuctuations and causes longer lasting
trends in the exchange rate. As a result, the longer term fundamentalist trading
rule becomes unpopular in favor of the longer term trend-chasing rule.
The third essay is entitled ”Transaction Taxes, Greed and Risk Aversion in an Agent-
Based Financial Market Model”. It is under review in the Journal of Economic
Interaction and Coordination. Recent agent-based ﬁnancial market models come
to the result that taxing ﬁnancial transactions does not per se increase ﬁnancial
stability (Westerhoﬀ 2003, 2008a; Demary 2008, 2010). However, the response of
volatility and misalignments to rising tax rates seem to be 푢-shaped. Moreover,
greed and the risk appetite of traders are often blamed for ﬁnancial instability and
there is no evidence how greed and risk aversion aﬀect the eﬀectiveness of regulations
in ﬁnancial markets, e.g. how transaction taxes work in a market with risk averse
traders compared to a market with less risk averse traders. I aim to ﬁll this gap in
the literature by analyzing how diﬀerent degrees of risk aversion and aggressiveness
measured by behavioral parameters of traders aﬀect the working of transaction taxes
2The diﬀerence between the models of Westerhoﬀ (2008a) and Demary (2008) is that traders do
not trade on interest diﬀerentials in Westerhoﬀ (2008a) but on return expectations.
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within an agent-based framework. My simulations indicate that a tax rate of 0.1
percent demarcates the stabilizing tax regime from the destabilizing one. I ﬁgure out
that the shape of the volatility and misalignment response curves to taxation depend
on behavioral parameters of the model. Higher transaction taxes are necessary,
either when chartists trade more aggressively, fundamentalists trade less aggressively,
agents switch more frequently between trading strategies or only have short memory
in their ﬁtness measures. A lower risk aversion of agents, however, makes higher tax
rates more eﬀective as indicated by a ﬂatter volatility response curve.
The last essay is entitled ”Speculative Bimodality in Real Exchange Rates: Estima-
tion, Testing and Forecasting”and deals with the estimation of stochastic diﬀerential
equations with with a cubic drift for modeling and forecasting ﬁnancial instability.
The cubic drift model can be interpreted as a reduced form of the agent-based ﬁ-
nancial market model of Lux (1995). Bimodal distributions emerge from this type
of diﬀerential equation for a certain interval of the models’ parameters. I estimate
these models for 14 monthly real exchange rates taken from the European Central
Bank’s database covering the time from 1993:01 to 2009:02. Parameter estimates
give evidence for bimodal exchange rate distributions for fourteen exchange rates,
two cubic-drift models and two estimation periods. Forecasts of the exchange rate
density predict the exchange rate to be in the vicinity of one of the two attractors
for most of the time. However, there are periods, in which both attractors are cov-
ered with probability mass indicating uncertainty about the equilibrium exchange
rate. The models identify the beginning of the Exchange Rate Mechanism II and
the introduction of the Euro as two major phase transitions. Based on tests on
unconditional and conditional predictive accuracy I ﬁnd that the cubic-drift models
outperform the random walk in out-of-sample forecasting for one out of fourteen real
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 8
exchange rates. I conclude that bimodality is a good description of real exchange
rates.
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2 Who Does a Currency Transaction
Tax Harm More: Short-Term
Speculators or Long-Term
Investors?
Chapter originally published as
Demary, Markus (2008), ”Who Does a Currency Transaction Tax Harm More: Short-
Term Speculators or Long-Term Investors?”, Jahrbu¨cher fu¨r Nationalo¨konomie und
Statistik, Vol. 228, pp. 228-250.
Abstract. We propose a novel heterogeneous interacting agents model in which
traders are allowed to select endogenously between two diﬀerent forecasting mod-
els and are moreover allowed to be short-term speculators or long-term investors.
Within this model framework we study the eﬀects of currency transaction taxes on
exchange rate volatility and traders’ behavior measured by their population frac-
tions. The numerical analysis yields the result that these taxes reduce the variance
of exchange rate returns, but increases their kurtosis. Moreover taxation does not
lead to a reduction in the misalignment. The second result is, the tax harms short-
term speculation in favor of long-term investments, while it also harms trading rules
based on economic fundamentals in favor to trend-extrapolating trading rules. But
these results are only valid if agents trade very aggressively. Otherwise taxation is
not necessary.
Key Words: Currency Transaction Taxes, Financial Market Volatility, Foreign
Exchange Markets, Heterogeneous Interacting Agents
JEL Classiﬁcation: C15, F31, F32, G15, G18
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2.1 Introduction
Foreign exchange markets are excessively volatile and risky due to speculative bub-
bles and crashes. These transitory bubbles and crashes do not reveal rational
arbitrage-free pricing behavior but might be due to irrational and trend-chasing
behavior of speculators. Because trend-chasing behavior and short-term speculation
leads to excessive risks, policy instruments like currency transaction taxes were pro-
posed for reducing speculative attacks and excessive risks. Tobin (1978) proposes
following Keynes (1936) the introduction of an internationally uniform tax on all
currency transactions. This tax should reduce the proﬁtability of speculation and
should lead to a stabilization of the exchange rate. The proponents of this policy
instrument claim that the proportional taxation of foreign currency transactions
does not harm international trade but penalizes high frequency speculation. This
argument can summarized in the following proposition:
Currency transaction taxes crowd out short term speculators in favor of long term
investors.
In order to analyze this proposition we have to consider the following requirements
and assumptions: (i) we need a model framework in which we are able to distinguish
between short-term speculators and long-term investors, (ii) the number of short-
term speculators and long-term investors should not be ﬁxed, but traders should
change groups or leave the market, and (iii) the model should be able to match
empirical properties of foreign exchange market data for performing an economic
policy analysis which is close to reality.
For fulﬁlling requirements (푖), (푖푖) and (푖푖푖) the most appealing framework is an
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agent-based model of the ﬁnancial market that considers behavioral heterogeneity
of agents.
Survey data of foreign exchange markets yields empirical evidence for behavioral het-
erogeneity and heterogeneous expectations among traders. This empirical ﬁnding
gives an empirical basis for the chartist-fundamentalist agent-based model frame-
work. Due to survey studies like the one conducted by Taylor and Allen (1992),
these short term expectations display trend chasing behavior and are destabilizing
for this reason, while long term expectations are regressive and therefore of a stabi-
lizing nature. Based on this empirical fact, several studies like Brock and Hommes
(1997, 1998), Chiarella and He (2002), and Lux and Marchesi (2000) start to incorpo-
rate heterogenous expectations into economic models of the ﬁnancial market, while
only a few like Westerhoﬀ (2003), Grimaldi (2004) and DeGrauwe and Grimaldi
(2006) concentrate on exchange rates. Econometric tests on rational expectations
in the foreign exchange market1 are usually rejected and cannot explain stylized
facts of ﬁnancial market time series. For this reason researchers switched to the
chartist-fundamentalist approach based on the empirical evidence of heterogeneous
expectations from survey studies. This model framework uses the alternative expec-
tations hypothesis of behavioral heterogeneity which is an appealing building block
for models of the foreign exchange market. It assumes that traders are bounded
rational in that they do not use all available information and economic models to
forecast the future exchange rate because the true complex nature of the economy
is not known to them. Instead agents rely on simple rules of thumb in order to
approximate the structure of the model. Most of these interacting agent models
assume that the market is populated by two types of traders. The chartist trader
1See Taylor and Allen (1992) and Menkhoﬀ (1997) among others.
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type searches for patterns in past exchange rates like trends and trend reversals for
forecasting future rates, while fundamentalist traders search for over- and underval-
uations of the exchange rate with respect to its fundamental value and expect the
misalignment to be corrected in the distant future. Moreover, this approach allows
agents to choose endogenously one of this two views of the world. Moreover, there
is also empirical evidence for the chartist-fundamentalist approach2. Researchers
who use these quantitative models compare model implied statistics and numbers
like autocorrelations, standard deviations and distributional properties with those
emerging from ﬁnancial market data. The overall success of heterogeneous agents
models to explain empirical facts encourages to elaborate on them.
Studies like Westerhoﬀ (2003) use the chartist-fundamentalist approach for economic
policy analysis by analyzing the eﬀects of market regulations in foreign exchange
markets. Westerhoﬀ ﬁnds that small currency transaction taxes lower exchange rate
volatility while a high Tobin tax rate leads to an increase. He explains this ﬁnding
by a change in the composition of chartists and fundamentalists through the tax
levied on ﬁnancial market transactions. The reason for this ﬁnding is that small
transaction taxes make destabilizing chartism unproﬁtable and increase the fraction
of fundamentalist traders which stabilizes the exchange rate. If the tax rate ex-
ceeds a certain threshold also fundamentalism will be unproﬁtable and the fraction
of chartist traders will rise, such that a destabilization of the exchange rate occurs
and volatility will rise again. Mannaro et al. (2006) ﬁnd in their simulation study
within an artiﬁcial stock market framework that volatility will fall by 2% for a tax
2Engle and Hamilton (1990) ﬁnd that there is regime switching in exchange rates in that there are
phases of trends and mean-reversion. Vigfusson (1997) ﬁnds empirical evidence by estimating
parameters of the chartist-fundamentalist model in a Markov-switching framework. Other
studies that try to estimate chartist-fundamentalist models are Alfarano et al. (2005), Boswijk
et al. (2007), Gilli and Winkler (2003) and Westerhoﬀ and Reitz (2003).
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rate of 0.1%, while it will fall by 8% for a tax rate of 0.5% with respect to the
reference situation without taxes. Moreover, the percentage fraction of fundamen-
talists will rise due to the imposition of the transaction tax. In a simulation with
only random traders and chartists a small tax can also lead to a small increase in
volatility. Bianconi et al. (2006) analyze the eﬀectiveness of Tobin taxes in minority
games, while Ehrenstein et al. (2005) analyze the impact of this tax in a model
framework that goes back to the percolation model of Bouchaud and Cont (2000).
Moreover, Frankel (1996), Palley (1999) and Westerhoﬀ and Dieci (2006) are papers
that analyze the eﬀectiveness of currency transaction taxes. The latter one proposes
a model with bounded rational agents that apply either technical or fundamental
analysis for their trading decisions. In contrast to other models traders are allowed
to trade in two diﬀerent markets. The decision of each agent to enter one of the
two markets and to apply either technical or fundamental analysis again depends
on proﬁt considerations. This model is able to match empirical ﬁndings of ﬁnancial
market data which makes it usable for economic policy analysis. One of the model’s
implications is that taxation of only one market decreases the volatility of the taxed
market while the volatility in the other market increases. The reason for this is that
destabilizing technical traders move to the market in which the tax is not levied.
The other result of this study is that if the tax is levied in both markets it is able
to stabilize both markets.
In this paper we want to introduce an extended version of the chartist-fundamentalist
model of the foreign exchange market. Our model is similar to the models of Brock
and Hommes (1997, 1998), Chiarella and He (2002) and DeGrauwe and Grimaldi
(2006) among others. In contrast to these models we allow agents to choose between
diﬀerent investment horizons, such that there are short-term chartists and funda-
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mentalists and long-term chartists and fundamentalists. Moreover, we also deviated
from the commonly used discrete choice model for the evolution of trading rules and
introduce another evolutionary mechanism that also allows traders to choose be-
tween diﬀerent investment horizons. A typical simulation run of the baseline model
without taxes reveals that the model is able to match empirical properties of ex-
change rate data. This makes the model able for performing an economic policy
analysis. This is the second task of our paper. We employ the model for economic
policy analysis by introducing taxes on foreign exchange market transactions into
the model. Our research goal is to analyze, how these taxes inﬂuence traders’ behav-
ior and ﬁnancial market risks. Simulations yield the result that currency transaction
taxes reduce the variance of exchange rate returns but also increase their kurtosis.
Moreover, the tax harms short-term speculation in favor of long-term investment,
while it also harms trading rules based on economic fundamentals in favor to trend-
extrapolating trading rules. But these results are only valid under a scenario where
the behavioral parameters of fundamentalists and chartists are large. If these param-
eters are assumed to be small the market will be dominated by fundamentalists and
long-term traders so that a transaction tax will not result in more stable exchange
rates.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: the next section presents the
model economy, while section three will present model’s fundamental equilibrium.
The following section will contain the numerical analysis of the model, while section
ﬁve concludes.
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2.2 The Model Economy
This section presents the model’s building blocks. This quantitative model is similar
to the one proposed by DeGrauwe and Grimaldi (2006) with the diﬀerence that here
traders are allowed to choose between being a short-term speculator or a long-term
investor. The model’s building blocks are (i) the fundamental determinants of the
exchange rate, (ii) the agents’ portfolio selection problem, (iii) the agents’ forecasts
of the future exchange rate via diﬀerent forecasting models, (iv) agents’ evaluation
of these portfolio rules by a comparison of their past proﬁtability, (v) the exchange
rate is set by a market maker in contrast to DeGrauwe and Grimaldi (2006), and (vi)
a policy maker sets the currency transaction tax rate. In the following subsections
we will discuss these building blocks in more detail.
2.2.1 Fundamental Factors and Arbitrage
We assume that the fundamental factors driving the exchange rate are the gross
rates of return on the domestic and foreign bond with one-period maturity. We
assume both interest rates 푅 = (1 + 푟) to follow stochastic mean-reverting processes
of the form
ln푅푡+1 = (1− 훼) ln푅 + 훼 ln푅푡 + 휎휀푡+1, 휀푡 ∼ 풩 (0, 1), (2.1)
where 푅 is the long-run average interest rate, 훼 ∈ [0, 1] is the rate of mean-reversion
and 휀푡 is a random innovation to the interest rate. We choose the logarithmic version
in order to guarantee that interest rates remain positive.
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Similar, the rate of return on the foreign one-period-bond follows
ln푅∗푡+1 = (1− 훼∗) ln푅∗ + 훼∗ ln푅∗푡 + 휎∗휀∗푡 , 휀∗푡+1 ∼ 풩 (0, 1), (2.2)
where foreign variables are denoted with an asterisk.
Assuming homogeneous interest rate expectations and that all agents know the
true data generating processes for the interest rates, long-term bonds can be priced
according to the expectations hypothesis of the term structure. The expectations
hypothesis of the term structure well known from many macroeconomics textbooks
(see Romer 2005 for example) states that no arbitrage should be possible between
the rates of return of a long-term bond and the rates of return of a sequence of
one-period bonds over the maturity of the long-term bond. This consideration gives
us the following valuation formula for long-term bonds
ln푅푡,푁 =
1
푁
푁−1∑
푛=0
E푡 ln푅푡+푛. (2.3)
Using the fact that the 푛-period-ahead forecast of the autoregressive process for the
interest rate is given by
E푡 ln푅푡+푛 = 훼
푛 ln푅푡 + (1− 훼푛) ln푅 (2.4)
and applying the rule for the ﬁnite geometric series yields the following long-term
interest rate
ln푅푡,푁 =
1
푁
{
⋅1− 훼
푁
1− 훼 ⋅ ln푅푡 +푁 −
훼푁 − 훼
1− 훼 ln푅
}
. (2.5)
Figure 2.1 shows the time series of short-term and long-term interest rates of a
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Figure 2.1: Simulated Fundamental Factors
Note: Model generated time series according to the formulas (2.1) and (2.3). The used parameter
values are those given in table 2.1.
typical simulation run.
The second building block is the uncovered interest rate parity condition which
claims that the interest rate diﬀerential between two countries should be oﬀset by
the agents’ expected exchange rate change. Deviations from the no-arbitrage interest
rate parity condition
E푖푡푠푡+푛
푠푡
=
(
푅푡,푛
푅∗푡,푛
)푛
(2.6)
arise because interest rates follow stochastic processes. This deviation promises
proﬁts for foreign exchange traders and provokes them to demand foreign currency
in the ﬁnancial market. With 푠푡 we denote the bilateral exchange rate. If this
equation holds with equality the expected exchange rate change will be oﬀset by the
interest rate diﬀerential and no trade will occur. We call the foreign exchange rate
푠푡+1 under which no arbitrage is possible the fundamental exchange rate. This is due
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to the fact that it is completely determined by the model’s economic fundamentals
which are the domestic and the foreign interest rates.
2.2.2 Traders’ Demand for Foreign Currency
The next goal in building a quantitative model of the foreign exchange market is
to introduce traders who are characterized by behavioral heterogeneity. Following
DeGrauwe and Grimaldi (2006) we assume that each agent is allowed invest into a
domestic asset and a foreign asset. In contrast to DeGrauwe and Grimaldi (2006)
both assets are risky due to the randomness of domestic and foreign interest rates
and due to exchange rate risks.
We assume overlapping generations of agents, who enter the market for their perti-
nent investment horizon. After having realized proﬁts traders will leave the market
and consume. The timing of each period is deﬁned as follows:
(i) trader 푖 enters the market and observes interest rates, the exchange rate and
the past proﬁts of the other traders. Depending on the past proﬁts of the other
traders, he or she decides to be a short-run or long-run fundamentalist or to
be a short-run or long-run chartist trader,
(ii) depending on the interest rate diﬀerential and his or her expected depreciation
of the exchange rate the trader decides how much to invest in the domestic
and the foreign asset,
(iii) after the trader has realized his proﬁt, he or she leaves the market and con-
sumes.
Following Brock and Hommes (1997) agents are assumed to have preferences towards
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risks with constant absolute risk aversion characterized by the following exponential
utility function
푈(푊 푖푡+푛, 훿푖) = − exp{−훿푖푊 푖푡+푛}, (2.7)
where 푊 푖푡 is agent 푖’s wealth at time 푡, 푛 ∈ {1, ..., 푁} is the set of agents’ investment
horizons, and 훿푖 is the agents Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion. The
agent’s wealth is assumed to follow
푊 푖푡+푛 = (푅
∗
푡 )
푛푠푡+푛푑
푖
푡(1− 휏)2 + (푅푡)푛(푊 푖푡 − 푠푡푑푖푡), (2.8)
where 푅 = (1+푟) and 푅∗ = (1+푟∗) are the gross returns on the domestic and foreign
bond, while 푠푡 is the bilateral exchange rate between both countries. The ﬁrst part
is the return on the foreign asset on which a tax on foreign currency transactions
휏 ∈ [0, 1] is levied, while the second term measures the costs of borrowing in the
domestic country. For 푛 = 1 and 휏 = 0 this budget constraint collapses to the one
proposed by DeGrauwe and Grimaldi (2006).
If we assume wealth to be normally distributed we can simplify the portfolio selection
problem by maximizing the certainty equivalent
푈(푊 푖푡 , 훿푖) = E
푖
푡−1[푊
푖
푡 ]−
훿푖
2
Var푖푡−1[푊
푖
푡 ] (2.9)
subject to the same budget constraint. Maximization yields agent 푖 ’s demand
function for foreign currency for the has investment horizon 푛
푑푖,푛푡 =
E푖푡[푊
푖
푡+푛]
훿푖Var
푖
푡[푊
푖
푡+푛]
=
(푅∗푡 )
푛(1− 휏)2E푖푡[푠푡+푛]− (푅푡)푛푠푡
훿휎2푖,푡
. (2.10)
Thus, trader 푖’s demand is decreasing in his degree of risk aversion, in a higher
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risk of ﬂuctuations in his wealth 휎2푖,푡, decreasing in the transaction tax rate 휏 , and
increasing in the expected proﬁt. For 푛 = 1 and 휏 = 0 the demand function collapses
to the one used in DeGrauwe and Grimaldi (2006).
Following Brock and Hommes (1997) we assume that the risk evaluation is the same
for all agents and constant over time, the demand function simpliﬁes to
푑푖,푛푡 = 휓
(
(푅∗푡 )
푛(1− 휏)2E푖푡[푠푡+푛]− (푅푡)푛푠푡
)
, (2.11)
with 휓 = 1/훿휎2. This simpliﬁed demand function only depends on the domestic
and foreign interest rates, the currency transaction tax as well as the current and
the for the future expected exchange rate.
The trader’s demand for foreign currency possesses a term which depends on the
agent’s individual forecasting model of the future exchange rate. The set of possible
forecasting models will be tackled in the next subsection.
2.2.3 Traders’ Forecasting Models
We assume that the true data generating process of the exchange rate is unknown to
the agents and that they have to approximate it by rules of thumb. Therefore they
use ad-hoc rules for forecasting. We assume that two types of forecasting rules are
used. A rule which reacts on trends in the exchange rate is commonly called chartist
rule or technical trading rule. The other technique called fundamentalist forecasting
rule looks for over- and undervaluations of the exchange rate with respect to its
arbitrage-free fundamental value 푠푓푡 and expects a reversion back to it.
The fundamentalist forecasting rule for the one-step-ahead prediction of the ex-
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change rate can be written as
E푓푡 [푠푡+1 − 푠푡] = 휅푓 ⋅ (푠푓푡 − 푠푡). (2.12)
According to this equation known as error-correction model from the econometrics
literature, this rule predicts an exchange rate change such that 휅푓 ⋅100% of the
disequilibrium 푠푓푡 − 푠푡, which is the deviation of the realized exchange rate 푠푡 from
the arbitrage-free exchange rate 푠푓푡 , will be corrected by the subsequent exchange
rate change. Note that the two step ahead forecast assumes that 휅푓 ⋅100% of the
remaining disequilibrium (1 − 휅푓 ) ⋅ (푠푓푡 − 푠푡) will be corrected by the subsequent
exchange rate change and so on. From this consideration follows, that the 푛-step
ahead forecast will be
E푓푡 [푠푡+푛 − 푠푡+푛−1] = 휅푓 (1− 휅푓 )푛−1 ⋅ (푠푓푡 − 푠푡). (2.13)
For 푛 = 1 this forecasting model collapses to the one used in DeGrauwe and Grimaldi
(2006), Lux and Marchesi (2000), Chiarella and He (2002) and Brock and Hommes
(1997).
The expected exchange rate change E푓푡 [푠푡+푛]− 푠푡 over 푛 periods can be derived from
the forecasted one period exchange rate changes as follows
E푓푡 [푠푡+푛]− 푠푡 = E푓푡 [푠푡+푛 − 푠푡+푛−1] + E푓푡 [푠푡+푛−1 − 푠푡+푛−2] + ...+ E푓푡 [푠푡+1 − 푠푡]
=
[
1− (1− 휅푓 )푛] ⋅ (푠푓푡 − 푠푡). (2.14)
Fundamentalists believe that the arbitrage-free exchange rate 푠푓푡 is the exchange rate
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under which the uncovered interest rate parity condition holds with equality
푠푓푡 = 푠푡−1 ⋅
푅푡−1
푅∗푡−1
. (2.15)
Therefore, if this fundamental exchange rate 푠푓푡 realizes, the exchange rate change
oﬀsets the possible proﬁts from the interest rate diﬀerential and no arbitrage should
be possible.
The technical forecasting rule for the one-step-ahead prediction can be speciﬁed as
follows
E푐푡 [푠푡+1 − 푠푡] = (휅푐) ⋅ (푠푡 − 푠푡−1). (2.16)
This forecasting model known as autoregressive process from the econometrics liter-
ature predicts a trend-continuation. If the exchange rate change 푠푡−푠푡−1 is one, this
forecasting model predicts the next exchange rate change to be 휅푐. As usual in the
theory of autoregressive models we use the last period’s forecast to predict the next
future exchange rate if we do not have information about realizations. Thus, the
two-step-ahead forecast expects an exchange rate change of (휅푐)2 and so on. Thus,
the 푛-step-ahead prediction will be
E푐푡 [푠푡+푛 − 푠푡+푛−1] = (휅푐)푛 ⋅ (푠푡 − 푠푡−1). (2.17)
Equivalent to the fundamentalists’ technique, chartists calculate the expected ex-
change rate change E푐푡 [푠푡+푛 − 푠푡] over 푛 periods as the sum of the predicted one
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period exchange rate changes over 푛 periods
E푐푡 [푠푡+푛 − 푠푡] = E푐푡 [푠푡+푛 − 푠푡+푛−1] + ...+ E푐푡 [푠푡+1 − 푠푡] (2.18)
=
1− (휅푐)푛
1− 휅푐 ⋅ 휅
푐 ⋅ (푠푡 − 푠푡−1). (2.19)
For 푛 = 1 this forecasting model collapses to the one used in DeGrauwe and Grimaldi
(2006), Lux and Marchesi (2000), Chiarella and He (2002) and Brock and Hommes
(1997).
Now that we modeled demands for foreign currency and the traders forecasting
models for predicting the future exchange rate we will have a look at the selection
and revision of used trading rules from the set of possibilities. This point will be
tackled in the following subsection.
2.2.4 Evolution of Trading Rules
The agents’ strategy space consists of ﬁve trading rules. The agent can either be a
short-run fundamentalist or a short-run chartist, or the trader can be a long-term
fundamentalist or a long-term chartist. The ﬁfth possibility for the agents is to stay
inactive, that means not to trade. Most studies force agents to trade. Westerhoﬀ
(2003a) suggested to allow agents not to trade in his analysis of the eﬀectiveness of
currency transaction taxes.
As already said, we assume that agents may have multi-period investment horizons.
In the numerical simulation of the model the information concerning the individual
agent’s investment horizon is saved every period in the matrix Φ푡, which has the
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dimension 푀 × 5 and may have for example the following form
Φ푡 =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1 1 100 84 1
1 1 61 31 1
1 1 87 54 1
...
...
...
...
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
. (2.20)
The ﬁrst two columns of this investment-horizon matrix identify the short-run fun-
damentalist trading rule and the short-run chartist trading rule, which have an
investment horizon of one by construction. Columns three and four identify the
long-term fundamentalist trading rules and the long-term chartist trading rule and
the time until their investment matures. Agents are allowed to stay inactive for one
period. This information is given in column ﬁve. Agents 1, ...,푀 are given in rows,
while strategies 1,...,5 are given in columns. Thus, this investment horizon matrix
reads as follows. If agent 1 is a long-run fundamentalists, then the time to maturity
of his investment is is 100 periods in this example. If he is a long-term chartist, then
the time to maturity is 84 periods. This investment-horizon matrix is updated as
follows
Φ푡+1 = Φ푡 −
[
0 0 1 1 0
]
, (2.21)
where 0 is a 푀 × 1 vector of zeros, 1 is a 푀 × 1 vector of ones and 푀 is the number
of agents. Thus, the investment horizon of long-term agents decreases by one period
until maturity is reached. After that it switches back to the maximum investment
horizon of 푁 periods. The starting value for this updating process is generated by
a random draw for the columns three and four in order to avoid artiﬁcial 푁 -period
cycles.
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Agents are only allowed to change their trading rules if maturity is reached. Thus
short-term traders and inactive traders are allowed to switch every period, long-term
traders are only allowed to switch every 푁th period. The information about which
agent is allowed to switch and which agent is not allowed to switch is saved in the
matrix 푺푡, where we set the element 푺푡(푖, 푗) equal to one, when one of agent 푖’s
trading rule 푗 has reached the investment horizon 푛푖 = 1 and zero for 푛푖 > 1
Φ푡(푖, 푗) = 1 =⇒ 푺푡(푖, 푗) = 1 (2.22)
Φ푡(푖, 푗) > 1 =⇒ 푺푡(푖, 푗) = 0 for 푖 = 1, ...,푀, 푗 = 1, ..., 5. (2.23)
Note, that this matrix only contains information about if an agent is allowed to
change a trading rule or not. This matrix contains the information given in this
example that agent one is allowed to change his type, if he is type one, two or three,
but he is not allowed to switch if he is type four. Thus, this matrix does not tell
us, which trading rule the agent is currently using. This information is contained in
the population matrix Γ푡, where Γ푡(푖, 푗) is one if agent 푖 uses the trading rule 푗 and
zero otherwise. Thus, the row sum of this matrix is one, because an agent can only
use one trading rule at the same time. We will explain the updating process of this
matrix in the subsequent paragraph.
We assume that agents switch to the trading rule, which was the most successful in
the past if they are allowed to switch. Therefore agents calculate the proﬁts each
trading rule yielded over the last 푁 periods. The 1×5 vector of past proﬁts is given
by
Π푡 =
[
휋푓,1푡 휋
푐,1
푡 휋
푓,푁
푡 휋
푐,푁
푡 0
]
, (2.24)
where the agents realizes a proﬁt of zero if he or she stays inactive.
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The proﬁt of agent 푖 is measured by the variable 휋푖,푛푡
휋푖,푛푡 =
{
푠푡(푅
∗
푡−푛)
푛(1− 휏)2 − 푠푡−푛(푅푡−푛)푛
} ⋅ 푑푖,푛푡 , (2.25)
for 푖 ∈ {푐, 푓} and 푛 = 1, ..., 푁 . The ﬁrst part of this equation is the investment into
the foreign bond while the second term measures the loan in the domestic country
needed to ﬁnance the investment. In this equation we replaced the forecast E푖푡−푛푠푡
with the realized exchange rate 푠푡. Thus, 휋
푖,푛
푡 measures the proﬁt per unit currency
that results from the exchange rate change and the interest rate diﬀerential times
the amount of currency demanded. This expression is similar to the one used in
Grimaldi (2004) and DeGrauwe and Grimaldi (2006) with the diﬀerence to their
model that we scale the proﬁt per unit currency by the currency demanded by the
agent.
The updating vector Π∗푡 has the entry one at the same place, where Π푡 has its
maximum and zeros at all other entries. Thus, this vector indicates to which trader
type the agent has to switch if he is allowed to switch. The switching of agents
is conducted, by replacing the pertinent row in the population matrix Γ푡 with the
vector Π푡. This operation is conducted if an agent is allowed to switch. Switching
to other trading rules is only possible if agent 푖 uses rule 푗 (Γ푡(푖, 푗) = 1) and if agent
푖 using rule 푗 has reached the investment horizon 푛푖 = 1 (푺푡(푖, 푗) = 1). Hence,
푺푡(푖, 푗) = 1 & Γ푡(푖, 푗) = 1 =⇒ Γ푡+1(푖, 푗)← Π푡(푗) ∀ 푗 = 1, ..., 5. (2.26)
In this case we replace row 푖 of Γ푡 with the vector Π푡. If, the condition
푺푡(푖, 푗) = 0 =⇒ Γ푡+1(푖, 푗)← Γ푡(푖, 푗) (2.27)
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is met, then agent 푖 using rule 푗 is not allowed to update his or her trading strategy
and hence has stick to his or her trading strategy.
All information about the number of agents, who are allowed to trade and the
number of agents being using one special trading rule is contained in these matrices.
Now we ﬁnished modeling the agents’ behavior when trading in the foreign exchange
market. What remains is to model institutional properties of the foreign exchange
market, for example the price setting mechanism.
2.2.5 Institutional Properties and Price Setting
The market maker collects all individual demands in order to determine the market
demand. Individual demands 푑푖,푛푡 can be aggregated to the market demand 퐷푡 by
adding them, while weighting them with the population fractions 푤푖,푛푡 of traders,
who are allowed to trade. These population fractions can be calculated as the row
sum of the population matrix Γ푡 divided by the number of all agents
퐷푡 = 푤
푐,1
푡 푑
푐,1
푡 + 푤
푐,푁
푡 푑
푐,푁
푡 + 푤
푓,1
푡 푑
푓,1
푡 + 푤
푓,푁
푡 푑
푓,푁
푡
− 푤푐,1푡−1휋푐,1푡−1 − 푤푐,푁푡−푁휋푐,푁푡−푁 − 푤푓,1푡−1휋푓,1푡−1 − 푤푓,푁푡−푁휋푓,푁푡−푁 . (2.28)
Agents are allowed to trade at the beginning of their investment and at the end
of their investment. They have to pay back the loan they raised in one country in
order to invest in the other country. This eﬀect is captured by the last term of this
equation.
If market demand is positive, the market maker will rise the price of the exchange
rate, while he will lower it, if market demand is negative. Thus the exchange rate
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changes proportional to the sum of all market orders. This behavior of the market
maker can be approximated by the following price impact function3
푠푡+1 = 푠푡 + 훽푠푡퐷푡, (2.29)
while 훽 measures the market response to the order ﬂow 퐷푡. The exchange rate
return can be calculated as
휌푡+1 =
푠푡+1 − 푠푡
푠푡
= 훽퐷푡. (2.30)
Thus, the model is complete now. Because it cannot be solved analytically, we will
rely on quantitative results derived by numerical simulations. This means that we
analyze the numbers and statistics implied by the model in comparison with numbers
and statistics implied by empirical exchange rate data.
2.3 Fundamental Steady States
In this part we want to describe the non-stochastic steady state. Therefore we
restrict all shocks to be zero and concentrate on the deterministic skeleton of the
model. A steady state is characterized by the absence of stochastic shocks
휀푡 = 휀
∗
푡 = 0 (2.31)
3Kyle (1985) derives this price impact function as the solution of his continuous double auction
model. Lux and Marchesi (2000) and Westerhoﬀ (2003a) also use this pricing rule within an
agent-based-framework.
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and by variables equal to their constant long-run values denotes with a bar
푅푡 = 푅푡−1 = 푅,푅∗푡 = 푅
∗
푡−1 = 푅∗, 푠푡 = 푠푡−1 = 푠. (2.32)
Note, that interest rates are exogenous in this model. The condition of a zero interest
rate diﬀerential 푅 = 푅∗ is necessary in order to have a constant steady-state 푠 = 푠푓 .
Otherwise, investments is the country with the higher interest rate will be attractive
for which reason agents buy or sell foreign currency even in steady-state which leads
to a appreciation or depreciation of the currency in steady-state.
From the agents’ demand schedule (2.11) and the deﬁnition of proﬁts (2.25) follows
under the conditions of the steady state
푑푖,푡 = 푑푖,푡−1 = 0, 휋푖,푡 = 휋푖,푡−1 = 0, (2.33)
while the population fractions are undetermined under the proposed evolutionary
mechanism.
Chartists’ demand will be zero when 푠푡−1 = 푠푡 = 푠. However, fundamentalists’
demand will only be zero when 푠 = 푠푓 . From the market maker’s price impact
function (2.29) follows, that 푠 is a fundamental steady-state then.
Non-fundamental steady-states 푠푡−1 = 푠푡 = 푠 can be possible, when no trader uses
the fundamentalist trading rules. In this case there is no driving force that brings
the exchange rate back to the fundamental equilibrium.
Summing up, the fundamental steady state is characterized by equal rates of return
in both countries and no exchange rate change. Therefore we get zero demands and
zero proﬁts, because the exchange rate equals its no-arbitrage fundamental value.
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2.4 Simulation Results
This section presents the results of the numerical simulation of the model. The
model is evaluated by its performance to match numbers and statistics of real world
exchange rate data, while the policy analysis is done by inferring how numbers and
statistics change due to a change in the policy instrument.
2.4.1 Calibration
As mentioned before, we are neither able to analyze the model’s properties nor to
conduct the economic policy analysis by means of analytical methods. Therefore
we have to rely on quantitative results from numerical simulations of the model.
The model is simulated with the parameters given in table 2.1. We assume two
scenarios. Scenario 1 is characterized by low behavioral parameters and thus traders
will not trade very aggressively. In contrast to this, scenario 2 is characterized by
high behavioral parameters implying that traders will trade more aggressively. The
reason is that under scenario 1 the market is dominated by stabilizing traders, while
there is dominance of destabilizing traders under scenario 2.
In the baseline simulation we set the transaction tax rate to zero in order to have a
benchmark for the policy simulations conducted later. This numerical analysis wants
to infer if a typical simulation run is able to match empirical properties of exchange
rate data. In contrast to this, the policy simulations thereafter are based on on
a larger Monte Carlo study with several simulation runs. This baseline case can
also be inferred from the larger Monte Carlo simulation by looking at the pertinent
column of table 2.4 discussed later on.
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Table 2.1: Parameter Calibration for both Scenarios
(a) Scenario 1
mean reversion parameters standard deviations of shocks
훼1 = 0.95 훼2 = 0.95 휎1 = 0.03 휎2 = 0.03
risk aversion parameters max. horizon simulation length
훿퐶 = 1 훿퐹 = 1 푁 = 30 푇 = 6 000
exchange rate response forecasting parameters
훽 = 0.01 휅퐶 = 0.3 휅퐹 = 0.2
transaction tax number of agents
휏 = 0 300
(b) Scenario 2
mean reversion parameters standard deviations of shocks
훼1 = 0.95 훼2 = 0.95 휎1 = 0.03 휎2 = 0.03
risk aversion parameters max. horizon simulation length
훿퐶 = 1 훿퐹 = 1 푁 = 30 푇 = 6 000
exchange rate response forecasting parameters
훽 = 0.01 휅퐶 = 0.9 휅퐹 = 0.9
transaction tax number of agents
휏 ∈ {0.000, 0.005, 0.010, 0.015, 0.020} 300
Note: These parameters are used for the baseline simulation of the model without transaction
taxes. Scenario 1 is characterized by low behavioral parameters 휅퐶 = 0.3 and 휅퐹 = 0.1, while
scenario 2 is given by high behavioral parameters 휅퐶 = 0.9 and 휅퐶 = 0.9 indicating that agents
trade more aggressively. The reason is that under scenario 1 the market is dominated by stabilizing
traders, while there is dominance of destabilizing traders under scenario 2.
For conducting the numerical simulation we assume the interest rates in both coun-
tries to be quite persistent because empirical exchange rate data are also quite near
a unit-root process. Thus, we assume the two interest rate processes to follow
ln푅푡 = 0.05 ⋅ 1.005 + 0.95 ⋅ ln푅푡−1 + 0.03 ⋅ 휀푡, 휀푡 ∼ 풩 (0, 1). (2.34)
For modeling risk aversion we assume chartist traders and fundamentalist traders to
have the same value for the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion. Under
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scenario 1, we assume chartists to have an extrapolation parameter less than one
E퐶푡 [푠푡+푛 − 푠푡] =
1− (0.3)푛
1− 0.3 ⋅ 0.3(푠푡 − 푠푡−1), (2.35)
such that their forecasting model predicts a return of 0.3 for the next period, if the
current return is one and the two-period return to be 0.09. Under scenario 2 we
assume this parameter to be 0.9 so that chartist traders extrapolate more strongly
and trade more aggressively.
Under scenario 1 we assume that fundamentalist traders expect exchange rate dise-
quilibria to be corrected with 20% per period. Although many studies assume this
parameter to be between zero and 0.1 we made the experience that we get results
which match empirical data better if we use a higher value for this parameter. Thus,
the fundamentalists’ forecasting model becomes
E퐹푡 [푠푡+푛 − 푠푡] =
[
1− (1− 0.2)푛] ⋅ (푠푓푡 − 푠푡). (2.36)
Under scenario 2 we assume this parameter to be 0.9 such that fundamentalist
assume misalignments to be corrected much faster. Therefore, they will trade more
aggressively.
Furthermore, we set the exchange rate response to 훽=0.01
푠푡+1 = 푠푡 + 0.01 ⋅ 푠푡퐷푡. (2.37)
Endowed with this parameter calibration we are able to conduct the numerical sim-
ulations. Although some calibrated parameter values diﬀer from the values used in
similar models we stick to this parameterization. The reason is on the one hand
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that we use another evolutionary mechanism than other studies, on the other hand
we want to analyze two scenarios, one in which the ﬁnancial market is dominated
by stabilizing traders and one in which the market is dominated by destabilizing
traders.
2.4.2 The Baseline Simulation
This part of our research consists of results of the baseline simulation without taxes.
The aim is to provide insights about how good numbers and statistics of a typical
simulation run match numbers and statistics implied by empirical exchange rate
data.
Statistical Properties
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 show the simulation outcome of the baseline model without
taxes under scenario 1, the case where traders are not very aggressive in trading and
scenario 2, the case where traders trade aggressively. Figure 2.1 shows the exchange
rate under scenario 1. The exchange rate shows a random walk like behavior like
empirical ﬁnancial time series. One can clearly see that the time series displays
periods of trends and crashes as we typically ﬁnd in ﬁnancial market time series.
Although the exchange rate looks more or less the same under both scenarios, the
exchange rate returns are characterized by a diﬀerent behavior as can be seen from
ﬁgure 2.3. The model is able to reproduce the stylized facts volatility clustering
and excess kurtosis which can be seen from this ﬁgure. In the model produced time
series periods of high volatility and periods of low volatility tend to cluster together
like in empirical daily return time series. What can be seen is, that extreme returns
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are realized quite frequently and volatility clusters are more realistic under scenario
1.
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Figure 2.2: Exchange Rate and Misalignment: Scenario 1
Note: Model generated time series from the baseline simulation under scenario 1. The used pa-
rameter values are those given in table 2.1. The ﬁrst 1000 data points were removed.
By looking at ﬁgure 2.4 we can analyze this phenomenon in greater detail. The upper
subﬁgures show a quantile-quantile-plot with respect to the normal distribution.
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Here quantiles of the standard normal distribution are plotted against the quantiles
of the empirical return distribution. If the data is normally distributed all points
should lie on the broken line.
From this ﬁgures we can infer deviations from the normal distribution in the positive
and negative extreme parts. In the lower subﬁgures the estimated kernel density of
the returns is plotted together with the density of a normally distributed random
variable with the same mean and variance the input sample has. From this ﬁgure can
be seen that the density of the model generated data has a higher peak and fatter
tails with respect to the normal distribution which means that this distribution is
leptokurtic like empirical exchange rate distributions are. These results are valid
under scenario 1 and 2.
The phenomenon of volatility clustering can be analyzed in more detail from ﬁgure
2.5. This ﬁgure plots the autocorrelation function of returns and squared returns for
80 lags. Here, raw returns display only small serial correlations which indicates that
exchange rate returns are diﬃcult to predict from their past data. This ﬁnding is
more or less in line with the eﬃcient market hypothesis. In contrast to this squared
returns display strong correlations over 80 lags. This indicates that although returns
themselves are uncorrelated they are not independently distributed because squared
returns display high serial dependencies. We can interpret squared returns as a noisy
measure for volatility because
Var[푟푡∣ℐ푡−1] = E[푟2푡 ∣ℐ푡−1] and 푟2푡 = E[푟2푡 ∣ℐ푡−1] + 푣푡 (2.38)
=⇒ 푟2푡 = Var[푟2푡 ∣ℐ푡−1] + 푣푡. (2.39)
Therefore, high serial correlations of squared returns indicates that volatility is se-
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Figure 2.3: Exchange Rate Returns: Scenario 1 and Scenario 2
Note: Model generated time series from the baseline simulation. The used parameter values are
those given in table 2.1. The ﬁgure above is based on scenario 1, while the ﬁgure below is based
on scenario 2. The ﬁrst 1000 data points were removed.
rially correlated and therefore predictable. This strong serial correlation in squared
returns leads to the empirical fact of volatility clustering which the model is able to
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Figure 2.4: Return Distribution: Scenario 1 and Scenario 2
Note: Model generated time series from the baseline simulation under scenario 1. The used param-
eter values are those given in table 2.1. The ﬁgure above is based on scenario 1, while the ﬁgure
below is based on scenario 2. The dark line represents the kernel density of the model generated
exchange rate returns, while the light line is the density of a normally distributed random variable
with the same mean and the same variance. The ﬁrst 1000 data points were removed.
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Figure 2.5: Autocorrelation Functions: Scenario 1 and Scenario 2
Note: Model generated time series from the baseline simulation under scenario 1. The used param-
eter values are those given in table 2.1. The ﬁgure above is based on scenario 1, while the ﬁgure
below is based on scenario 2. The ﬁrst 1000 data points were removed.
explain. Under scenario 1 autocorrelations look more realistic than under scenario 2.
The reason for this is that under scenario 1 returns are uncorrelated while volatility
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is highly correlated like in empirical return time series. Under scenario 2 returns are
characterized by large correlations while squared returns display negative autocor-
relations for lags larger than 40 which is in contrast to empirical autocorrelations.
Again, scenario 1 is more realistic.
Table 2.2: Summary Statistics of a Typical Simulation Run
Scen. 1 Scen. 2 USD-Euro YEN-USD GBP-USD
mean 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
st. deviation 0.001 0.013 0.006 0.007 0.006
skewness -0.603 0.039 0.014 -0.487 -0.135
kurtosis 36.794 5.728 3.619 7.335 6.573
ARCH 0.329 0.335 0.014 0.056 0.065
GARCH 0.670 0.666 0.977 0.942 0.922
Note: Mean, variance, skewness and kurtosis are calculated from the model generated exchange
rate return data by using the parameters of the baseline simulation given in table 2.1. ARCH and
GARCH are the coeﬃcients of an GARCH(1,1) model ﬁtted to the model generated return data.
The exchange rate data used in columns 3,4 and 5 are taken from the FRED2 database of the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis in daily frequency from 04-01-1999 to 05-31-2005. The data is
available under the series-ID: DEXUSEU, DEXJPUS, and DEXUSUK.
A quantitative model is a good description of reality if the numbers and statistics
produced by a typical numerical simulation run are able to match numbers and
statistics from empirical data. Table 2.3 contains summary statistics of the baseline
simulation under scenario 1 and scenario 2 in comparison with summary statistics of
empirical exchange rate return data. What can be seen is that the mean of simulated
returns and empirical returns is always zero, while the model is calibrated in that
way that the variance of the model is similar to the variance of empirical returns.
The kurtosis of empirical data and of the baseline simulation is always greater than
3, which indicates that this kurtosis is larger than that of a normally distributed
random variable. This fact also could be seen from the quantile-quantile-plot and the
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kernel density graphs discussed before. Moreover, we ﬁtted a GARCH(1,1) model
to the baseline simulation data and the empirical data. The GARCH-model due to
Bollerslev (1986) assumes the data to be conditional normally distributed
푟푡∣ℐ푡−1 ∼ 풩 (0, 휎2푡 ), with ℐ푡−1 = {푟푡−1, 푟푡−2, ...}, (2.40)
while the variance is assumed to follow an autoregressive process
휎2푡 = 휔 + 푎푟
2
푡−1 + 푏휎
2
푡−1. (2.41)
New information about volatility can enter the model through squared returns, while
the last term measures the persistence of volatility. Empirical studies usually ﬁnd
푎 to be less than 0.1 and 푏 approximately 0.9, with 푎 + 푏 close to one. This is an
indication of the strong persistence in volatility. From table 2.3 one can infer, that
this fact can also be found in estimates for the three exchange rate return time series
as well as for the model generated return time series. Thus, our model is also able
to display high persistence of volatility. Summing up, summary statistics of both
scenarios are in line with empirical ﬁndings.
Fundamental Traders and Technical Traders
Figure 2.7 plots the evolution of the population fractions of traders using either the
technical trading rule or the fundamental trading rule. This simulation is again
based on scenario 1, the case in which traders do not trade very aggressively. What
can clearly be seen from this ﬁgure is that for this calibration of the model majorities
for the fundamentalist trading rule emerge because the members of the pertinent
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Figure 2.6: Fraction of Fundamentalist and Technical Traders: Scenario 1 and Sce-
nario 2
Note: Model generated time series from the baseline simulation under scenario 1. The used param-
eter values are those given in table 2.1. The ﬁgure above is based on scenario 1, while the ﬁgure
below is based on scenario 2. The ﬁrst 1000 data points were removed. Short term and long term
traders were aggregated to the two groups of fundamentalist and technical traders.
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group approach 100%. What can be learned is that if traders do not trade very
aggressively the market is dominated by fundamentalists most of the time. Thus,
taxation does not help to reduce volatility because the market is already dominated
by stabilizing traders. Therefore, we conduct our economic policy analysis under
scenario 2, the case where the fraction of destabilizing trend chasers is larger as can
be seen from the ﬁgure.
Short-term Speculators and Long-term Investors
Figure 2.8 plots the time variation of population fractions of traders having either
short-term investment horizons or long-term investment horizons. This outcome is
again based on scenario 1. What can be seen is, that the population fractions are
ﬂuctuating but displaying a dominance of long-term traders. Again, under scenario
1 taxation will not yield any reductions in volatility because as can be seen the
market is already dominated by long-term traders, while short-term speculators are
the minority. Therefore, we use scenario 2 for the policy simulations performed later
because we have a larger fraction of destabilizing short-term speculators here.
All in all, this section showed, that our model is able to reproduce deviations of the
exchange rate from the fundamental value, random walk or martingale behavior of
the exchange rate, volatility clustering and fat tails in the distribution. Moreover,
we learn about traders behavior that if they do not trade very aggressively the
ﬁnancial market is characterized by a high dominance of long-term traders and a high
dominance of traders using the fundamental-based trading rule. Thus, there is no
need for a currency transaction tax under this scenario. For performing the economic
policy analysis we use a scenario with a larger fraction of short-term traders and
CHAPTER 2. WHO DOES A CURRENCY TRANSACTION TAX HARM MORE:
SHORT-TERM SPECULATORS OR LONG-TERM INVESTORS? 47
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
Short−run Traders
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Long−run Traders
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Short−run Traders
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Long−run Traders
Figure 2.7: Fraction of Short-term and Long-term Traders: Scenario 1 and Scenario
2
Note: Model generated time series from the baseline simulation under scenario 1. The used pa-
rameter values are those given in table 2.1. The ﬁgure above is based on scenario 1, while the
ﬁgure below is based on scenario 2. The ﬁrst 1000 data points were removed. Fundamentalist and
chartist traders were aggregated to the two groups short-term traders and long-term traders.
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chartist traders. This is the case if we allow agents to trade more aggressively. By
varying the transaction tax rate we are able to analyze the eﬀects of this economic
policy instrument on ﬁnancial risks and the composition of trading rules. This
analysis will be performed in the next section.
2.4.3 Sensitivity to Transaction Tax Rate Changes
This section presents the economic policy analysis of the model by means of numer-
ical methods. The analysis of properties of a typical simulation run as conducted
in the former section will not give us enough information about the overall eﬀects
of transaction tax changes. Therefore we use a richer Monte Carlo method for the
analysis of the eﬀects of currency transaction taxes. In detail we perform several
simulation runs and take averages and standard deviations over these simulation
runs for the statistics and numbers of interest. This method will provide more in-
formation about how tax rate changes aﬀect properties of the exchange rates in a
stochastic environment. For performing the policy simulation we choose scenario 2,
the case with higher values for the chartists’ extrapolation parameter and the funda-
mentalists’ error-correction parameter. The reason is that this calibration provides
us with higher values for the population fractions of destabilizing traders.
Statistical Properties
Table 2.4 shows summary statistics of the model generated exchange rate returns
for diﬀerent values of the transaction tax rate ranging from 0% which represents the
baseline case to 2% which is the highest taxation of our study. These values are
averages over 100 simulation runs of sample size 1000 while the standard deviation
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of these numbers are given in parenthesis. The calibration is the one of scenario 2,
the case where agents trade more aggressively and thus, the fraction of destabilizing
traders is larger.
Table 2.3: Variation of the Transaction Tax: Scenario 2
휏 0.0% 0.5% 1.0% 1.5% 2.0%
mean 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SE (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
variance 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.005
SE (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
skewness 0.064 0.079 0.070 0.061 0.069
SE (0.113) (0.148) (0.253) (0.419) (0.299)
kurtosis 4.291 5.216 6.751 8.619 10.211
SE (0.744) (1.219) (1.591) (2.319) (2.660)
minimum -0.027 -0.026 -0.028 -0.028 -0.026
SE (0.014) (0.017) (0.017) (0.015) (0.016)
maximum 0.028 0.027 0.028 0.028 0.026
SE (0.012) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015)
misalignment 0.411 0.349 0.431 0.452 0.442
SE (0.137) (0.163) (0.168) (0.168) (0.184)
Note: The statistics and numbers reported are averages of 100 simulation runs of size 1000. Stan-
dard errors of the Monte Carlo simulation are reported in parenthesis. All columns are based on
the same seed of random variables. A currency transaction tax rate 휏 = 0% deﬁnes the baseline
case. The simulation outcome is based on the parameterization of scenario 2 given in table 2.1.
From this table one can infer that the mean exchange rate return does not change due
to changes in the transaction tax rate. This result implies that taxation of currency
transactions does not change the long run exchange rate returns of holding foreign
currency. Moreover one can see that positive transaction tax rates are able to reduce
the variance of exchange rate returns from 0.7% for the case of the baseline simulation
to 0.5% for a tax rate of 2% levied on international currency transactions. Although
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decreasing volatility the tax rises the kurtosis of the distribution from 4.3 for the
baseline case to 10.2 for the case of a tax rate of 2%. Thus, positive transaction
tax rates increase the probability of extreme positive and negative returns which
leads to a higher risk of extreme events. This ﬁnding limits the success of taxes to
reduce risks in foreign exchange markets. Moreover, one can see that the tax does
not change the skewness of the distribution signiﬁcantly as well as the minimum
and the maximum return. The misalignment measured as the deviation from the
uncovered interest rate parity condition is decreasing from 0.411 to 0.349 and then
monotonically increasing. This u-shaped response of the misalignment to increasing
tax rates can also be found in Westerhoﬀ (2003). In his study, distortions are
decreasing since the number of fundamentalist traders is higher compared to the
number of chartist traders under small tax rates, while the number of chartist traders
is higher under higher tax rates. Misalignments decrease when fundamentalism is
more often used, while misalignments decrease, when chartism gains attractiveness.
We will provide a similar behavioral interpretation for this ﬁnding in the following
lines. What is surprising in our analysis, is that the misalignment decreases for
a tax increase from 1.5 percent to 2 percent. Summing up, although the currency
transaction tax reduces exchange rate volatility its success in reducing risks is limited
because it rises the probability for extreme positive and negative returns.
Fundamental Traders and Technical Traders
From table 2.5 one can infer how positive transaction tax rates inﬂuence traders
behavior under scenario 2. The numbers belonging to this table are also averages
over 100 simulation runs of size 1000 and are based on the same seed of random
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numbers like the statistics in table 2.3. From this table one can infer that the
number of traders using the fundamental trading rules is increasing from 78.3% to
78.6% for a tax increase from 0.0% to 0.5%. For tax rates above 0.5% the number
of fundamentalists decreases. The chartist decrease from 21.7% to 21.2% and then
increase for higher tax rates. Hence, we get a similar picture as can be found in
Westerhoﬀ (2003). Small taxes favor fundamentalist trading rules, while higher tax
rates favor chartist trading rules. From these changes in trading behavior we can
derive a similar explanation for the u-shaped response of misalignments to taxation.
Misalignments decrease for small tax rates, since the tax harms destabilizing chartist
rules more compared to stabilizing fundamentalist rules. However, misalignments
increase for higher tax rates, since higher tax rates favor destabilizing chartist trading
rules and harm stabilizing fundamentslist rules.
Table 2.4: Average Percentages of Used Trading Rules: Scenario 2
휏 0.0% 0.5% 1.0% 1.5% 2.0%
fundamental 0.783 0.786 0.731 0.689 0.675
SE (0.087) (0.093) (0.070) (0.045) (0.046)
technical 0.217 0.212 0.266 0.306 0.320
SE (0.087) (0.093) (0.071) (0.046) (0.047)
inactive 0.000 0.002 0.003 0.005 0.005
SE (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
short-term 0.756 0.633 0.495 0.399 0.331
SE (0.090) (0.116) (0.069) (0.087) (0.069)
long-term 0.244 0.356 0.502 0.597 0.664
SE (0.090) (0.116) (0.090) (0.086) (0.069)
Note: Average percentage fractions of used trading rules for diﬀerent transaction tax rates 휏 . The
statistics reported are averages of 100 simulation runs of size 1000. The results of each column are
based on the same seed of random variables. Standard errors of the Monte Carlo simulations are
reported in parenthesis. The used parameter values are those given in table 2.1 under scenario 2.
휏=0% represents the baseline case.
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Short-term Speculators and Long-term Investors
From table 2.5 one can also infer that the number of short term traders is decreasing
from 75.6% in the baseline simulation to 33.1% under a tax rate of 2% while the
number of long term traders is increasing from 24.4% to 66.4%. This is in line with
the conventional view that a transaction tax makes short-term trading more costly
and therefore prevents speculative attacks in favor of long-term investments.
Summing up, we come to the conclusion that levying a tax on foreign exchange
market transactions within this model framework will result in a decline of short-
term speculators in favor of long-term investors while it will also lead to an increase
in chartist trading rules and to a decrease in fundamental based trading. Moreover
we come to the conclusion that a currency transaction tax is able to reduce the
variance of exchange rate returns while it will increase their kurtosis. Therefore the
overall success of this policy instrument in reducing foreign exchange market risks
is not for sure. Therefore policy makers should wait for new research results about
the eﬀectiveness of this tax before introducing it.
2.5 Conclusion
In paper we want to analyze the eﬀectiveness of a currency transaction tax, especially
the following proposition is often heard from proponents of the Tobin tax:
Currency transaction taxes crowd out short term speculators in favor of long term
investors.
In order to analyze this proposition we have to consider the following requirements
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and assumptions:
(i) we need a model framework in which we are able to distinguish between short
term speculators and long term investors,
(ii) the number of short term traders and long term traders should not be ﬁxed but
traders should change groups or leave the market
(iii) the model should be able to match stylized facts of empirical ﬁnancial market
data for performing a policy analysis which is close to reality.
For fulﬁlling requirements (푖), (푖푖) and (푖푖푖) the most appealing framework is an
agent-based model of the ﬁnancial market. This model class allows us to distinguish
between diﬀerent types of agents. Moreover this framework allows agents to change
their type. Furthermore the overall success of this model class to match stylized
facts of ﬁnancial market data encourages to elaborate on them. Usually agent-based
models of the ﬁnancial market assume two types of agents: chartist traders and
fundamentalist traders. In our model we allowed these two groups of traders to be
either a short-term speculator or a long term investor. Moreover, agents are allowed
not to enter the market as proposed by Westerhoﬀ (2003a).
In contrast to other agent-based ﬁnancial market models we do not use any abstract
fundamental value but use the interest rate diﬀerential between the home and the
domestic country to be our fundamental value. Stochastic interest rates in both
countries lead to temporal arbitrage opportunities and therefore to demand for for-
eign currency. A market maker aggregates the agents’ individual market orders and
rises the exchange rate due to positive excess demand and lowers it due to negative
excess demand. Moreover, a policy maker levies a tax on international currency
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transactions.
Simulations of the baseline model without transaction taxes produce time series
which match time series properties of empirical exchange rate data. This makes
the model usable for an economic policy analysis which is closer to reality. Under
this scenario agents are assumed not to trade to aggressively. Therefore, we chose
small numbers for their behavioral parameters. Simulations show that taxation will
not reduce volatility under this scenario because the market is already populated
by stabilizing fundamentalist traders and long-term investors. Therefore, we chose
a scenario with higher values for the behavioral parameters for the economic policy
analysis. The reason is that under this scenario the fractions of chartists and short
term traders are higher.
This economic policy analysis of our model shows that positive transaction taxes are
capable of reducing volatility. The disadvantage of this policy instrument is, that the
probability of extreme positive or negative exchange rate returns is increased. That
means higher transaction tax rate increases the kurtosis of the return distribution
which increases the frequency of sharp trends and crashes in the exchange rate
and thusly leads to additional risks. The tax alters traders behavior by reducing
short-term speculation in favor of long-term investments, which is in line with the
arguments of the proponents of the Tobin tax and our proposition. In contrast to
their view, in our model the tax favors trend extrapolating trading rules an punished
trading rules based on economic fundamentals. Because trend extrapolating trading
rules are a source of destabilization of the exchange rate, this can be the reason why
the transaction tax increases the kurtosis of the return distribution. All in all, this
model showed that currency transaction taxes have advantages and disadvantages.
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A policy maker should consider this when taking into account to introduce a tax of
this type.
Summing up, further research should look for analytical solutions to a simpliﬁed
version of this model and for extensions by the incorporation of other long-term
investment strategies into the model in order to get more information about the
eﬀectiveness of transaction taxes on traders’ behavior and the reduction of risks in
ﬁnancial markets. As a policy advice can be given that policy makers should wait
for additional research results before introducing a currency transaction tax because
its overall success is not for sure.
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3 Transaction Taxes and Traders
with Heterogeneous Investment
Horizons in an Agent-Based
Financial Market Model
Chapter originally published as
Demary, Markus (2010), ”Transaction Taxes and Traders with Heterogeneous In-
vestment Horizons in an Agent-Based Financial Market Model”, Economics: The
Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal, Vol. 4, 2010-8.
Abstract. This agent-based ﬁnancial market model is a generalization of the model
of Westerhoﬀ (2008a) by traders who are allowed to have diﬀerent investment hori-
zons as introduced by Demary (2008). Our research goals are, ﬁrst, to study what
consequences the introduction of heterogeneous investment horizons has for agent-
based ﬁnancial market models, and second, how eﬀective transaction taxes are in
stabilizing ﬁnancial markets. Numerical simulations reveal that under suﬃciently
small tax rates traders abstain from short-term trading in favour of longer invest-
ment horizons. This change in behavior leads to less volatility and less mispricings.
When the tax rate exceeds a certain threshold, however, mispricings increase as
also found in Westerhoﬀ (2003a, 2008a). This emergent property is due to the fact
that taxation reduces short-term ﬂuctuations and causes longer lasting trends in the
exchange rate. As a result, the longer term fundamentalist trading rules becomes
unpopular in favor of the longer term trend-chasing rule.
Key Words: Agent-Based Models, Financial Market Stability, Regulation of Fi-
nancial Markets, Technical and Fundamental Analysis, Transaction Taxes
JEL Classiﬁcation: C15, D84, G01, G15, G18
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3.1 Introduction
Asset prices are excessively volatile and risky (LeRoy and Porter 1981, Shiller 1981)
due to speculative bubbles and crashes. Because large asset price crashes lead to se-
vere recessions, research on the occurance of asset price bubbles and their avoidance
through ﬁnancial market regulations is a highly relevant topic for economic sci-
entists, economists in ﬁrms and institutions as well as for economic policy makers.
Because empirical case studies of ﬁnancial market regulations lack of suﬃciently rich
datasets, agent-based ﬁnancial market simulations are promising tools for analysing
the eﬀectiveness of policy measures.1
Famous proposals of ﬁnancial market regulations go back to Keynes (1936) and To-
bin (1978) who proposed to introduce taxes on ﬁnancial markets in order to reduce
speculative trading. Both assume that short term traders have a destabilizing im-
pact on prices, while long term traders’ trading behavior is stabilizing. Both suggest
that the introduction of a transaction tax will harm short-term speculators more
compared to longer term investors. The rationale behind this proposal is that a
round trip of borrowing money in one country, investing it in another country and
consuming the proﬁt in the home country will lead to higher transaction costs the
more frequent transactions takes place. Some empirical papers, however, ﬁnd that
the introduction of transaction taxes may be destabilizing.2 Westerhoﬀ (2008a)
notes that these empirical studies are not without problems. Umlauf (1993), for
example, analyzes Sweden’s introduction of a 2 percent securities transaction tax,
1See Westerhoﬀ (2008a) for an survey of the advantages of agent-based ﬁnancial market models
and applications of ﬁnancial market regulations like transaction taxes, trading halts and central
bank interventions.
2See for example Umlauf (1993), Jones and Seguin (1997), Aliber (2003), Hau (2006).
CHAPTER 3. TRANSACTION TAXES AND TRADERS WITH HETEROGENEOUS
INVESTMENT HORIZONS IN AN AGENT-BASED FINANCIAL MARKET MODEL 63
which is following Westerhoﬀ (2008a) a quite high tax rate. Sweden abolished the
ﬁnancial market tax because it did not lead to the expected success. Insights to the
failure of this real world policy experiment can be given by referring to the hetero-
geneous agents model proposed by Westerhoﬀ (2003a). This model predicts that
small transaction taxes are stabilizing, while higher transaction taxes are destabiliz-
ing. The reason is that diﬀerent tax rates have a diﬀerent impact on the composition
of stabilizing and destabilizing trading rules. A small tax rate makes destabilizing
trading rules unproﬁtable, while a higher tax rate also makes stabilizing trading
rules unproﬁtable.
Inspired by this result, Westerhoﬀ (2008a) suggests to analyze the eﬀectiveness of
small transaction taxes on ﬁnancial markets by means of agent-based ﬁnancial mar-
ket models. Lux (2009b) highlights that agent-based models are preferable tools for
doing policy experiments which are close to reality. Westerhoﬀ (2008a) surveys the
following advantages of agent-based policy analysis: (i) The researcher is able to
generate a huge amount of data, (ii) is able to measure all variables precisely, (iii) is
able to control for exogenous shocks and special events and simulate them by vary-
ing a policy parameter under otherwise same conditions. In this way the researcher
is able to analyze how a certain policy performs under these special events. (iv)
Finally, the researcher is able to measure the behavior of artiﬁcial agents during the
simulations.
Up to now, there is a growing body of articles which employ agent-based models
for the analysis of the eﬀectiveness of currency transaction taxes.3 We already
3Other policy applications of agent-based models are Westerhoﬀ (2001), Wieland and Westerhoﬀ
(2005), Westerhoﬀ and Wieland (2004), Westerhoﬀ (2008a) who analyze the eﬀectiveness of
central bank interventions. Westerhoﬀ (2003b), Westerhoﬀ (2006) and Westerhoﬀ (2008a)
analyze the eﬀectiveness of trading halts for stabilizing ﬁnancial markets. Weidlich and Veit
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referred to Westerhoﬀ (2003a) who ﬁnds that small currency transaction taxes lower
exchange rate volatility, while higher tax rates lead to an increase in volatility.
Westerhoﬀ and Dieci (2006) propose an agent-based model in which traders are
allowed to trade in two diﬀerent ﬁnancial markets. The model predicts that when
a policy maker levies a transaction tax only onto one market, the volatility in this
market will decline, while the volatility in the second market will increase. The
reason is that trend-chasing trading rules are more proﬁtable in the untaxed market.
The second result of their article is, that levying the tax on both markets, will
lead to a decline in the volatilty in both markets. Demary (2008) introduces an
artiﬁcial foreign exchange market with chartists and fundamentalists who are allowed
to choose between being a day trader and being a longer term trader. Levying a
transaction tax onto this artiﬁcial foreign exchange market leads to an increase
in the kurtosis of the return distribution, which means a higher probability of large
positive and negative returns. This increased probability of extreme returns emerges
from the changed composition of short-term and longer term traders. Under taxation
short-term trading becomes unproﬁtable relative to longer term trading. Short-term
traders who normally trade small orders every day now decide to trade larger orders
every 30 days. This increase in larger orders leads to an increase in the kurtosis
of the return distribution. Pelizzari and Westerhoﬀ (2007) show that transaction
taxes are only eﬀective under certain market structures, while they will not work
under some other market structures. Summing up, all these studies reveal important
insights for economic policy makers into the eﬀects of currency transaction taxes on
ﬁnancial markets.
(2008) introduce an agent-based model for analyzing electricity market regulation, while Haber
(2008) uses an agent-based model for monetary and ﬁscal policy analysis.
CHAPTER 3. TRANSACTION TAXES AND TRADERS WITH HETEROGENEOUS
INVESTMENT HORIZONS IN AN AGENT-BASED FINANCIAL MARKET MODEL 65
In this paper we expand the artiﬁcal ﬁnancial market of Westerhoﬀ (2008a) by the
trader types with diﬀerent investment horizons of Demary (2008).4 Our ﬁrst objec-
tive is to study the implications of longer term investment horizons for exchange rate
dynamics in agent-based models, the second one is to use this artiﬁcial laboratory
for analyzing the eﬀectiveness of currency transaction taxes. The analysis of these
two objectives can be combined to analyzing the joint hypothesis that transaction
taxes stabilize ﬁnancial markets by crowding out short-term speculators in favor of
longer term investors. In line with the literature we are interested in how this reg-
ulatory policy changes emergent properties that arise from the changed interaction
of traders, like bubbles and crashes, excess volatility, volatility clustering and the
fat-tailness of the return distribution.
Within our model the following results emerge. Numerical simulations of our artiﬁ-
cial ﬁnancial market reveal that emergent properties and stylized facts still remain
when longer term traders are introduced. The economic policy analysis reveals that
small transaction taxes make short-term trading unproﬁtable. Therefore, the num-
ber of short-term fundamentalists and short-term chartists decreases to zero. More-
over, volatility and distortions decrease under small transaction taxes. The reason
for this result lies in the fact that under small transaction taxes the market is popu-
lated by a larger fraction of longer term fundamentalist traders in relation to longer
term chartist traders. However, when tax rates are too high, misalignments increase
as also found in Westerhoﬀ (2003a, 2008a). The reason for this 푢-shaped response
of misalignments to increasing tax rates is caused by the changed composition of
trading rules. When tax rates are too high the longer term fundamentalist trading
4Note, that under the restriction that all traders have a short-term investment horizon, our model
collapses to Westerhoﬀ’s model.
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rule becomes unpopular, while the number of traders, who favor the longer term
chartist trading rule increases. The reason lies in the fact that short-term traders
abstain from trading under transaction taxes. The diminishing short-term ﬂuctua-
tions lead to longer swings in the exchange rate, which makes longer term chartist
trading rules more proﬁtable. In contrast to Keynes (1936) and Tobin (1978) taxing
ﬁnancial markets is not per se stabilizing by making short-term trading unproﬁtable
in favor of longer term trading. Our model shows that the result depends of the
composition of the trading rules used in the ﬁnancial market and depends on tax
rate.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the
artiﬁcal foreign exchange market, while section three will present an analysis of the
model’s steady state. Section four tackles the validation of this model, while section
ﬁve discusses the simulation results. Section six ends this paper with conclusions
and outlook.
3.2 Transaction Taxes in an Agent-Based Financial
Market Model
In this section we introduce the agent-based ﬁnancial market which is a general-
ization of the model proposed by Westerhoﬀ (2008a), which can represent either
a foreign exchange market, a stock market or a commodity market (Westerhoﬀ
2008a). We interpret it as a foreign exchange market and calibrate it to exchange
rate data, here. Following Demary (2008) we introduce longer term traders into this
model. If all traders have a daily investment horizon, then our model collapses to
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Westerhoﬀ’s. Inﬂuential contributions to agent-based ﬁnancial market models5 are
surveyed in Westerhoﬀ (2008b), Hommes (2006), LeBaron (2006) and Lux (2009a,
2009b). All models have in common that agents choose from a ﬁnite set of behavioral
rules. Commonly, these are a fundamental trading rule, which reacts to deviations
of the asset price from its fundamental value, and a chartist trading rule, which
reacts on trends in the asset price. The former one has a centripetal eﬀect on the
asset price dynamics, while the later one has a centrifugal eﬀect (Lux 2009a). These
heterogenous agents are either assumed to consist of a ﬁnite population (Kirman
1991) or of a continuum of agents (Brock and Hommes 1998). Moreover, models
may diﬀer in the assumed process for the evolution of heterogeneous trading rules.
While in Brock and Hommes (1998) and DeGrauwe and Grimaldi (2006) the popu-
larity of trading rules is governed by the past success of these rules, in Kirman (1991)
and Lux and Marchesi (1999, 2000) the evolution of trading rules is governed by so-
cial interactions. LeBaron (1999) uses genetic algorithms as evolutionary processes.
Macroscopic properties of asset prices like bubbles and crashes, excess volatility,
excess kurtosis of the return distribution and volatility clustering emerge from the
interaction of agents. Note that these properties cannot simply be deduced by ag-
gregating agents (Westerhoﬀ 2008a) but emerge independently of the microscopic
properties (Lux 2009a). An example for an emergent property is the occurance and
burst of a speculative bubble. When the majority of agents relies on chartist rules
a speculative bubble can emerge, when this bubble makes fundamental rules more
popular and agents switch to this trading strategy, this change in behavior results
in a crash back to the fundamental value. Summing up, these models are quite
5Important and inﬂuential contributions are Day and Huang (1990), Kirman (1991), Chiarella
(1992), Chiarella and He (2002), DeGrauwe and Grimaldi (2006), Lux (1995), Lux and Marchesi
(1999, 2000), Brock and Hommes (1998), LeBaron (1999) and Farmer and Joshi (2002).
CHAPTER 3. TRANSACTION TAXES AND TRADERS WITH HETEROGENEOUS
INVESTMENT HORIZONS IN AN AGENT-BASED FINANCIAL MARKET MODEL 68
successful in replicating stylized facts of daily ﬁnancial market data (Lux 2009a).
Similar to Demary (2008) we want to analyze in detail the following proposition -
which is often heard from the proponents of transaction taxes and the public media
especially in times of ﬁnancial instability - within our artiﬁcial ﬁnancial market:
transaction taxes stabilize asset prices by crowding out short-term speculators in
favor of longer term investors. In order to analyze this proposition we have to
consider the following requirements and assumptions:
(i) we need a model in which we are able to distinguish between short-term traders
and longer term investors,
(ii) the number of short-term traders and longer term traders should not be ﬁxed
but traders should be allowed to change groups or leave the market, and
(iii) the model should be able to match empirical properties of ﬁnancial market data
in order to perform policy experiments which are close to reality.
For fulﬁlling requirements (푖), (푖푖) and (푖푖푖) the most appealing framework is an
agent-based model of a ﬁnancial market. This artiﬁcial foreign exchange market
should consist of the following building blocks
(i) a fundamental exchange rate 푠푓푡 , which is purely determined by exogenous fac-
tors (e.g. monetary aggregates, current accounts, business cycle conditions,
...)
(ii) traders who choose from a ﬁnite set of possible trading rules: a short-term
fundamentalist rule, a short-term chartist rule, a longer term fundamentalist
rule, a longer term chartist rule, or being inactive,
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(iii) an evolutionary mechanism for determining the popularity of a certain trading
rule according its past performance,
(iv) a market maker who adjusts the exchange rate in response to excess demand,
(v) a policy maker who determines the value of the currency transaction tax rate.
We will elaborate this building blocks in more detail.
3.2.1 Traders’ Demand for Foreign Currency
Westerhoﬀ (2008a) models the agents’ demand in line with the literature on het-
erogeneous agents models of ﬁnancial markets (Brock and Hommes 1998, Day and
Huang 1990, Lux 1995, Lux and Marchesi 2000, DeGrauwe and Grimaldi 2006),
but adds random disturbances to the agents’ demands in order to account for the
empirical variety of trading rules. Orders are assumed to be proportional to the
expected exchange rate change
푑푖,푡 = 훽퐸푖,푡[푠푡+1 − 푠푡], (3.1)
with 푖 ∈ {푆퐶, 푆퐹, 퐿퐶,퐿퐹} and 훽 as the price impact factor. Short-term chartists’
(SC) expectations are given by
퐸푡,푆퐶 [푠푡+1 − 푠푡] = 휅퐶(푠푡 − 푠푡−1) + 휀퐶푡 ,where 휀퐶푡 ∼ 풩 (0, 휎2퐶), (3.2)
while short-term fundamentalists’ (SF) expectations are given by
퐸푡,푆퐹 [푠푡+1 − 푠푡] = 휅퐹 (푠푓푡 − 푠푡) + 휀퐹푡 ,where 휀퐹푡 ∼ 풩 (0, 휎2퐹 ). (3.3)
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Chartists trade foreign currency because they expect the recent trend (푠푡 − 푠푡−1)
to sustain in the next period. The parameter 휅퐶 governs the strength of the trend
extrapolation. Note, that 푠푡 is the exchange rate in logarithmic notation, thus, 푠푡−
푠푡−1 is the percentage change in the exchange rate. Chartists expect to make proﬁts
by buying (selling) the exchange rate at 푠푡 and selling (buying) it at the expected
higher (lower) value 푠푡+1. Following Westerhoﬀ (2008a), the random disturbance 휀
퐶
푡
accounts for the variety of possible chartist trading rules. Fundamentalists buy (sell)
foreign currency when the current exchange rate 푠푡 is below (above) the fundamental
one 푠푓푡 . The reason is that this group expects the exchange rate to return to its
fundamental value in the future, where 휅퐹 is the assumed rate of misalignment-
correction. Thus, fundamentalist traders expect proﬁts by buying (selling) foreign
currency at the exchange rate 푠푡 and selling (buying) it at the higher (lower) one 푠푡+1,
which they assume to be close to the fundamental value 푠푓푡 . The fundamental value
is assumed to be purely exogenous. Westerhoﬀ (2008a) adds the random disturbance
휀퐹푡 to this equation, which should represent a perception error or a deviation from
the strict deterministic trading rule.
In addition to these two trading rules we assume, following Demary (2008), two
longer-term trading rules for chartists and fundamentalists. The rationale behind
this assumption is that traders assume a longer lasting trend in the exchange rate6
or they expect a longer convergence period to the fundamental value. Longer-term
chartists (LC) expectations are given by
퐸푡,퐿퐶 [푠푡+푁 − 푠푡] =
[1− (휅퐶)푁
1− 휅퐶 휅퐶
]
(푠푡 − 푠푡−1). (3.4)
6See Engel and Hamilton (2000) for an empirical analysis of long swings in exchange rates.
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More precise, it is the chartists’ forecast corresponding to an investment horizon of
푁 days. For 푁 = 1 this forecasting rule collapses to the conventional one period
chartist rule. This trading rule can be derived as follows. When a longer term
chartist trader observes the current trend segment 푠푡 − 푠푡−1 he or she will expect a
trend of 휅퐶(푠푡 − 푠푡−1) for the next period. For calculating the following exchange
rate change, the trader uses this forecast and calculates (휅퐶)
2(푠푡 − 푠푡−1) for the
following period. Thus, the expected exchange rate change 푠푡+푁 − 푠푡 conditional on
the chartists’ rule the sum over all one period forecasts. By applying the rule for
the ﬁnite geometric series equation (3.4) can be derived. Following Demary (2008)
the longer-term fundamentalists’ (LF) expectations are given by
퐸푡,퐿퐹 [푠푡+푁 − 푠푡] =
[
1− (1− 휅퐹 )푁
]
(푠푓푡 − 푠푡). (3.5)
This trading rule can be derived by the following consideration. When fundamen-
talist traders observes the misalignment 푠푓푡 − 푠푡 he or she expects 휅퐹 ⋅100% of this
misaligment to be corrected by the next exchange rate change. Thus, he or she
expects (1−휅퐹 )⋅100% of the misalignment to prevail, of which 휅퐹 (1−휅퐹 )⋅100% will
be corrected by the subsequent exchange rate change an so on. Thus, the expected
exchange rate change 푠푡+푁 − 푠푡 conditional on the fundamentalist forecasting rule is
the sum over all one period forecasts. Again, by applying the formula for the ﬁnite
geometric series equation (3.5) can be derived. Note, that for 푁 = 1 this rule col-
lapses to the conventional one period fundamentalist rule. Furthermore, note that
we do not add random disturbances to the longer term trading rules. The reason is
that we assume longer term trading rules to be more robust compared to one period
rules.
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3.2.2 Price Adjustment
Westerhoﬀ (2008a) assumes following Farmer and Joshi (2002) a price impact func-
tion which can be interpreted as a stylized description of a risk-neutral market
maker. Following Westerhoﬀ (2008a), this market maker mediates transactions out
of equilibrium and adjusts prices in response to excess demand. More precisely, the
market maker will rise the exchange rate when excess demand for foreign currency
is positive, while he will lower the exchange rate in response to negative market
demand 퐷푡
푠푡+1 = 푠푡 +퐷푡 + 휀푡,where 휀푡 ∼ 풩 (0, 휎2푠). (3.6)
Market demand 퐷푡 is deﬁned as the sum of orders of fundamentalist traders and
chartist traders weighted by their pertinent population weights 푤푆퐶푡 , 푤
푆퐹
푡 , 푤
퐿퐶
푡 and
푤퐿퐹푡
퐷푡 = 푤
푆퐶
푡 푑
푆퐶
푡 + 푤
푆퐹
푡 푑
푆퐹
푡 + 푤
퐿퐶
푡 푑
퐿퐶
푡 + 푤
퐿퐹
푡 푑
퐿퐹
푡 . (3.7)
Westerhoﬀ (2008a) adds the random disturbance 휀푡 to the market maker’s price
adjustment rule, because it only represents a simple representation of real markets.
It can be interpreted as a non-fundamental innovation. From equations (3.6) and
(3.7) can be inferred that the orders of the four trader groups as well as their
population fractions determine exchange rate dynamics in a nonlinear way.
3.2.3 Evolution of Trading Rules
In the model of Westerhoﬀ (2008a) traders have three alternatives. They can either
be a fundamentalist trader or a chartist trader. The third possibility for traders is to
stay inactive. In our version of this model traders have two additional alternatives.
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They can either be a longer term chartist or a longer term fundamentalist. Following
Brock and Hommes (1998), DeGrauwe and Grimaldi (2006) and Westerhoﬀ (2008a)
the selection of one of these ﬁve alternatives depends on the strategies’ past per-
formances. The rationale behind this is an evolutionary mechanism in which more
agents prefer to follow the trading rule which was most proﬁtable in the past. Note,
that this mechanism does not model herding behavior explicitly because there is no
social interaction.7 Inspired by Westerhoﬀ (2008a) we assume the following ﬁtness
functions for short-term fundamentalist and short-term chartists
퐴푆퐶푡 = (exp{푠푡} − exp{푠푡−1})푑푆퐶푡−2 (3.8)
− 휏(exp{푠푡}+ exp{푠푡−1})∣푑푆퐶푡−2∣+ 휃퐴푆퐶푡−1
퐴푆퐹푡 = (exp{푠푡} − exp{푠푡−1})푑푆퐹푡−2 (3.9)
− 휏(exp{푠푡}+ exp{푠푡−1})∣푑푆퐹푡−2∣+ 휃퐴푆퐹푡−1.
The ﬁrst term of the performance measures 퐴푆퐶푡 and 퐴
푆퐹
푡 is the return the agent got
by investing in foreign currency by placing his or her order 푑푆퐶푡−2 or 푑
푆퐹
푡−2 to the market
maker. Here, Westerhoﬀ (2008a) assumes that traders submit orders in period 푡−2,
which are executed at period 푡−1. Whether a pertinent trading rule is proﬁtable or
not thus depends on the realized price in period 푡. The second term is the transaction
cost the trader has to pay when executing orders. If the trader buys (sells) foreign
currency at the price 푠푡−1 he or she has to pay a tax amount of 휏 exp{푠푡−1}∣푑푡−2∣
on this transaction, where 휏 is the transaction tax rate. The trader only realizes a
proﬁt if he or she sells (buys) the currency back at the price 푠푡. Again, a tax will
be levied on this transaction with the tax amount 휏 exp{푠푡}∣푑푡−2∣. Thus, Westerhoﬀ
7For herding models see Lux and Marchesi (1999, 2000) and Lux (2009a).
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(2008a) assumes a round trip where the investors have to pay the transaction tax
twice. The parameter 휃 is a memory parameter. Thus, the last term measures how
quickly proﬁts are discounted for strategy selection. If 휃 is high, then past proﬁts
generated by this trading rule will be considered in todays strategy selection, while
for 휃 = 0 past proﬁts do not play any role for todays strategy selection. For 푑 = 1
all past proﬁts will play a role for todays selection. The ﬁtness measures for the
longer term trading strategies 퐴퐿퐶푡 and 퐴
퐿퐹
푡 are
퐴퐿퐶푡 = (exp{푠푡} − exp{푠푡−푁})푑퐿퐶푡−푁−1/푁 (3.10)
− 휏(exp{푠푡}+ exp{푠푡−푁})∣푑퐿퐶푡−푁−1∣/푁 + 휃퐴퐿퐶푡−1
퐴퐿퐹푡 = (exp{푠푡} − exp{푠푡−푁})푑퐿퐹푡−푁−1/푁 (3.11)
− 휏(exp{푠푡}+ exp{푠푡−푁})∣푑퐿퐹푡−푁−1∣/푁 + 휃퐴퐿퐹푡−1.
Following Demary (2008), we divide the proﬁt generated by the multi-period invest-
ment through the investment horizon 푁 . Thus, we measure the proﬁt per day. This
assumption is necessary in order to have a fair comparison between short-term trad-
ing strategies and longer term strategies. Following Westerhoﬀ (2008a) the proﬁt
of being inactive for one period is zero. Following Brock and Hommes (1998) and
Westerhoﬀ (2008a) the population fractions of agents are given by the discrete choice
model proposed by Manski and McFadden (1981)
푤푆퐶푡 =
exp{훾퐴푆퐶푡 }
1 + exp{훾퐴푆퐶푡 }+ exp{훾퐴푆퐹푡 }+ exp{훾퐴퐿퐶푡 }+ exp{훾퐴퐿퐹푡 }
(3.12)
푤푆퐹푡 =
exp{훾퐴푆퐹푡 }
1 + exp{훾퐴푆퐶푡 }+ exp{훾퐴푆퐹푡 }+ exp{훾퐴퐿퐶푡 }+ exp{훾퐴퐿퐹푡 }
(3.13)
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for short term traders,
푤퐿퐶푡 =
exp{훾퐴퐿퐶푡 }
1 + exp{훾퐴푆퐶푡 }+ exp{훾퐴푆퐹푡 }+ exp{훾퐴퐿퐶푡 }+ exp{훾퐴퐿퐹푡 }
(3.14)
푤퐿퐹푡 =
exp{훾퐴퐿퐹푡 }
1 + exp{훾퐴푆퐶푡 }+ exp{훾퐴푆퐹푡 }+ exp{훾퐴퐿퐶푡 }+ exp{훾퐴퐿퐹푡 }
(3.15)
for longer term traders, and ﬁnally
푤퐼푡 =
1
1 + exp{훾퐴푆퐶푡 }+ exp{훾퐴푆퐹푡 }+ 푒푥푝{훾퐴퐿퐶푡 }+ exp{훾퐴퐿퐹푡 }
(3.16)
for inactive traders, whose proﬁts are zero by construction. Note that the higher
the ﬁtness of one particular strategy, the higher will be the percentage fraction of
agents, who use it. The parameter 훾 ≥ 0 controls how sensitive traders react to a
change in the ﬁtness measure of their trading rule. The higher 훾 the more agents
switch to the strategy with the highest ﬁtness. For 훾 = 0 all trading strategies will
be selected with equal probability, while for 훾 = ∞ all agents select the strategy
with the highest performance.
Note, that for 푁 = 1 (all traders have the same investment horizon) our model
collapses to the model of Westerhoﬀ (2008a).
3.3 (Non-)Fundamental Steady-States
In order to analyze the steady-states of the model we have to set all shocks to zero
and concentrate on the deterministic skeleton of the model. In order to be in steady
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state the restriction
(푠푡, 푠
푓
푡 , 푑
푖
푡, 푤
푖
푡, 퐴
푖
푡) = (푠푡−1, 푠
푓
푡−1, 푑
푖
푡−1, 푤
푖
푡−1, 퐴
푖
푡−1) = (푠, 푠푡, 푑푖, 푤푖, 퐴푖) (3.17)
should hold (푖 ∈ {푆퐹, 퐿퐹, 푆퐶,퐿퐶, 퐼}). Thus, all variables should be equal to their
(fundamental) long-run values and all dynamics should rest there. Under the re-
striction 푠푡 = 푠푡−1 = 푠 = 푠푓 all ﬁtness measures collaps to zero
퐴푆퐶 = 퐴푆퐹 = 퐴퐿퐶 = 퐴퐿퐹 = 0 (3.18)
leading to a uniform distribution of the popularity of all ﬁve trading rules
푤푆퐶 = 푤푆퐹 = 푤퐿퐶 = 푤퐿퐹 = 푤퐼 = 0.2. (3.19)
Chartists’ demand will be zero when the exchange rate remains constant
푑푆퐶 = 푑퐿퐶 = 0, (3.20)
while the fundamentalists’ demand will only be zero when the steady state exchange
rate 푠 equals the fundamental exchange rate 푠푓
푑푆퐹 = 푑퐿퐹 = 0. (3.21)
Thus, the fundamental steady state is characterized by zero demands for foreign
currency, zero proﬁts and equal selection of possible trading rules. Note, that this
result can often be found in heterogeneous traders models of this type (see DeGrauwe
and Grimaldi 2006).
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When the exchange rate is in a state 푠, where it is diﬀerent from the fundamental
exchange rate 푠 ∕= 푠푓 fundamentalist traders’ demand is always positive in absolute
value. These orders will push the exchange rate back to the fundamental value.
3.4 Calibration and Model Validation
In order to use this artiﬁcial foreing exchange market as a computer laboratory for
the analysis of regulatory policies we have to assume numerical values for the model’s
parameters ﬁrst.8 This set of parameter values can be found in Table 3.1. Most of the
parameter values are taken from Westerhoﬀ (2008a). According to him, parameters
are chosen such that the model is able to match numbers and statistics of real world
ﬁnancial market data.9 Westerhoﬀ (2008a) assumes both extrapolation parameters
to have the value 0.04. By following his suggestions short-term chartists expects a
return of 0.04 percent for the next day in response to a return of 1 percent today
and a cumulative return of 0.046 percent over the next 30 days. Fundamentalists,
however, assume a return of 0.04 in response to a misalignment of 1 percent and a
cumulative return of 0.71 over the next 30 days.
Westerhoﬀ (2008a), Lux and Marchesi (2000), Lux (2009a) and Franke and West-
erhoﬀ (2009) validate agent-based models by analyzing how good the model is able
to reproduce stylized facts of empirical daily ﬁnancial market data like uncorrelated
raw returns, volatility clustering, long memory and fat tails of the return distri-
8All programming and computations were done using the free open source software R (R Devel-
opment Core Team 2009).
9Studies that estimate rather than calibrate these models are Gilli and Winker (2003), Wester-
hoﬀ and Reitz (2003), Lux (2009c), Alfarano, Lux and Wagner (2005), Boswijk, Hommes and
Manzan (2007), Winker, Gilli and Jeleskowic (2007), Manzan and Westerhoﬀ (2007) and Ghon-
gadze and Lux (2009). These studies suggest to that the chartist and fundamentalist reaction
parameters 휅퐶 and 휅퐹 lie between 0 and 0.1 for daily data (see Westerhoﬀ 2008a).
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Table 3.1: Parameter Calibration
Parameter Value Interpretation
훽 1.00 price adjustment
휎푠 0.01 volatility of non-fundamental innovations
휎푠푓 0.01 volatility of fundamental innovations
휅퐶 0.04 chartists’ reaction
휎퐶 0.03 variety of chartist rules
휅퐹 0.04 fundamentalists’ reaction
휎퐹 0.005 variety of fundamentalist rules
훾 800 intensity of choice
휃 0.985 memory parameter
푁 30 longer term investment horizon
Note: Most parameter values are based on Westerhoﬀ (2008a). We set a higher value for the
intensity of choice parameter 훾. The longer term investment horizon is assumed to be 30 days.
bution. Thus, we analyze how numbers and statistics like distributional moments,
autocorrelations and distributional shape parameters of our generated computer lab-
oratory data match numbers and statistics of data generated in the real world. If
our models produces data whose properties are close to those of real world data,
than we will - as proposed by Lux (2009a) - be able to perform an economic policy
analysis which should be close to reality. The economic policy analysis can be done
by running the simulations for a given seed of random variables but for diﬀerent
values of the policy parameter. More general results can be achieved by calculating
average statistics over several simulation runs. These results can be interpreted as
cross-section averages over several artiﬁcial ﬁnancial markets.
Following Westerhoﬀ (2008a) and Lux (2009a) we use the following validation criteria
(Lux-Westerhoﬀ criteria hereafter):
(i) the model should generate bubbles and crashes (deviations from fundamental
value),
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(ii) asset prices should be more volatile than their fundamental values (excess
volatility),
(iii) the return distribution should deviate from the normal distribution (excess kur-
tosis),
(iv) absence of autocorrelations in raw returns (non-predictability of daily returns),
(v) hyperbolically decaying autocorrelations of absolute returns (volatility cluster-
ing).
Table 3.2: Summary Statistics: Baseline Simulation versus Empirical Data
Model USD-Euro YEN-USD GBP-USD USD-AusD
mean 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
st. dev. 0.015 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.009
skewness 0.000 0.179 -0.509 -0.330 -0.757
kurtosis 6.963 5.560 6.885 9.315 17.009
Note: Mean, variance, skewness and kurtosis are calculated from the model generated exchange
rate return data by using the parameters given in Table 3.1. The exchange rate data for the US-
Dollar to Euro, Yen to US-Dollar, Great Britain Pound to US-Dollar and US-Dollar to Australian
Dollar are taken from the FRED2 database of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis in daily
frequency. The data series range from 1999-01-04 to 2009-10-09 and are available under the series-
ID: DEXUSEU, DEXJPUS, DEXUSUK and DEXAUUS.
Figure 3.1 contains results of the baseline simulation of our artiﬁcial foreign exchange
market. The baseline simulation is characterized by the absence of transaction taxes.
Moreover, the fundamental exchange rate is assumed to stay constant. Thus, fun-
damental based trading rules are not aﬀected by the risk that the fundamental rate
will change in the future. Fundamental risks make arbitrage more risky (Brunner-
meier 2001) and thereby limit arbitrage. As a result, the fundamental trading rules
may become less proﬁtable, because fundamental forecasting rules generate larger
prediction errors. We will tackle the problem of fundamental risks in section 3.5.2
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Figure 3.1: Simulation without Transaction Taxes
Note: Simulation of 3000 artiﬁcial trading days. The underlying parameter values are 휅푓 = 휅푐 =
0.04, 푁 = 30, 훾 = 800, 휃 = 0.975, 휎푓 = 0.005, 휎푐 = 0.03 and 휎푠 = 0.01. The fundamental value
is assumed to be constant and normalized to zero. Distortion is measured as the absolute value of
the deviation of the exchange rate from its fundamental value.
and abstain from these kinds of risk during the baseline simulation.
From Figure 3.1 we can infer that most of the chartist traders prefer to be short-term
traders, while fundamental traders prefer the longer term investment horizon. This
results is in line with the argument of Keynes (1936) and Tobin (1978) that short-
term traders are destabilizing, while longer term traders are stabilizing. Moreover,
this result is also in line with the empirical evidence from questionnaire studies like
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Taylor and Allen (1992)10. There are periods with sharp increases in the number of
short-term chartist traders. These periods correspond to periods with high volatility
and large misalignments in the exchange rate. Thus, short-term chartists lead to
additional risks. These periods of high volatility are followed by periods with a low
volatility and a high popularity of the longer term fundamentalists trading strategy.
Raw returns display two small negative autocorrelations. These mean reverting
dynamics may result from the dominance of longer term fundamental traders who
trade large orders against the mispricing. The autocorrelation function of absolute
returns shows slowly decaying serial correlations in the magnitude of returns which
correspond the the persistent phases of high and low volatility in the artiﬁcial return
data. Summing up, the model is able to generate bubbles and crashes which can
be inferred from the time series plot of misalignments (Figure 3.1). Moreover, it
is able to generate non-predictable returns, which can be inferred from the small
serial correlations in the artiﬁcial exchange rate returns. Furthermore, the models
is able to generate volatility clustering. This, can be inferred by just eyeballing the
time series of returns or more elaborate by the slowly decaying serial correlations in
absolute returns. Moreover, within the model a return distribution emerges which
is characterized by excess kurtosis. As can be inferred from Table 3.2, the model
is able to generate statistics, which are in line with the statistical properties of the
Yen, Euro, the Great Britain Pound and the Australian Dollar versus US-Dollar
daily exchange rate data. Note, that empirical data as well as data generated by
our artiﬁcial foreign exchange market are characterized by zero means, standard
deviations in the range of 0.006 to 0.015 and a kurtosis measures that ranges from
5.6 to 17.0. Thus, our model for daily exchange rate ﬂuctuations can be regarded as
10See Menkhoﬀ and Taylor (2007) for an survey article on questionnaire studies in ﬁnancial mar-
kets.
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validated by the Lux-Westerhoﬀ criteria (Westerhoﬀ 2008a, Lux 2009a). Moreover,
we can conclude that all stylized facts remain unaﬀected by the introduction of
longer term traders.
3.5 The Eﬀectiveness of Transaction Taxes
Lux (2009a) and Westerhoﬀ (2008a) suggest to use agent-based models as computer
laboratories for performing economic policy experiments which are prohibitively
costly to perform in real world markets. The advantages of agent-based model-
ing referred in Westerhoﬀ (2008a) apply to the agent-based experiments presented
in this paper in the following way:
(i) We are able to generate as much data points as needed for our policy analysis.
In our agent-based policy analysis we choose following Westerhoﬀ (2008a) a
simulation horizon of 5000 data points, which corresponds to a time horizon of
20 years since the model is calibrated to daily data. In more detail, we simulate
100 simulation runs of 5000 artiﬁcial trading days and take averages over all
numbers and statistics for each value of the currency transaction tax. The
advantage of this Monte-Carlo procedure is that our results do not only depend
on one certain seed of random variables. One can interpret the generated
sample as a panel of 100 foreign exchange markets over 5000 time steps.
(ii) Westerhoﬀ (2008a) notes that the second advantage of agent-based modeling
is that we are able to measure all variables precisely during our policy analysis.
Within the agent-based experiments presented here we are able to measure the
fundamental value as well as the decisions of our artiﬁcial traders precisely.
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(iii) We are able to control for exogenous shocks. Within our simulation we intro-
duce three types of exogenous events. These are random deviations from the
market maker’s price adjustment rule, fundamental news, and random devia-
tions from the chartists’ and fundamentalists’ trading rules. Other exogenous
events like a large drop in the fundamental value (e.g. a big recession) are not
introduced. Thus, we analyze the eﬀectiveness of the currency transaction tax
during ”normal” trading days.
(iv) We perform the simulations under the same conditions (the same seed of ran-
dom variables), but with diﬀerent values of the policy instrument. In this
way we are able to get an inference on how the policy instrument changes
macroscopic properties - measured by numbers and statistics - of our artiﬁcial
market. Westerhoﬀ (2003a, 2008a) suggests the following evaluation criteria
(a) volatility, deﬁned as the average absolute change in the exchange rate
Vol =
1
푇
푇∑
푡=1
∣푠푡 − 푠푡−1∣, (3.22)
and
(b) distortion
Dis =
1
푇
푇∑
푡=1
∣푠푓푡 − 푠푡∣, (3.23)
which is deﬁned as the average absolute deviation of the exchange rate 푠푡
from its fundamental value 푠푓푡 .
Moreover, Demary (2008) and Westerhoﬀ (2008a) suggest to analyze the
change the average percentage fraction of used trading rules as a measure
of traders’ behavior, which will change in response to policy changes, while
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Demary (2008) suggests also to analyze the change in the kurtosis of the ex-
change rate returns
Kurt =
1
푇
∑푇
푡=1(푠푡 − 푠푡−1)4
( 1
푇
∑푇
푡=1(푠푡 − 푠푡−1)2)2
(3.24)
as a measure of catastrophic risks.
3.5.1 Simulations without Fundamental Risk
Figure 3.2 to 3.4 contain snapshots of 3000 trading days within our artiﬁcial foreign
exchange market. Figure 3.2 is based on a tax rate of 0.1 percent on each currency
transaction, while Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4 are based on the tax rates of 0.3 and 0.5
percent. From Figure 3.2 one can infer by just visual inspection that bubbles and
crashes, volatility clusters and distortions still prevail under a small transaction tax.
Absolute returns are still characterized by persistent serial correlations. Similar
to Figure 3.1 most of the traders prefer to be short-term chartist or longer term
fundamentalist. Figure 3.3 shows a simulation run of our artiﬁcial foreign exchange
market under a transaction tax rate of 0.3 percent. What can be seen is that short-
term chartism now has the lowest popularity. The reason is that taxation makes
this trading rule too expensive. The large ﬂuctuations and amplitudes in short-term
chartist and longer term fundamentalists population fractions are now absent. As
a result, the occurrence of spectacular bubbles and crashes also diminishes, as can
be inferred from the time series plot of distortions. Moreover, taxation reduces the
autocorrelation of absolute returns. Thus, volatility clusters are absent under this
tax rate. From Figure 3.4 can be inferred that taxation of ﬁnancial transactions
smoothes the ﬂuctuations in the popularity of trading rules. However, it seems that
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the highest stabilizing impact is achieved by increasing the tax rate from 0 to 0.1
percent.
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Figure 3.2: Simulation with a 0.1 Percent Transaction Tax Rate
Note: Simulation of 3000 artiﬁcial trading days. The underlying parameter values are 휅푓 = 휅푐 =
0.04, 푁 = 30, 훾 = 800, 휃 = 0.975, 휎푓 = 0.01, 휎푐 = 0.03 and 휎푠 = 0.01. The fundamental value is
normalized to zero. The transaction tax rate is 0.1 percent. Distortion is measured as the absolute
value of the deviation of the exchange rate from its fundamental value.
Figure 3.5 contains summarized results of our policy experiments for small trans-
action taxes between 0 and 1 percent. Each reported number is the average over
5000 artiﬁcial trading days and 100 simulation runs. The simulations for diﬀerent
tax rates are based on the same seed of random variables. The tax rate is varied
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Figure 3.3: Simulation with a 0.3 Percent Transaction Tax Rate
Note: Simulation of 3000 artiﬁcial trading days. The underlying parameter values are 휅푓 = 휅푐 =
0.04, 푁 = 30, 훾 = 800, 휃 = 0.975, 휎푓 = 0.01, 휎푐 = 0.03 and 휎푠 = 0.01. The fundamental value is
normalized to zero. The transaction tax rate is 0.3 percent. Distortion is measured as the absolute
value of the deviation of the exchange rate from its fundamental value.
from 0 (the baseline case) in 0.1 percentage point steps and measured by the x-axis
of the plot. As one can see, taxation of foreign currency transactions with small tax
rates does not change the average returns on holding foreign currency. However,
it decreases the volatility of exchange rate returns and the distortion of the mar-
ket (the average misalignment). Thus, the transaction tax helps to decrease price
volatility and brings the exchange rate on average closer to its fundamental value.
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Figure 3.4: Simulation with a 0.5 Percent Transaction Tax Rate
Note: The numbers and statistics of this ﬁgure are based on 3000 artiﬁcial trading days. The
underlying parameter values are 휅푓 = 휅푐 = 0.04, 푁 = 30, 훾 = 800, 휃 = 0.975, 휎푓 = 0.01, 휎푐 = 0.03
and 휎푠 = 0.01. The fundamental value is normalized to zero. The transaction tax rate is 0.5
percent. Distortion is measured as the absolute value of the deviation of the exchange rate from
its fundamental value.
However, the tax has no eﬀect on the kurtosis of the exchange rate return distri-
bution. The reason for this can be inferred from the change in the composition of
trading rules. The number of short-term chartists and short-term fundamentalists
decreases to zero on average, while the number of longer-term chartists and longer-
term fundamentalists is increasing. Moreover, the number of inactive traders is
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Figure 3.5: The Eﬀectiveness of Small Currency Transaction Taxes
Note: The numbers and statistics of this ﬁgure are averages over 5000 artiﬁcial trading days over
100 simulation runs. They can be interpreted as averages over time and (artiﬁcial) markets. Note
that all simulations for diﬀerent values of the transaction tax rate are based on the same seed
of random variables. The underlying parameter values are 휅푓 = 휅푐 = 0.04, 푁 = 30, 훾 = 800,
휃 = 0.975, 휎푓 = 0.005, 휎푐 = 0.03 and 휎푠 = 0.01. The fundamental value is normalized to zero.
Distortion is deﬁned as the average absolute deviation of the exchange rate from its fundamental
value.
increasing because some short-term traders decide not to trade because transaction
costs are higher than the returns of trading in the foreign exchange market. This
is also the reason why the kurtosis of the exchange rate return distribution is not
increasing. Suppose that all short-term traders switch to the longer-term trading
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Figure 3.6: The Eﬀectiveness of Higher Currency Transaction Taxes
Note: The numbers and statistics of this ﬁgure are averages 5000 artiﬁcial trading days over 100
simulation runs. They can be interpreted as averages over time and (artiﬁcial) markets. Note that
all simulations for diﬀerent values of the transaction tax rate are based on the same seed of random
variables. The underlying parameter values are 휅푓 = 휅푐 = 0.04, 푁 = 30, 훾 = 800, 휃 = 0.975,
휎푓 = 0.005, 휎푐 = 0.03 and 휎푠 = 0.02. The fundamental value is normalized to zero. Distortion is
deﬁned as the average absolute deviation of the exchange rate from its fundamental value.
strategies. This change in behavior will result in the fact that some traders place
larger orders every 30 days instead of placing small orders every day. Because re-
turns are proportional to market demand in our model, larger orders in a 30 days
cycle lead to more frequent large returns and thus to a larger kurtosis of the return
distribution. In the artiﬁcial foreign exchange market proposed by Demary (2008) a
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lot of traders change from short-term trading to longer term trading instead of be-
coming inactive. Therefore, the kurtosis of the exchange rate distribution increases
in his simulations, which means a higher probability of large positive and negative
returns. In the model presented here, however, enough short-term traders decide
not to trade instead of becoming longer-term traders, which leads to the observed
negligible eﬀect of transaction taxes on the extreme parts of the return distribution
measured by the kurtosis.
Figure 3.6 contains summary results for tax rates between 1 and 4 percent. As one
can see, higher tax rates have no signiﬁcant impact onto the standard deviation
and the kurtosis of the exchange rate returns. Within this interval for the tax
rate the number of short-term chartists is zero, while the number of short-term
fundamentalists declines to zero. For tax rates above 2.5 percent there are no short-
term fundamentalists in the market. The number of inactive traders is monotonically
increasing under these tax scenarios and lies between 30 and 40 percent. When
the tax rate takes the value 4 percent, then 40 percent of the artiﬁcial traders
decide not to trade. Moreover, it can be inferred that the number of longer term
fundamentalists is decreasing under rising tax rates. While more than 30 percent of
all traders use the longer term fundamentalist strategy for a tax rate of 1 percent,
only 20 percent use this strategy for a tax rate of 4 percent. However, higher tax
rates lead to a higher popularity of the longer term chartist trading rule. Under
a 1 percent transaction tax approximately 30 percent of all traders use the longer
term chartist rule, while approximately 40 percent use the chartist rule under a
tax rate of 4 percent. The reason for the increasing popularity of the chartist rule
is the following. Short-term trading is prohibitively costly under these high tax
rates. When there is no short-term trading, then high frequency ﬂuctuations in the
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exchange rate are absent and longer lasting trends emerge. When there are longer
lasting trends with less noise, then the longer term chartist forecasting technique
becomes more precise and therefore more agents prefer to choose the chartist trading
rule. Similar, longer term fundamentalist rules become more unprecise when the
exchange rate exhibits longer lasting trends. As a result, which emerges from the
changed composition of trading rules, distortion is rising under higher tax rates.
The reason is, that under higher tax rates chartist rules are more frequently used
compared to fundamentalist trading rules. A similar result can also be found in
Westerhoﬀ (2003a). Furthermore, it can be inferred from Figure 3.6, that higher tax
rates do not have any signiﬁcant impact on volatility because the number of short-
term traders is zero. In contrast to Demary (2008) higher tax rates do not have any
impact on the kurtosis of the return distribution. As explained above, the kurtosis is
increasing in his model because a lot of short-term traders decide to become longer
term traders. This results in a higher frequency of larger orders which leads to a
higher kurtosis of the return distribution. In this model, however, 40 percent of all
traders decide not to trade instead of becoming longer term traders. Thus, higher
tax rates have no signiﬁcant impact on the kurtosis of the return distribution here.
3.5.2 Simulations under Fundamental Risk
In Figure 3.7 the fundamental exchange rate is assumed to follow a random walk
푠푓푡+1 = 푠
푓
푡 + 0.01휀푡+1, where 휀푡 is standard normally distributed fundamental news.
When the fundamental rate follows a random walk, then the fundamental-based
trading strategies becomes more risky. The reason is that fundamentalists can only
assume that the exchange rate changes in order to correct to the fundamental rate
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푠푓푡 , because it is the best forecast of the uncertain future fundamental rate 푠
푓
푡+푁 .
When there is a large fundamental innovation, then fundamentalists make a large
prediction error. As a consequence, fundamentalists lose money which may result
in a higher popularity of chartist rules for the next period. Brunnermeier (2001)
notes that this fundamental risk limits arbitrage and in this way leads to persistent
speculative bubbles. From Figure 3.7 can be inferred, that similar to the simulations
without fundamental risk most of the chartist traders are short term traders, while
most of the fundamentalists are long- term traders. Again, periods with a clear
dominance of chartist traders correspond to periods with large ﬂuctuations in the
exchange rate and large misalignments. These periods are followed by longer cor-
rection periods with a clear dominance of longer term fundamentalist traders. The
emergent properties are again excess kurtosis of the return distribution and volatility
clustering, which can be inferred from the slowly decaying autocorrelations of abso-
lute returns. In contrast to the simulations without fundamental risk, raw returns
seem to exhibit more persistent autocorrelations.
Figure 3.8 contains simulation results of our artiﬁcial foreign exchange market with
fundamental risk in which a policy maker introduces a currency transaction tax rate
of 0.5 percent. Under taxation short term chartism becomes unproﬁtable, thus, the
number of traders who use this trading rule becomes zero over the whole simulation
horizon. In reaction to missing chartists misalignments diminish, which is the reason
for the diminishing periods with a clear dominance of longer term fundamental
traders. Short-term fundamentalism also becomes unproﬁtable, however, longer
term chartism rises in popularity compared to the case without taxation. Emergent
properties from this changed interaction are diminishing autocorrelations of raw
returns and diminishing autocorrelations of absolute returns. Thus, under taxation
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Figure 3.7: Simulation with Fundamental Risk and no Transaction Taxes
Note: Simulation of 3000 artiﬁcial trading days. The underlying parameter values are 휅푓 = 휅푐 =
0.04, 푁 = 30, 훾 = 800, 휃 = 0.975, 휎푓 = 0.005, 휎푐 = 0.03 and 휎푠 = 0.02. The fundamental value is
normalized to zero. The transaction tax rate is 0 percent.
volatility clusters diminish. Moreover, the misalignments decrease in amplitude.
Figure 3.9 contains ﬁgures with summary statistics over 100 simulation runs of size
5000. These can be interpreted as statistics over a panel of 100 artiﬁcial markets
and 5000 trading days. These summary statistics are plotted for diﬀerent values of
the currency transaction tax rate. Similar to other conﬁgurations taxation does not
change average daily returns. The standard deviation of returns and the kurtosis of
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Figure 3.8: Simulation with Fundamental Risk and a 0.5 percent Transaction Tax
Note: Simulation of 3000 artiﬁcial trading days. The underlying parameter values are 휅푓 = 휅푐 =
0.04, 푁 = 30, 훾 = 800, 휃 = 0.975, 휎푓 = 0.005, 휎푐 = 0.03 and 휎푠 = 0.02. The fundamental value is
normalized to zero. The transaction tax rate is 0.5 percent. Distortion is deﬁned as the absolute
deviation of the exchange rate from its fundamental value.
the return distribution are decreasing under taxation. The lower kurtosis measure
is due to the diminishing volatility clusters under taxation. Taxation of round trips
increases the costs of speculation. In response the number of inactive traders is
increasing in the transaction tax rate. As already indicated Figure 3.8, the number
of short-term fundamentalists and short-term chartists are decreasing in the tax rate,
while the number of longer term chartists and longer term fundamentalists is at least
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Figure 3.9: The Eﬀectiveness of Small Transaction Taxes under Fundamental Risk
Note: The numbers and statistics of this ﬁgure are averages over 5000 artiﬁcial trading days over
100 simulation runs. They can be interpreted as averages over time and (artiﬁcial) markets. Note
that all simulations for diﬀerent values of the transaction tax rate are based on the same seed
of random variables. The underlying parameter values are 휅푓 = 휅푐 = 0.04, 푁 = 30, 훾 = 800,
휃 = 0.975, 휎푓 = 0.005, 휎푐 = 0.03 and 휎푠 = 0.02. Distortion is deﬁned as the average absolute
deviation of the exchange rate from its fundamental value.
for small tax rates increasing. Note, that the response of longer term fundamentalist
traders is hump-shaped again. For tax rates below 0.5 percent the number of longer
term term fundamentalists is increasing, while fundamentalists decrease in number
when transaction taxes are higher than 0.5 percent. However, the number of longer
term chartist traders is monotonically increasing in the currency transaction tax
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Figure 3.10: The Eﬀectiveness of Higher Transaction Taxes under Fundamental Risk
Note: The numbers and statistics of this ﬁgure are averages over 5000 artiﬁcial trading days over
100 simulation runs. They can be interpreted as averages over time and (artiﬁcial) markets. Note
that all simulations for diﬀerent values of the transaction tax rate are based on the same seed
of random variables. The underlying parameter values are 휅푓 = 휅푐 = 0.04, 푁 = 30, 훾 = 800,
휃 = 0.975, 휎푓 = 0.005, 휎푐 = 0.03 and 휎푠 = 0.01. Distortion is deﬁned as the average absolute
deviation of the exchange rate from its fundamental value.
rate. The rationale is the following. Under taxation the number of short-term
traders decrease in magnitude, which leads to less short-term ﬂuctuations in the
exchange rate. Thus, longer lasting trends in the exchange rate emerge, which make
the longer term chartist trading rule more proﬁtable compared to the longer term
fundamentalist rule. As can be inferred from Figure 3.10 misalignments increase for
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tax rates above 2 percent. This 푢-shaped response of misalignment are similar to
Westerhoﬀ (2003a, 2008a) due to the fact that the number of longer term chartists
is increasing in the transaction tax rate, while the number of fundamentalists rises
for small tax rates, while the popularity of this trading strategy decreases in number
for higher tax rates.
3.5.3 Sensitivity Analysis
Table 3.3 and Table 3.4 contain results of a sensitivity analysis. The re-
ported numbers and statistics are averages over 5000 artiﬁcial trading days and
50 simulation runs. We report the volatility and the distortion for the tax
rates 휏 ∈ {0.0%, 1.0%, 2.0%, 3.0%, 4.0%} and for diﬀerent calibrations of the
model’s parameters like the fundamentalists’ misalignment-correction parameter
휅퐹 ∈ {0.02, 0.04, 0.06, 0.08}, the chartists’ trend-extrapolation parameter 휅퐶 ∈
{0.02, 0.04, 0.06, 0.08}, the intensity of choice parameter 훾 ∈ {400, 600, 800, 1000},
the memory parameter 휃 ∈ {0.75, 0.80, 0.975, 0.985} and the longer term traders
investment horizon 푁 ∈ {1, 10, 20, 30}.
Table 3.3 contains the sensitivity analysis under a constant fundamental value, while
the results in Table 3.4 are based on the assumption that the fundamental value fol-
lows a random walk. From Table 3.3 we can infer that the volatility seems to be
robust for diﬀerent calibrations of the model. It is slightly declining in the tax rate
for all 20 calibrations. Results for the distortion are robust for tax rates below 3.0%
at least for variations in the fundamentalist and chartist behavioral parameters as
well as for the memory parameter and the intensity of choice parameter. For tax rate
above 3.0% we ﬁnd that values of the distortion measure vary with changes in the
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Table 3.3: Sensitivity Analysis: Constant Fundamental Value
Constant Fundamental Value
Volatility Distortion
Tax Rate 0.0% 1.0% 2.0% 3.0% 4.0% 0.0% 1.0% 2.0% 3.0% 4.0%
휅퐹 = 0.02 0.013 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.018 0.013 0.014 0.016 0.083
휅퐹 = 0.04 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.019 0.013 0.014 0.016 0.068
휅퐹 = 0.06 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.018 0.013 0.014 0.016 0.041
휅퐹 = 0.08 0.013 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.018 0.013 0.014 0.016 0.061
휅퐶 = 0.02 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.016 0.013 0.014 0.020 0.075
휅퐶 = 0.04 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.017 0.013 0.014 0.016 0.092
휅퐶 = 0.06 0.013 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.018 0.013 0.014 0.016 0.053
휅퐶 = 0.08 — 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.010 — 0.013 0.014 0.016 0.055
훾 = 400 0.012 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.016 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.014
훾 = 600 0.012 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.017 0.013 0.013 0.014 0.015
훾 = 800 0.013 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.017 0.013 0.013 0.014 0.016
훾 = 1000 0.013 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.020 0.013 0.014 0.015 0.017
휃 = 0.750 0.012 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.018 0.014 0.014 0.013 0.013
휃 = 0.800 0.012 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.018 0.014 0.013 0.013 0.013
휃 = 0.975 0.013 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.018 0.013 0.013 0.014 0.016
휃 = 0.985 0.013 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.018 0.013 0.014 0.016 0.052
푁 = 1 0.014 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.069 0.323 0.364 0.426 0.360
푁 = 10 0.013 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.025 0.018 0.053 0.224 0.336
푁 = 20 0.013 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.020 0.014 0.015 0.017 0.046
푁 = 30 0.013 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.018 0.013 0.013 0.014 0.016
Note: The numbers and statistics are averages over 5000 artiﬁcial trading days over 50 simulations
runs. Note that all simulations for diﬀerent values of the transaction tax rate are based on the
same seed of random variables. The underlying parameter values are 휅푓 = 휅푐 = 0.04, 푁 = 30,
훾 = 800, 휃 = 0.975, 휎푓 = 0.005, 휎푐 = 0.03 and 휎푠 = 0.005 except otherwise stated.
calibration. Interestingly, we ﬁnd that the 푢-shaped reaction of the distortion mea-
sure to changes in the tax rate is robust to all 20 parameterizations. However, the
convexity of this curve is smaller for higher values of the chartists’ and fundamen-
talists’ behavioral parameters as well as for smaller intensity of choice parameters
and smaller memory parameter values. Thus, mispricings are reduced when fun-
damentalist traders as well as chartist traders act more aggressively. Moreover, we
ﬁnd that the convexity of the distortion-tax-curve is smaller, the higher the longer
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Table 3.4: Sensitivity Analysis: Fundamental Value Follows Random Walk
Fundamental Value Follows Random Walk
Volatility Distortion
Tax Rate 0.0% 1.0% 2.0% 3.0% 4.0% 0.0% 1.0% 2.0% 3.0% 4.0%
휅퐹 = 0.02 0.013 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.019 0.014 0.016 0.023 0.081
휅퐹 = 0.04 0.012 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.018 0.014 0.017 0.019 0.101
휅퐹 = 0.06 0.013 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.018 0.014 0.016 0.021 0.109
휅퐹 = 0.08 0.013 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.019 0.014 0.016 0.019 0.095
휅퐶 = 0.02 0.013 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.018 0.014 0.016 0.023 0.068
휅퐶 = 0.04 0.013 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.019 0.014 0.016 0.024 0.111
휅퐶 = 0.06 0.013 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.019 0.014 0.016 0.030 0.139
휅퐶 = 0.08 — 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.010 — 0.014 0.016 0.026 0.091
훾 = 400 0.012 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.017 0.014 0.015 0.016 0.017
훾 = 600 0.012 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.018 0.014 0.015 0.017 0.023
훾 = 800 0.013 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.018 0.014 0.016 0.021 0.101
훾 = 1000 — 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.010 — 0.014 0.017 0.040 0.203
휃 = 0.750 0.012 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.019 0.016 0.015 0.015 0.015
휃 = 0.800 0.012 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.020 0.016 0.015 0.015 0.015
휃 = 0.975 0.013 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.019 0.014 0.015 0.016 0.021
휃 = 0.985 — 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.010 — 0.014 0.016 0.031 0.115
푁 = 1 0.015 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.084 0.417 0.439 0.431 0.452
푁 = 10 0.013 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.024 0.021 0.236 0.375 0.410
푁 = 20 0.013 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.020 0.015 0.018 0.119 0.346
푁 = 30 0.013 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.019 0.014 0.016 0.020 0.115
Note: The numbers and statistics are averages over 5000 artiﬁcial trading days over 50 simulations
runs. Note that all simulations for diﬀerent values of the transaction tax rate are based on the
same seed of random variables. The underlying parameter values are 휅푓 = 휅푐 = 0.04, 푁 = 30,
훾 = 800, 휃 = 0.975, 휎푓 = 0.005, 휎푐 = 0.03 and 휎푠 = 0.005 except otherwise stated.
term traders’ investment horizon. Furthermore, the distortion is smaller in value for
longer investment horizons. This ﬁnding is robust for all tax rates considered here.
This ﬁndings also hold, when we assume the fundamental value to follow a random
walk (Table 3.4). Thus, traders with longer investment horizons act as a stabilizing
force as proposed by Keynes (1936) and Tobin (1978). We conclude, that the ﬁnding
that small tax rates decrease distortion, while higher tax rates increase it is a robust
ﬁnding for 20 calibrations of this agent-based ﬁnancial market model.
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3.6 Conclusion
Agent-based models with heterogeneous interacting agents are powerful tools for eco-
nomic policy analysis. Their success in replicating stylized facts of ﬁnancial markets
data like bubbling and crashing asset prices, non-predictability of returns, excessively
high volatilities of returns, excessively high probabilities of extreme large absolute
returns and volatility clustering makes them preferable tools for analyzing regula-
tions in ﬁnancial markets. The empirical stylized facts emerge within agent-based
models from the interaction of heterogeneous traders. By aﬀecting the individual
agents’ decisions, these regulations have eﬀects on emergent properties like the ones
cited before which cannot simply be deduced by aggregating over individual agents.
Within this paper we introduced the longer term traders of Demary (2008) into the
foreign exchange market model proposed by Westerhoﬀ (2008a). Our ﬁrst result is
that the stylized facts of ﬁnancial market data also emerge when longer term traders
are introduced into these models. Because our model is able to reproduce stylized
facts of ﬁnancial market data, we regard is as validated by the Lux-Westerhoﬀ
criteria (Lux 2009a and Westerhoﬀ 2008a). The success of this artiﬁcial foreign
exchange market in replicating stylized facts of foreign exchange market data makes
it a powerful tool for analyzing the following proposition which is often heard from
the proponents of ﬁnancial market taxes and the public media in times of ﬁnancial
instability: transaction taxes stabilize ﬁnancial markets by crowding out short-term
traders in favor of longer term investors.
The economic policy analysis leads to the following results.
(i) Small transaction taxes make short-term trading unproﬁtable. Therefore, the
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number of short-term fundamentalists and short-term chartists decreases to
zero. One emergent property of this change in behavior are the diminishing
volatility clusters. Moreover, volatility and distortions decrease under small
transaction taxes. The reason for this result lies in the fact that under small
transaction taxes the market is populated by a higher number of longer term
fundamentalist traders compared to longer term chartist traders.
(ii) However, when tax rates are too high, misalignments increase as also found
in Westerhoﬀ (2003a, 2008a). The reason for this 푢-shaped response of mis-
alignments to increasing tax rates is caused by the changed composition of
trading rules. In his model tax rates above a certain threshold make fun-
damental trading unproﬁtable relative to trend-chasing trading. Within our
artiﬁcial foreign exchange market a similar result emerges. Here, the longer
term fundamentalist trading rule becomes unpopular under tax rates above
a certain threshold, while the number of traders, who favor the longer term
chartist trading rule increases. In contrast to Keynes (1936) and Tobin (1978)
taxing ﬁnancial markets is not per se stabilizing by making short-term trading
unproﬁtable in favor of longer term trading. Our model shows that this result
depends on the composition of the trading rules used in the ﬁnancial market
and on the tax rate.
(iii) A sensitivity analysis indicates that these ﬁndings are robust for 20 diﬀerent
calibrations of the model. Furthermore, it indicates that higher investment
horizons of longer term traders lead to less misalignments. We conclude that
longer term traders act as a stabilizing force within this model.
This model shows that taxing ﬁnancial markets has complex eﬀects caused by be-
CHAPTER 3. TRANSACTION TAXES AND TRADERS WITH HETEROGENEOUS
INVESTMENT HORIZONS IN AN AGENT-BASED FINANCIAL MARKET MODEL 102
havioral heterogeneity and the interaction of agents. Therefore policy makers should
pay attention to recent research in the area of agent-based ﬁnancial market models.
Within a world in which heterogeneous agents interact the eﬀects of currency trans-
action taxes are complex and their eﬀects on markets emerge from the change in the
composition of popular trading rules in the market. The stabilizing or destabilizing
eﬀects of regulatory policies thus emerge by changing the composition of trading
rules. This study and Westerhoﬀ (2003a, 2008a) come to the result that there is
a threshold tax rate where transaction taxes becomes destabilizing. Because this
threshold is not known in reality introducing a tax rate on ﬁnancial transactions
which is above this threshold may have destabilizing eﬀects. Moreover, when a pol-
icy maker wants to set a tax rate below this threshold, he or she has to consider
other transaction costs in the ﬁnancial market. Therefore, the tax threshold might
be lower in reality due to additional transaction costs. Furthermore, Demary (2008)
ﬁnds that the kurtosis of the return distribution may increase due to taxation be-
cause agents trade larger orders instead of a sequence of smaller orders. This results
may also emerge in similar agent-based ﬁnancial market models, when it is more
proﬁtable for traders to change to longer term trading rules instead of deciding not
to trade. Furthermore Pelizzari and Westerhoﬀ (2007) ﬁnd that the eﬀectiveness of
transaction taxes depends on the underlying market microstructure. During phases
of ﬁnancial instability policy makers often refer to the introduction of ﬁnancial mar-
ket taxes. Recent research, like this study and the papers cited therein show, that
changes in the composition in trading rules has important consequences for the ef-
fectiveness of ﬁnancial market taxes. Therefore policy makers should be aware of
the danger of setting the wrong tax rate. The Swedish experience with transaction
taxes was perhaps caused by tax rates, which were simply set too high. Agent-based
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models may therefore give important insights into the working of ﬁnancial market
regulations.
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4 Transaction Taxes, Greed and Risk
Aversion in an Agent-Based
Financial Market Model
A revised version of this chapter is forthcoming in Journal of Economic Interaction
and Coordination. The ﬁnal publication is available at www.springerlink.com
Abstract. Recent agent-based ﬁnancial market models came to the result that tax-
ing ﬁnancial transactions does not per se increase ﬁnancial stability and that the
response of volatility and misalignments to rising tax rates seem to be 푢-shaped.
Moreover, greed and the risk appetite of traders are often blamed for ﬁnancial insta-
bility and there is no evidence how greed and risk aversion aﬀect the eﬀectiveness
of regulations in ﬁnancial markets. We aim to add to this gap in the literature by
analyzing how the eﬀectiveness of transaction taxes depend on diﬀerent behavioral
patterns within an agent-based framework. Our simulations indicate that a tax rate
of 0.1 percent demarcates the stabilizing tax regime from the destabilizing one. We
ﬁgure out that transaction taxes are less eﬀective, either when chartists trade more
aggressively, fundamentalists trade less aggressively, agents switch more frequently
between trading strategies or only have short memory in their ﬁtness measures.
Lower risk aversion of agents, however, makes higher tax rates more eﬀective as
indicated by a ﬂatter volatility response curve. We conclude that additional regula-
tions should concentrate on the traders’ responsibilities for their risk-exposure.
Key Words: Agent-Based Financial Market Models, Regulations of Financial Mar-
kets, Financial Stability, Monte Carlo Analysis, Technical and Fundamental Analy-
sis
JEL Classiﬁcation: C15, D84, G01, G15, G18
111
CHAPTER 4. TRANSACTION TAXES, GREED AND RISK AVERSION IN AN
AGENT-BASED FINANCIAL MARKET MODEL 112
4.1 Introduction
Financial instability is often said to be caused by greed and the risk appetite of
market participants. Newspaper articles which comment ﬁnancial market outcomes
are full of phrases like ”bull markets” or ”hot spots” during ﬁnancial bubble periods.
Westerhoﬀ (2004a) suggest that agents’ greed and fear has important implications
for asset price dynamics. He notes that agents optimistically believe in booming mar-
kets, while panic dominates when prices change abruptly. Menkhoﬀ and Schmidt
(2005) ﬁnd in a questionnaire survey among fund managers that buy-&-hold traders
behave fundamentally oriented and risk averse, while momentum traders are less
risk-averse and follow aggressively the trend. We should expect that the higher risk-
aversion limits the stabilizing impact of fundamentalists, while less risk-aversion
enhances the destabilizing impact of chartists. Thereby greed and risk-aversion
might aﬀect the eﬀectiveness of regulations through the stabilizing behavior of fun-
damentalists. Up to now, there is less evidence how ﬁnancial regulations work under
diﬀerent behavioral patterns. The scope of this paper is to ﬁll this gap in the liter-
ature by analyzing how traders’ risk aversion and aggressiveness aﬀects the ability
of transaction taxes to stabilize ﬁnancial markets within an agent-based model.1
Up to now, there is a growing body of literature which analyzes the eﬀectiveness of
transaction taxes in agent-based ﬁnancial market models (Westerhoﬀ 2003a, 2008b;
Westerhoﬀ and Dieci 2006; Pelizzari and Westerhoﬀ 2007; Demary 2008, 2010). Lux
(2009a) highlights that the success of agent-based models in replicating empirical
stylized facts makes them preferable tools for economic policy analysis.2 Wester-
1Keynes (1936) blamed traders’ ”animal spirits” for the occurance of bubbles and crashes in
asset prices. He proposed to tax ﬁnancial markets in order to reduce speculative trading. His
argument was concretized by Tobin (1978), who proposed to tax international capital ﬂows.
2The eﬀectiveness of central bank interventions were analyzed with agent-based models in West-
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hoﬀ (2008a) highlights the following advantages of agent-based policy analysis: (i)
the researcher is able to generate as much data as needed, (ii) is able to measure
all variables precisely, (iii) is able to control any exogenous events, (iv) is able to
replicate the policy experiment under the same conditions, and (v) the researcher
is able to measure the behavior of the artiﬁcial agents. The last point is crucial
for understanding the coordination of individual decisions which determine the ag-
gregate behavior of the system. Demary (2008, 2010) highlights that agent-based
models are preferable tools for analyzing ﬁnancial regulations, since they meet the
necessary requirements and assumptions for performing these policy experiments:
(i) these models distinguish between diﬀerent trading strategies, (ii) traders are
allowed to change their trading strategy or leave the market in response to regula-
tions, (iii) the models are based on realistic behavioral assumptions, (iv) are able to
generate realistic asset price dynamics, and (v) might therefore be able to generate
realistic policy implications as also highlighted in Lux (2009a).
Most studies that analyze the eﬀectiveness of ﬁnancial market taxes within agent-
based models ﬁgure out that taxing ﬁnancial transactions is not stabilizing per se.
Westerhoﬀ (2003a, 2008a) ﬁnds that small transaction taxes have the potential to
stabilize ﬁnancial markets, while higher tax rates will destabilize the market. De-
mary (2010) introduces additional longer term traders into the model of Westerhoﬀ
(2008a) and replicates this 푢-shaped response of mispricings to taxation. His simu-
lations reveal that under suﬃciently small tax rates traders abstain from short-term
trading in favor of longer term investment horizons. Similar to Westerhoﬀ (2003a,
erhoﬀ (2001), Wieland and Westerhoﬀ (2005), Westerhoﬀ (2008a). Weidlich and Veit (2008)
use agent-based models for analyzing regulations in the electricity market, while Haber (2008)
applies an agent-based model for monetary and ﬁscal policy analysis. Westerhoﬀ (2003b, 2006,
2008a) analyze the eﬀectiveness of trading halts in ﬁnancial markets.
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2008a), mispricings increase when the tax rate exceeds a certain threshold. This
outcome emerges, since taxation reduces short-term ﬂuctuations and longer lasting
trends emerge. As a result, the longer term fundamentalist rule becomes unpopular
and the longer term chartist rule rises in popularity, which leads to a destabiliza-
tion of the artiﬁcial ﬁnancial market. Westerhoﬀ and Dieci (2006) analyze ﬁnancial
market taxes when traders are allowed to trade in two diﬀerent markets. Their simu-
lations reveal that the volatility in the taxed market will decline, while the volatility
in the untaxed market will increase, since the trend-chasing trading rules are more
proﬁtable in untaxed markets. However, the volatility in both markets will decline
when the tax is levied onto both markets. Pelizzari and Westerhoﬀ (2007) show
that transaction taxes work in a dealership market since liquidity is provided by
specialists, while they are not eﬀective in continuous double auction markets since
the reduction in market liquidity increases the market impact of orders.
Most studies do not analyze how the eﬀectiveness of policy measures depend on
behavioral patterns of traders. Therefore, we introduce ﬁnancial market taxes into
the model proposed by DeGrauwe and Grimaldi (2006), which explicitly assumes risk
averse traders. We expand the original model by structural stochastic volatility as
proposed by Franke and Westerhoﬀ (2009), Westerhoﬀ (2008a) and Westerhoﬀ and
Dieci (2006). As Franke and Westerhoﬀ (2009) note, structural stochastic volatility
is an important generator of volatility clusters. This expansion leads to more realistic
daily ﬂuctuations of returns compared to the original model formulation. In addition
to that, we are able to analyze the impact of taxation onto the empirically observed
volatility clusters as done in Demary (2010).
Within our analysis we ﬁgure out which behavioral patterns make taxation more ef-
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fective as indicated by a change in the shape of the 푢-shaped volatility and misalign-
ment response curves to taxation. Within the model the following results emerge: (i)
The tax rate 0.1 percent demarcates the stabilizing tax regime from the destabilizing
tax regime. (ii) The volatility and misalignment response curves become ﬂatter the
less risk averse agents are. (iii) More aggressive fundamental trading makes taxes
more eﬀective, while (iv) more aggressive chartists makes them less eﬀective. (v)
The more agents switch to the most proﬁtable trading rule in response to changes in
the performance measures, the less eﬀective is taxation. (vi) Longer memory in the
performance measures makes low transaction taxes more eﬀective as indicated by
a ﬂatter volatility response curve. We conclude that additional regulations should
concentrate on the traders’ responsibilities for their risk-exposure.
The remainder of this essay is structured as follows. Section two presents the model,
where section three analyses some properties of the model. Section four deals with
calibration, validation and the simulation design. Section ﬁve presents the results of
the policy analysis, while section six ends this paper with conclusions and outlook.
4.2 The Artiﬁcial Financial Market
The artiﬁcial ﬁnancial market is modeled in spirit of DeGrauwe and Grimaldi (2006)
who assume risk averse traders.3 In contrast to the original formulation, we abstract
from the time varying risk evaluation of traders and expand the model to a structural
stochastic volatility model (SSV) as proposed by Westerhoﬀ (2008a) and Franke and
Westerhoﬀ (2009). As Franke and Westerhoﬀ (2009) note, SSV might be a relevant
3Inﬂuential contributions to agent-based ﬁnancial market models are surveyed in Westerhoﬀ
(2008b), Hommes (2006), LeBaron (2006) and Lux (2009a).
CHAPTER 4. TRANSACTION TAXES, GREED AND RISK AVERSION IN AN
AGENT-BASED FINANCIAL MARKET MODEL 116
generator of volatility clusters. Under the introduction of SSV the DeGrauwe and
Grimaldi (2006) model is able to generate more realistic daily ﬂuctuations of asset
prices compared to the original formulation even when we abstract from the time-
varying risk-evaluation of traders. The rationale for this restriction is that although
we want the model to be a good description of observed data, we wish to keep it
sophisticated simple as well in order to understand easier how ﬁnancial regulations
work within the model.
The model presented in this paper consists of the following building blocks
(i) an exogenous fundamental exchange rate,
(ii) traders who choose between a fundamental and a trend-chasing trading rule,
who are allowed not to trade, when the transaction costs associated with trad-
ing in the foreign exchange market are higher compared to the returns of
trading,
(iii) an evolutionary process that determines the popularity of the trading rules
according to their past performance,
(iv) market demand that meets market supply for determining the value of the
exchange rate, and
(v) a policy maker who sets the currency transaction tax rate.
4.2.1 Portfolio Allocation
Following DeGrauwe and Grimaldi (2006) we assume that traders are myopic one-
period investors who only care about the return and the risk of their investment.
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Traders allocate their investment positions by investing in either a riskless domestic
asset with return 푟 or into a risky foreign asset with return 푟∗. The foreign asset
is risky due to ﬂuctuations in the exchange rate 푠푡. Agents have to buy foreign
currency, when they decide to invest into the foreign asset. They determine their
demand for the foreign currency 푑푖푡 by maximizing their mean-variance-utility
풰(푊 푖푡+1) = ℰ 푖푡 (푊 푖푡+1)−
휇
2
풱 푖푡(푊 푖푡+1) (4.1)
subject to their wealth constraint
ℰ 푖푡푊푡+1 = (1 + 푟)푊푡 + (1 + 푟∗)ℰ 푖푡푠푡+1푑푖푡 − (1 + 푟)푠푡푑푖푡, (4.2)
and the ﬂuctuations in wealth
풱 푖푡(푊푡+1) = (1 + 푟∗)2푑2푖,푡풱 푖푡(푠푡+1).4 (4.3)
The agent’s wealth at time 푡+1 is denoted by 푊 푖푡+1 and consists of the compounded
wealth endowment from the previous period (1+푟)푊푡, the investment in the foreign
asset (1 + 푟∗)ℰ 푖푡푠푡+1푑푖푡 and the domestic component −(1 + 푟)푠푡푑푖푡. When the agent
borrows money in his or her home country for an investment into the foreign asset,
then 푑푖푡 > 0, since he or she needs to convert the domestic money into foreign
currency, while 푑푖푡 < 0 indicates that the agent borrows money abroad, which he or
she has to convert to domestic currency for investing it into the home country. Since
푑푖푡 is the demand for foreign currency, the exchange rate 푠푡 is given as the price of
4At this stage of the maximization problem agents treat ℰ 푖푡 (.) and 풱푖푡(.) as expectation operator
and variance operator. Hence, we can pull (1+푟∗)2 and 푑2푖,푡 oﬀ the variance operator, since they
are realized at time 푡. When forming their demands 푑푖,푡, agents change the expected exchange
rate ℰ 푖푡 (푠푡+1) and the exchange rate risk 풱푖푡(푠푡+1) by bounded-rational rules-of-thumb.
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the foreign currency in domestic currency units. Note, that DeGrauwe and Grimaldi
(2006) assume agents to be bounded rational. Hence, ℰ(.) and 풱(.) are not the
objective expectation and variance operators based on objective probabilities, but
they are the individual traders subjective expectations and the subjective variance
assessments based on bounded-rational rules of thumb. By solving this portfolio
allocation problem we arrive at the following demand for foreign currency
푑푖푡 =
(1 + 푟∗)ℰ 푖푡 (푠푡+1)− (1 + 푟)푠푡
휇(1 + 푟∗)2풱 푖푡(푠푡+1)
. (4.4)
Typically for utility functions with constant absolute risk aversion the demand for
the risky asset does not depend on initial wealth 푊푡, is rising in the return of the
risky asset and declining in the risk of the asset. Note, that 휇 is the degree of
risk aversion, a parameter crucial for our analysis. Since we abstract from interest
rate risk, we set following DeGrauwe and Grimaldi (2006) the interest rates to zero
(푟 = 푟∗ = 0). Under this restriction we arrive at a demand function, which is in
line with the ones used in Westerhoﬀ (2003a, 2003b, 2003c, 2004b) and Manzan and
Westerhoﬀ (2003)
푑푖푡 =
ℰ 푖푡 (푠푡+1)− 푠푡
휇풱 푖푡(푠푡+1)
. (4.5)
Traders buy foreign currency when they expect the exchange rate to rise (ℰ 푖푡 (푠푡+1) >
푠푡), while they sell foreign currency when they expect the exchange rate to decline in
the future (ℰ 푖푡 (푠푡+1) < 푠푡). However, these demands are augmented by risk aversion
in the DeGrauwe and Grimaldi (2006) model. This means, that the demands will
be smaller in absolute value when there is more risk associated with trading in the
foreign exchange market.
Buy or sell orders generate transaction costs 휏푠푡푑
푖
푡, since the policy maker levies a
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proportional transaction tax 휏 in spirit of the one proposed by Tobin (1978). A
round trip of investing in the foreign country and consuming the proﬁt in the home
country leads to the following proﬁt after taxes (see Westerhoﬀ 2008a and Demary
2010)
휋˜푖푡 = (푠푡 − 푠푡−1)푑푖푡−1 − 휏(푠푡 + 푠푡−1)∣푑푖푡−1∣. (4.6)
The ﬁrst part of this formulation is the return of buying (selling) foreign currency
at 푠푡−1 and selling (buying) it at 푠푡, while the last part is the transaction costs
associated with these two transactions. When agents face transaction costs they
will only adjust their portfolios, when the proﬁt from adjusting the portfolio is
higher compared to the transaction costs
푥푖푡 =
⎧⎨⎩ 푑
푖
푡, if (푠푡 − 푠푡−1)푑푖푡−1 > 휏(푠푡 + 푠푡−1)∣푑푖푡−1∣;
0, otherwise.
(4.7)
Hence, the transaction tax creates a neutral band around the no-arbitrage condition
(푠푡 − 푠푡−1)푑푖푡−1 = 0, which is in line with the literature on ﬁnancial market taxes.
4.2.2 Agents’ Forecasting Rules
The traders’ forecasting rules are modeled following the literature on agent-based
ﬁnancial market models. These trading rules are based on empirical evidence from
survey studies among market participants which were originally performed by Taylor
and Allen (1992).5 One result is that professional traders either rely on trading rules
that take explicitly economic fundamentals into account, while others use chartist
techniques that rely on trends or other patterns in past asset prices and ignore
5Menkhoﬀ and Taylor (2007) give an overview over these studies and their key results.
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economic fundamentals. As already noted, Menkhoﬀ and Schmidt (2005) ﬁnd that
buy-&-hold traders behave fundamentally oriented and risk averse, while momentum
traders are less risk averse and follow aggressively the trend.
The fundamentalist forecasting rule expects that the exchange rate 푠푡 will revert to
the fundamental exchange rate 푠푓푡 in the distant future, with a rate of error-correction
of 휅퐹 ⋅ 100 percent.
ℰ퐹푡 (Δ푠푡+1) = 휅퐹 (푠푓푡−1 − 푠푡−1) + 휎퐹 휀퐹푡 , with 휀퐹푡 ∼ 풩 (0, 1). (4.8)
The random disturbance 휀퐹푡 can be interpreted as the fundamentalists’ mispercep-
tion of the fundamental value (Westerhoﬀ 2008a). Its volatility 휎퐹 accounts for
the uncertainty associated with using this expectational rule. This assumption is
based on the fact that neither the fundamental value nor the reversion speed of the
exchange rate toward this fundamental can be inferred without observational error.
Chartists believe that the past trend segment 푠푡−1 − 푠푡−2 can be extrapolated into
the future
ℰ퐶푡 (Δ푠푡+1) = 휅퐶(푠푡−1 − 푠푡−2) + 휎퐶휀퐶푡 , with 휀퐶푡 ∼ 풩 (0, 1). (4.9)
The parameter 휅퐶 is the strength of the trend-extrapolation. For 휅퐶 > 0 this rule is
trend-chasing, while chartists act as contarians for 휅퐶 < 0. It can also be interpreted
as the chartists’ aggressiveness. The random disturbance 휀퐶푡 can be interpreted as a
deviation from this strict deterministic rule. The volatility parameter 휎퐶 accounts
for the variety of chartist rules (Westerhoﬀ 2008a).
The volatilities 휎퐶 and 휎퐹 are crucial for the SSV mechanism.
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4.2.3 Risk Evaluation
DeGrauwe and Grimaldi (2006) assume agents to calculate a moving average of past
forecast errors in order to account for the uncertainty associated with their trading
rule
풱 푖푡(푠푡+1) = 휔 + 훼(푠푡 − ℰ 푖푡−1(푠푡))2 + 훽풱 푖푡−1(푠푡). (4.10)
When agents assume a constant risk, as in Brock and Hommes (1998), then 훼 =
훽 = 0, We assume this restriction, since we concentrate on SSV as a generator for
volatility clusters.6
4.2.4 Evaluation of Trading Rules
Traders are allowed to change their trading rules when other rules are more successful
compared to theirs. This mechanism was originally proposed by Brock and Hommes
(1998). Following Westerhoﬀ (2008a) and Demary (2010) we assume the following
ﬁtness measures
휋푖푡 = (푠푡 − 푠푡−1)푥푖푡−1 − 휏(푠푡 + 푠푡−1)∣푥푖푡−1∣+ 휃휋푖푡−1. (4.11)
The memory parameter 휃 can often be found in agent-based models (see Westerhoﬀ
2008a and Westerhoﬀ and Dieci 2006). It measures how strong agents discount past
6The time-varying risk-evaluation (TVRE) of traders as well as the heterogeneity in the variation
of the trading rules of chartists and fundamentalists (which leads to SSV) are both generators
of volatility clustering. When I abstract from the TVRE and only use the SSV, volatility
clusters and slowly declining autocorrelations of absolute returns remain. However, when I
abstract from SSV and only use the TVRE, the model produces less persistent autocorrelations
compared to empirical data. I conclude that SSV is the more important generator of volatility
clustering. Moreover, this simpliﬁcation is not crucial for the models ability to explain stylized
facts nor for the implications of the policy analysis.
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proﬁts for strategy selection. When 휃 = 0, then only todays proﬁts determine the
popularity of the trading strategies, while for 휃 = 1 all past proﬁts will be considered.
Following Westerhoﬀ (2003a, 2008a) and Demary (2010) we assume that traders can
choose between using the chartist trading rule, the fundamentalist trading rule or
they abstain from trading. The last possibility is crucial when traders act under
transaction costs. When the transaction costs of trading in the foreign exchange
market are higher compared to the return of trading then traders decide to stay
inactive as already highlighted in the subsection before. Brock and Hommes (1998)
suggest the percentage fractions of traders to be determined by the discrete choice
model proposed by Manski and McFadden (1981). Hence, the percentage fraction
of traders using the fundamentalist rule is determined as
푤퐹푡 =
exp{훾휋퐹푡−1}
1 + exp{훾휋퐹푡−1}+ exp{훾휋퐶푡−1}
, (4.12)
the percentage fraction of traders using the chartist rule is
푤퐶푡 =
exp{훾휋퐹푡−1}
1 + exp{훾휋퐹푡−1}+ exp{훾휋퐶푡−1}
, (4.13)
while the percentage fraction of traders, who abstain from trading is given by
푤퐼푡 =
1
1 + exp{훾휋퐹푡−1}+ exp{훾휋퐶푡−1}
, (4.14)
since the proﬁt generated by abstaining from trade is zero by construction. The
parameter 훾 can be interpreted as the intensity-of-choice parameter. The higher 훾
the more agents switch to the trading rule which was the most proﬁtable one in the
past. For 훾 = 0 we have the special case of constant population fractions, while for
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훾 =∞ all agents switch to the most proﬁtable trading strategy.
4.2.5 Market Equilibrium
Market demand for foreign currency 푋푡 is given by the sum over all individual
demands 푥푖푡 multiplied by the number of agents 푛
푖
푡, who use one of the possible
trading strategies
푋푡 ≡ 푛퐶푡 푥퐶푡 + 푛퐹푡 푥퐹푡 + 푛퐼푡푥퐼푡 . (4.15)
Here 푛퐶푡 is the number of agents, who use the chartist trading rule to determine their
demand, 푛퐹푡 is the number of agents who use the fundamentalist rule to determine
their demand, while 푛퐼푡 is the number of inactive agents. Since these agents abstain
from trading, their demand is zero. Since DeGrauwe and Grimaldi (2006) normalize
the supply of foreign assets to zero, the market clearing condition is given by
푛퐶푡 푥
퐶
푡 + 푛
퐹
푡 푥
퐹
푡 = 0. (4.16)
The rationale for setting the supply for foreign currence to zero is that we abstract
from central bank interventions which are beyond the scope of this paper.
We follow the derivation of the model explained in DeGrauwe and Grimaldi (2006).
By dividing through the total number of agents 푁 ≡ 푛퐶푡 + 푛퐹푡 + 푛퐼푡 and by deﬁning
the percentage fractions as 푤푖푡 ≡ 푛푖푡/푁 , we arrive at
푤퐶푡 푥
퐶
푡 + 푤
퐹
푡 푥
퐹
푡 = 0. (4.17)
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Inserting the traders’ demand functions (4.7) results in
푤퐶푡 ⋅
푠푡−1 + ℰ퐶푡 (Δ푠푡+1)− 푠푡
휇풱퐶푡 (푠푡+1)
+ 푤퐹푡 ⋅
푠푡−1 + ℰ퐹푡 (Δ푠푡+1)− 푠푡
휇풱퐹푡 (푠푡+1)
= 0, (4.18)
where we assume following DeGrauwe and Grimaldi (2006) that ℰ 푖푡 (푠푡+1) = 푠푡−1 +
ℰ 푖푡 (Δ푠푡+1)7
Dividing by {푤퐶푡 /풱퐶푡 (푠푡+1) + 푤퐹푡 /풱퐹푡 (푠푡+1)} yields
푠푡 = 푠푡−1 + Θ퐶푡 ℰ퐶푡 (Δ푠푡+1) + Θ퐹푡 (ℰ퐹푡 (Δ푠푡+1)), (4.19)
where we deﬁne the risk-adjusted population fractions in line with DeGrauwe and
Grimaldi (2006) as
Θ퐶푡 ≡
푤퐶푡 /풱퐶푡 (푠푡+1)
푤퐶푡 /풱퐶푡 (푠푡+1) + 푤퐹푡 /풱퐹푡 (푠푡+1)
(4.20)
Θ퐹푡 ≡
푤퐹푡 /풱퐹푡 (푠푡+1)
푤퐶푡 /풱퐶푡 (푠푡+1) + 푤퐹푡 /풱퐹푡 (푠푡+1)
. (4.21)
Inserting the fundamentalist and chartist forecasting models yields
푠푡 = 푠푡−1 + Θ퐶푡 (휅퐶(푠푡−1− 푠푡−2) +휎퐶휀퐶푡 ) + Θ퐹푡 (휅퐹 (푠퐹푡−1− 푠푡−1) +휎퐹 휀퐹푡 ) +휎휀푆푡 , (4.22)
where 휀푆푡 ∼ 풩 (0, 1) is a constant fraction of noise traders in the market, which
ensure a minimum fraction of liquidity in the market for the case that a large frac-
tion of chartists and fundamentalists abstain from trading under transaction taxes.
7DeGrauwe and Grimaldi (2006) assume that 푠푡 is not known to the agents, when their form their
expectations.
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Rearranging this equation results in
푠푡 = 푠푡−1 + Θ퐹푡 휅퐹 (푠
퐹
푡−1 − 푠푡−1) + Θ퐶푡 휅퐶(푠푡−1 − 푠푡−2) + 휎푡휀푆푡 (4.23)
휎푡 ≡ 휎 + Θ퐹푡 휎퐹 + Θ퐶푡 휎퐶 . (4.24)
This model is characterized by SSV, which is according to Franke and Westerhoﬀ
(2009) an important generator of volatility clustering. The mean value dynamics
(4.22) are characterized by a centrifugal component 휅퐶(푠푡−1−푠푡−2) and a centripetal
component 휅퐹 (푠
퐹
푡−1− 푠푡−1) (see Lux 2009). The centrifugal component is caused by
the trend-chasing behavior of chartist traders, while the centripetal force is caused
by the stabilizing behavior of fundamentalists. The exchange rate dynamics is char-
acterized by an on-oﬀ-intermittency due to ﬂuctuations in the population weights
Θ퐹푡 and Θ
퐶
푡 = 1 − Θ퐹푡 (see Lux and Marchesi 2000). Thus, the exchange rate 푠푡
deviates from its fundamental value 푠퐹푡 and a speculative bubble emerges when Θ
퐶
푡
is large, while the exchange rate will be attracted by its fundamental value, when Θ퐹푡
is large. These ﬂuctuations in the population weights also lead to volatility clusters
due to the SSV formulation of the volatility dynamics (4.23), when the variability in
chartist rules is larger compared to the variability in fundamentalist rules 휎퐶 > 휎퐹 .
When Θ퐶푡 is large, the market is in a high volatility state, while the market will be
in a low volatility state, when Θ퐹푡 is large. By aﬀecting the population weights, the
transaction tax rates has eﬀects onto the mean value dynamics as well as onto the
volatility dynamics.
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4.3 The Fundamental Equilibrium
For analyzing the long-term properties of the model we follow the derivations in
Westerhoﬀ and Dieci (2006) and concentrate on the deterministic skeleton of the
model. Hence, we set all shocks to zero. The long-term solution is given when
(푠푡−1, 푠퐹 , 푥푖푡−1, 푤
푖
푡−1, 휋
푖
푡−1) = (푠푡, 푠
퐹 , 푥푖푡, 푤
푖
푡, 휋
푖
푡) = (푠, 푠
퐹 , 푥푖, 푤푖, 휋푖) (4.25)
for 푖 ∈ {퐶,퐹, 퐼}.
Within the long-term fundamental steady-state 푠푡−1 = 푠푡 = 푠 = 푠퐹 traders demand
for foreign currency will be zero
푥퐶 = 푥퐹 = 푥퐼 = 0, (4.26)
and all ﬁtness measures will be zero as well
휋퐶 = 휋퐹 = 휋퐼 = 0. (4.27)
Zero ﬁtness measures for all agents leads to a uniform distribution in the popularity
of all three trading rules
푤퐶 = 푤퐹 = 푤퐼 =
1
3
, (4.28)
which leads to
Θ퐶 = Θ퐹 =
1
2
. (4.29)
Comparable results can often be found in chartist-fundamentalist models (DeGrauwe
and Grimaldi 2006, Westerhoﬀ 2008a, Westerhoﬀ and Dieci 2006).
CHAPTER 4. TRANSACTION TAXES, GREED AND RISK AVERSION IN AN
AGENT-BASED FINANCIAL MARKET MODEL 127
Stability properties for the fundamental steady-state can be found in the appendix.
4.4 Calibration, Validation and Simulation Design
4.4.1 Calibration
Before we start the simulation of the model and the policy analysis, we have to
ﬁnd reasonable values for the model’s parameters. Most parameter values are in
the range as the ones used in Westerhoﬀ (2008a) and Demary (2010), which are
chosen such that the model is able to match numbers and statistics of real world
ﬁnancial market data.8 Westerhoﬀ (2008a) and Demary (2010) assume chartists’
and fundamentalists’ aggressiveness as 휅퐶 = 휅퐹 = 0.04. Hence, chartists expect
an exchange rate change of 0.04 for the next trading day in response to a past
exchange rate change of 1, while fundamentalists expect an exchange rate change of
0.04 in response to a misalignment of 1. The variation in the chartist trading rules
휎퐶 = 0.055 is higher compared to the fundamentalists misperception 휎퐹 = 0.005,
in order to achieve volatility clusters through the SSV mechanism. The memory
parameter 휃 = 0.98 indicates that agents orientate on recent as well as on past
performances of all trading rules. The intensity of choice parameter 훾 = 600 ensures
that enough traders change their views of the world in response to changes in the
performance measures. The agents’ subjective volatility estimate 휔 = 0.03 seems
to be high, since its value is larger compared to the volatility of the exchange rate.
However, this high value is necessary for the simulations to be computationally
8Studies in which agent-based ﬁnancial market models were estimated are Gilli and Winker (2003),
Westerhoﬀ and Reitz (2003), Lux (2009b), Alfarano, Lux and Wagner (2005), Boswijk, Hommes
and Manzan (2007), Winker, Gilli and Jeleskovic (2007), Manzan and Westerhoﬀ (2007) and
Ghonghadze and Lux (2009).
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stable and to avoid unrealistic large crashes in the exchange rate due to unrealistic
high demands of chartists. Another is, that it is the compound parameter 휇 × 휔
that determines risk aversion and not the value of 휔 alone. We calibrate the risk
aversion parameter 휇 = 50 such that the simulations yield realistic return properties.
The reason for this assumption is, that there is no empirical evidence on reasonable
values for this parameter. The fundamental value of the exchange rate is assumed
to be constant and normalized to 푠퐹 = 10. Parameters are summarized in table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Calibration of the Baseline Simulation
Parameter Value Interpretation
휅퐶 0.04 chartists’ aggressiveness
휅퐹 0.04 fundamentalists’ agressiveness
휎퐶 0.055 variety of chartist rules
휎퐹 0.005 variety of fundamentalist rules
훾 600 intensity of choice
휃 0.98 memory parameter
휎푆 0.005 volatility of non-fundamental innovations
휇 50 degree of risk aversion
휔 0.03 subjective volatility estimate
푠퐹 10 fundamental exchange rate
Notes: Most parameter values are chosen following the parameterization of Westerhoﬀ (2008a)
and Demary (2010). All remaining parameters are given such that the model reproduces properties
of real world exchange rate data quite well.
4.4.2 Validation
Following Westerhoﬀ (2008a), Lux (2009a), Westerhoﬀ and Franke (2009) and De-
mary (2010) we use the following validation criteria, which are based on the styl-
ized facts of ﬁnancial market data: (i) asset prices are characterized by bubbles
and crashes (deviations from fundamental value), (ii) asset prices should be more
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volatile compared to their fundamental values (excess volatility or distortions), (iii)
the return distribution should deviate from the normal distribution (excess kurtosis),
(iv) absence of autocorrelation in raw returns (non-predictability of daily returns),
(v) persistent and slowly decaying autocorrelations in absolute returns (volatility
clustering).
There are additional stylized facts from which we abstract. We concentrate on the
minimum required stylized facts, that a model should be able to match instead.
Unfortunately, models with less economic structure are better in replicating stylized
facts. However, we need a model with an economic foundation to do an economic
policy analysis. Since the aim of this paper is not to reproduce stylized facts as
precise as possible, but to do an economic policy analysis within a model that is able
to reproduce realistic exchange rate ﬂuctuations, we are satisﬁed when our model
is able to match the most relevant (or minimum required) stylized facts of ﬁnancial
market data. When the model is able to meet the Franke-Lux-Westerhoﬀ validation
criteria, then our model is a suﬃcient representation of daily foreign exchange market
dynamics and we should expect to derive realistic policy implications from it.
Figure 4.1 shows a snapshot of a typical simulation run.9 The ﬁrst 1000 data points
were removed in order to avoid phenomena that depend on the initial conditions.
The exchange rate is characterized by persistent bubbles and crashes. As can be
seen in the ﬁgure, large distortions (large deviations from the fundamental value)
correspond to periods with a large number of chartist traders, while periods with
the exchange rate close to the fundamental value correspond to periods dominated
by fundamentalist traders. The observed distortions indicates that asset prices are
9All programming and computations were done using the free open source software R (R Devel-
opment Core Team 2009).
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Figure 4.1: Baseline Simulation: No Taxes Levied
Notes: The output of a typical simulation run. The underlying parameter values are those given
in Table 4.1. Fundamental values are represented by horizontal lines at 푠퐹 = 10 and 푤퐹 = 푤퐶 =
푤퐼 = 1/3. Distortion is the average absolute percentage deviation of the exchange rate from its
fundamental value, while volatility is the average absolute percentage time change in the exchange
rate.
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more volatile than their fundamental values. Another empirical fact the model is
able to replicate can be inferred from the autocorrelations of raw returns and ab-
solute returns. Raw returns are characterized by negligible autocorrelations which
indicate an absence of predictability on a daily basis. The autocorrelations of abso-
lute returns, however, are persistent and slowly decaying. This high autocorrelations
in absolute returns indicate the presence of volatility clusters. These changing peri-
ods of high an low volatility can be inferred as well by just eyeballing the time series
of returns. In line with our intuition, periods of high volatility tend to correspond to
periods with a large number of chartists, while periods with low volatility correspond
to periods with a high dominance of fundamentalist traders.
Table 4.2: Summary Statistics: Model versus Data
USD-Euro Yen-USD GBP-USD USD-AusD
mean 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
volatility 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.009
skewness 0.179 -0.509 -0.330 -0.757
kurtosis 5.560 6.885 9.315 17.009
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
mean 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
volatility 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.007
skewness 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
kurtosis 7.283 7.545 12.005 8.057
Notes: The exchange rate data are taken from the FRED2 database of the Federal Reserve Bank
of St. Louis in daily frequency. The data series range from 1999-01-04 to 2009-10-09 and are
available under the series-ID: DEXUSEU, DEXJPUS, DEXUSUK, DEXCAUS and DEXAUUS.
Model 1 to Model 4 are characterized by diﬀerent parameter sets. Model 1 represents the baseline
case given in table 1, while model 2 assumes more aggressive chartists 휅퐶 = 0.09, model 3 assumes
more aggressive fundamentalists 휅퐹 = 0.09, while model 4 assumes variabilities in forecasting rules
of 휎퐶 = 0.12 and 휎퐹 = 0.03. All remaining parameters are assigned to the values given in table
1.
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Table 4.2 compares summary statistics of the model to those of US-Dollar to Euro
exchange rate returns and those of the Yen - US-Dollar exchange rate, the Great
Britain Pound - US-Dollar and the US-Dollar - Australian Dollar exchange rates.
All four exchange rate return time series are characterized by an average daily return
near zero, a standard deviation between 0.7 percent and 0.9 percent and a kurto-
sis between 5.6 and 17.0 which indicate that the return distribution deviates from
a normal distribution. Table 4.2 contains summary statistics of model generated
exchange rate returns of a typical simulation run for a snapshot of 6,000 artiﬁcial
trading days.10 We report summary statistics for four calibrations of the model.
The model generated daily returns are as well characterized by a mean return near
zero, a standard deviation of 0.2 to 0.3 percent and a kurtosis in the range of 7.3 to
13.1 indicating deviations from the normal distribution. In contrast to the empirical
returns, we ﬁnd a skewness of zero in the artiﬁcial return distributions. The reason
lies in the fact that we abstract from persistent interest rate diﬀerentials and central
bank interventions, which can cause the skewness in the empirical return distribu-
tions. The volatility of models 1 to 3 are smaller compared to the empirical volatility,
while model 4 is able to mimick the empirical volatility. However, model 4 assumes a
higher variation of the chartists’ and fundamentalists’ trading rules (휎퐶 = 0.12 and
휎퐹 = 0.03) as applied in the literature (Westerhoﬀ 2008a, Demary 2010). However,
we perform the policy analysis under the parameterization of model 1, since this
parameterization is more common in the literature. However, one should keep in
mind that results only apply to the 1/3 of actual volatility the model mimicks.
10Actually, we simulated 7,000 trading days from which we skipped the ﬁrst 1,000 in order to avoid
artefacts that depend on initial conditions.
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4.4.3 Simulation Design
Westerhoﬀ (2008a) lists advantages of agent-based policy analysis which apply to
our experiments in the following way:
(i) We choose a simulation horizon of 7,000 artiﬁcial trading days, where we skip
the ﬁrst 1,000 data points since they are biased by ﬂuctuations that depend
on the chosen initial conditions. We calculate numbers and statistics over
6,000 trading days and present the variation in these numbers and statistics
over the 50 independent simulation runs in box plots.11 Although these box
plots are more diﬃcult to interpret compared to just average properties over
50 simulation runs, they deliver useful information about the variation of the
model’s properties for diﬀerent simulation runs.
(ii) Westerhoﬀ (2008a) also highlights that we are able to measure all variables
precisely during our simulations like the fundamental value and the decisions
of agents.
(iii) Westerhoﬀ (2008a) notes that the researcher is able to account for all exogenous
shocks. Within our simulations we introduce the shocks we already highlighted
in the description of the model. We do not introduce other exogenous events
like a large drop in the fundamental value (e.g. a big recession) or large non-
fundamental innovations (e.g. panic). The reason is that we want to analyze
the eﬀectiveness of ﬁnancial market taxes during ”normal” trading days.
(iv) Following Demary (2010) we perform the simulations under the same con-
11The box plots indicate the median over 50 simulation runs, the ﬁrst and the third quartile. The
whiskers indicate the most extreme points which are in a range of 1.5 from the box, while
outliers are highlighted as dots.
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ditions (the same seed of random variables), but under diﬀerent tax rates.
Simulations for each value of the currency transaction tax are based on the
same seed of 50× 6, 000 = 300, 000 random numbers.
The policy analysis should give us more insights in how greed and risk aversion aﬀect
the eﬀectiveness of ﬁnancial market taxes. Therefore, we have to vary the following
model parameters:
(a) Transaction tax rate.
(b) Risk aversion: A large value of 휇 indicates that the agent is more risk averse.
However, we are only able to measure constant absolute risk aversion. This
means that the degree of risk aversion does not depend on the agent’s wealth.
However, more complicated utility functions are neccessary for analyzing de-
creasing or increasing absolute risk aversion.
(c) Greed and aggressiveness: We deﬁne a greedy or aggressive agent as one, who
has a higher aggressiveness parameter either as a chartist (휅퐶) or as a funda-
mentalist (휅퐹 ) or the agent’s response to changes in proﬁts (훾) is high. In more
detail, when a chartist is greedy, he or she expects a stronger trend compared
to a less greedy chartist and therefore places larger orders. A greedy funda-
mentalist expects the exchange rate to revert faster to its fundamental value
and therefore places larger orders compared to a less greedy fundamentalist.
Moreover, a greedy agent switches more frequently between diﬀerent trading
rules in order to increase his or her proﬁts.
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4.4.4 Policy Evaluation
Westerhoﬀ (2003a, 2008a) suggests the following market (in-)eﬃciency measures for
evaluating the eﬀectiveness of policy measures:
(i) volatility, deﬁned as the average absolute percentage change in the asset price.
(ii) distortion, deﬁned as the average absolute deviation of the asset price from its
fundamental value, which measures the degree of excess volatility.
(iii) Westerhoﬀ (2008a) and Demary (2008, 2010) suggest to analyze the change in
the average percentage fraction of trading rules used by agents as a measure
of the change in traders’ behavior in response to policy measures, while
(iv) Westerhoﬀ (2008a) and Demary (2008, 2010) suggests to use the change in the
kurtosis of the return distribution as a measure of catastrophic risks caused
by large outliers. There are better measures for the tail behavior of the distri-
bution of returns like the Hill estimator for the tail index (Lux and Ausloos
2002). However, the kurtosis is a statistic which is very sensitive to outliers.
Hence, although not measuring tail behavior it might be a good statistic to
measure the occurance of extreme events directly, like a crash for example.
4.5 The Eﬀectiveness of Transaction Taxes
4.5.1 Simulation Runs under Taxation
Stabilizing Tax Regime: Figure 4.2 shows the model outcome of a typical simu-
lation run under a tax rate of 0.1 percent. Under this tax rate all chartists abstain
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from trading, while the number of fundamentalists ﬂuctuates around 20 percent.
Thus, the number of inactive traders ﬂuctuates around 80 percent. Hence, there are
more fundamentalist traders left compared to trend-chasing traders indicating that
this low tax rate might have the potential to stabilize ﬁnancial markets. However,
80 percent of traders are not trading which indicates a loss of liquidity. An absence
of autocorrelation in raw as well as in absolute returns can be inferred for the au-
tocorrelation diagrams. Thus, volatility clusters are absent under taxation, a result
which can also be found in Demary (2010). This result is caused by the decline in
the number of chartist traders, who account for a large fraction of the variation of
returns through the SSV mechanism. Moreover, bubbles are less persistent com-
pared to the baseline simulation. This outcome is due to the fact that there are no
chartist traders left in the market. Furthermore, returns look like white noise, while
distortions seem to be unsystematic. The model outcome indicates that the tax rate
0.1 percent lies within a stabilizing tax regime.
Destabilizing Tax Regime: Figure 4.3 shows a simulation run under a tax rate
of 1 percent. Under this tax rate chartists as well as fundamentalists abstain from
trading. Since fundamentalists are absent, there is no driving force that connects
the exchange rate to its fundamental value. As a result, the time series of distortions
is highly persistent and seems to follow a random walk. Thus, the exchange rate
seems to return to its fundamental value only with a small probability. Moreover,
volatility is rising in time, a phenomenon which is a characteristic of a random walk.
The results indicate that the tax rate of 1 percent lies within a destabilizing tax
regime. The results from ﬁgures 4.2 and 4.3 are in line with the 푢-shaped volatilty
and misalignment response curves found in the models of Westerhoﬀ (2003a, 2008a)
and Demary (2010). In the following lines we will get more insights into this point.
CHAPTER 4. TRANSACTION TAXES, GREED AND RISK AVERSION IN AN
AGENT-BASED FINANCIAL MARKET MODEL 137
1000 2000 3000 4000 5000
9
.9
5
1
0
.0
5
Exchange Rate
Trading Days
E
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 R
a
te
1000 2000 3000 4000 5000
−
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
1
Return
Trading Days
R
e
tu
r
n
1000 2000 3000 4000 5000
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
4
0
.0
0
8
Distortion
Trading Days
D
is
to
r
ti
o
n
1000 2000 3000 4000 5000
0
.0
0
.4
0
.8
Fundamentalists
Trading Days
P
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
1000 2000 3000 4000 5000
0
.0
0
.4
0
.8
Inactive Traders
Trading Days
P
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
1000 2000 3000 4000 5000
0
.0
0
.4
0
.8
Chartists
Trading Days
P
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
0 20 40 60 80
0
.0
0
.4
0
.8
Lag
A
C
F
Autocorrelation of Raw Returns
0 20 40 60 80
0
.0
0
.4
0
.8
Lag
A
C
F
Autocorrelation of Absolute Returns
1000 2000 3000 4000 5000
0
.0
0
0
0
0
.0
0
1
5
Volatility
Trading Days
V
o
la
ti
li
ty
Figure 4.2: Simulation of a Stabilizing Tax Regime: 0.1 Percent Tax
Notes: The output of a typical simulation run of a stabilizing tax regime. The underlying
parameter values are those given in table 1. Fundamental equilibrium values from the baseline
case are given by the horizontal lines located at 푠퐹 = 10 and 푤퐹 = 푤퐶 = 푤퐼 = 1/3.
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Figure 4.3: Simulation of a Destabilizing Tax Regime: 1 Percent Tax
Notes: The output of a typical simulation run of a destabilizing tax regime. The underlying
parameter values are those given in table 1. Fundamental equilibrium values from the baseline
case are given by the horizontal lines located at 푠퐹 = 10 and 푤퐹 = 푤퐶 = 푤퐼 = 1/3.
4.5.2 Comparison of Diﬀerent Tax Regimes
Figure 4.4 contains a comparison of tax regimes. The tax rate ranges from 0 (baseline
case) to 1 percent (destabilizing tax regime) and is varied in 0.05 percentage point
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steps. All simulations for diﬀerent tax rates are based on the same seed of random
variables. The ﬁgure shows volatility, distortion and the kurtosis, as well as the
population fractions of chartists, fundamentalists and inactive traders as a function
of the transaction tax rate. Remind, that 100 percent inactive traders indicate
that there are no chartists and fundamentalists left in the market, while a constant
fraction of noise traders is still trading.
From these ﬁgures can be inferred, that the number of chartists and fundamentalists
are declining on average in the tax rate. Moreover, all chartists and fundamentalists
are inactive on average for tax rates above 0.5 percent. Furthermore, the variation
in these population fractions is increasing in the tax rate. This can be inferred from
the larger boxes for higher values of the transaction tax rates. Moreover, there is
a larger number of outliers for higher tax rates as well. However, the number of
outliers for the number of chartists is larger compared to the outliers in the number
of fundamentalists. These results indicate several speculative attacks of chartists.
The volatility of the exchange rate returns is decreasing on average in the tax rate.
However, the variation in this statistic is increasing in the tax rate as well. This
can be inferred from the larger boxes. Note that the whisker of the baseline case
lies within the boxes for higher tax rates. Thus, there is a certain probability that
taxation will increase the volatility of exchange rate returns as well. This is especially
the case for the simulations in which the number of fundamentalists is near zero,
which limits the reversion of the exchange rate towards its fundamental values. From
the variation in the results of these policy experiments we can conclude that taxation
might also lead to higher volatility with a certain probability.
The kurtosis statistic is decreasing in the tax rate on average. There are small
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Figure 4.4: Comparison of Tax Regimes
Notes: All boxplots are based on 6,000 artiﬁcal trading days and 50 simulation runs. The middle
line of the box plots represent the median over 50 simulation runs, while the ends of the boxes
represent the ﬁrst and third quartiles. The whiskers indicate the most extreme point that is with
a factor of 1.5 of the hinge. Any points beyond the whiskers are outliers. Note, that simulations
for diﬀerent tax rates are based on the same seed of random variables. The underlying parameter
values are those given in table 4.1.
boxes indicating that there is a small process error due to diﬀerent seeds of random
variables. Hence, taxing ﬁnancial markets lead to a smaller number of large returns,
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that means to less crashes. However, there is as well a signiﬁcant number of outliers.
Thus, there are also simulation runs in which taxing ﬁnancial markets lead to a
higher frequency of crashes.
A similar picture can be found for the average distortion or excess volatility. Distor-
tions are decreasing in the tax rate on average but the variation in this number is as
well increasing in the tax rate. This can be inferred from the larger boxes for higher
tax rates. Moreover, there is a signiﬁcant number of large outliers. These results
indicate that distortion might be declining on average. However, the large number
of simulation runs in which it is increasing indicates that the stabilizing eﬀect is not
for sure and that there are signiﬁcant cases where taxation has destabilizing eﬀects.
This is especially the case for the simulation runs, where the number of fundamen-
talists is near zero, while there is a larger number of chartist traders left. In these
cases the reversion of the exchange rate towards its fundamental value is limited.
From these results we conclude that small taxes have the ability to stabilize the
ﬁnancial market, while higher tax rates have not. The stabilizing tax regime is de-
parted from the destabilizing one by a tax rate of 0.1 percent. For tax rates below
this threshold value the number of fundamentalists is higher compared to the num-
ber of chartists, while volatility and distortions are declining in the tax rate. The
reason for the destabilizing nature of higher tax rates is due to the fact, that these
tax regimes are characterized by a higher uncertainty around the average behavior
of volatility and distortions over several simulation runs as indicated by the larger
boxes. The uncertainty around these numbers is due to the larger outliers in the
number of chartists for higher tax rates. In these cases, their number is higher com-
pared to the number of fundamentalists, what explains the destabilization of the
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market. It seems that chartistm might be more proﬁtable compared to fundamen-
talism under higher transaction cost at least for some cases. Comparable results can
also be found in Westerhoﬀ (2003a, 2008a) and Demary (2010). The variation in our
result might be due to the nonlinearity of the model and its sensitivity to diﬀerent
seeds of random variables.
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Figure 4.5: Comparisons of Tax Regimes for Diﬀerent Degrees of Fundamentalists’
Aggressiveness 휅퐹
Notes: See Figure 4.4.
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4.5.3 Aggressiveness of Fundamentalists
Figure 4.5 contains a comparison of diﬀerent tax regimes for diﬀerent degrees of the
aggressiveness of fundamentalists. Results for volatility, kurtosis and distortions are
given in boxplots. These boxplots contain averages over 6,000 artiﬁcial trading day
plotted for 50 independent simulation runs. In contrast to Figure 4.4 we provide
plots for diﬀerent degrees of aggressiveness with which fundamentalists trade. More
precisely, we diﬀerentiate between the cases 휅퐹 ∈ {0.01, 0.04, 0.09, 0.15}, while the
tax rate is varied from 0 percent to 1 percent in 0.1 percentage point steps. Note,
that 휏 = 0.01 means that the tax rate is 1 percent.
We ﬁgure out the 푢-shaped volatility response on average for 휅퐹 = 0.01, the case in
which fundamentalists act less aggressive compared to the baseline case. Moreover,
there is large uncertainty around this median for larger tax rates, which is indicated
by the wider boxes and whiskers. The kurtosis seems to decline in the tax rate on
average, however, there are large outliers especially for larger tax rates. A 푢-shaped
response of distortions to higher tax rates can be found as well. However, there
are larger boxes and whiskers for higher tax rates indicating more variation in this
measure over the 50 simulation runs.
For larger values of 휅퐹 we ﬁnd that volatility is declining especially for higher tax
rates. However, ﬂuctuations in this statistics are not decreasing in the fundamen-
talists aggressiveness. For 휅퐹 = 0.15 we ﬁnd smaller boxes for lower tax rates, but
a larger number of outliers. Distortions are declining on average in the tax rate
when fundamentalists act more aggressively. Moreover, we ﬁnd smaller boxes and
whiskers at least for small tax rates. Furthermore, we ﬁnd a reduction in the number
of outliers for this measure, when fundamentalists act more aggressively.
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Summing up, these results are in line with the conventional view, that more ag-
gressive fundamentalists act as a stabilizing force. This can be inferred from the
volatility and misalignment response curves which become ﬂatter the more aggres-
sively fundamentalists trade. A comparable result can be found in the model used in
Demary (2010). We conclude, that taxation is more eﬀective, when fundamentalists
trade more aggressively.
4.5.4 Aggressiveness of Chartists
Figure 4.6 contains a comparison of diﬀerent tax regimes for diﬀerent degrees of
chartists’ aggressiveness. A higher value of this parameter indicates that chartists
place larger orders for a given trend segment and, hence, trade more aggressively.
We consider the cases 휅퐶 ∈ {0.01, 0.04, 0.06, 0.09}.
The 푢-shaped volatility response to taxation becomes ﬂatter for small tax rates
the less aggressively chartists trade. The smallest box can be found for a tax rate
of 0.1 percent, while boxes increase in size for tax rates above this value. Larger
boxes indicate a larger variation through diﬀerent simulation runs. For increasing
tax rates we ﬁgure out that whiskers become more narrow, while outliers of the
volatiliy increase in magnitude, when chartists become more aggressively. The higher
frequency of outliers might be caused by more frequent speculative attacks when
chartist act more aggressively.
For 휅퐶 = 0.09 we ﬁnd that chartists destabilize since we ﬁnd the highest number
of outliers of volatility for this value of the trend-extrapolation parameter. Large
outliers of the kurtosis measure increase especially for higher transaction tax rates,
when trend-chasing agents act more aggressive. The large outliers of a statistic
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which indicates large average returns in a sample indicates that there are infrequent
speculative attacks caused by chartists’ aggressiveness.
We ﬁgure out a 푢-shaped distortion response curve for rising tax rates as well. The
picture which emerges from the box plot is more or less robust to diﬀerent values of
the chartists’ aggressiveness. For the case 휅퐶 = 0.09 we ﬁnd more outliers and more
variation as indicated by a larger box for the case of a 0.1 percent transaction tax.
Summing up, the results indicate that a higher aggressiveness of chartists leads to a
destabilization and a smaller eﬀectiveness of transaction taxes in ﬁnancial markets.
The smaller eﬀectiveness can be inferred from the volatiliy response curve which
becomes ﬂatter on average the less aggressively chartists act. Similar ﬁndings can
be found in the sensitivity analysis in Demary (2010).
4.5.5 Intensity of Choice
Figure 4.7 contains a comparison of diﬀerent tax regimes for diﬀerent values of the
agent’s intensity-of-choice parameter. A higher value of this parameter indicates
that agents switch more often between trading strategies for maximizing proﬁts.
The case 훾 = 1 is the case where agents react more sluggish to changes in the
performance measures. As a result, ﬂat volatility, kurtosis, and distortion response
curves to taxation emerge. Moreover, the kurtosis measure corresponds to the one
of the normal distribution.
For the case 훾 = 50 and for higher values of this parameter a 푢-shaped volatility
response curve emerges. Volatility reductions can be found for tax rates between
0.3 and 0.8 but not for tax rates below 0.3 percent. For rising tax rates boxes
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Figure 4.6: Comparison of Tax Regimes for Diﬀerent Degrees of Chartists’ Aggres-
siveness 휅퐶
Notes: See Figure 4.4.
and whiskers increase indicating more variation for diﬀerent simulation runs. For
훾 = 100 we ﬁnd that the tax rates 0.1 percent and 0.2 percent become stabilizing,
since they decrease volatility now. However, we ﬁgure out that the tax rate 0.3
percent increases volatility when we enlarge 훾 to the value 600.
As already mentioned, we ﬁnd that the kurtosis of the exchange rate return distri-
CHAPTER 4. TRANSACTION TAXES, GREED AND RISK AVERSION IN AN
AGENT-BASED FINANCIAL MARKET MODEL 147
0 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.008 0.01
0
.0
0
2
7
2
0
.0
0
2
8
0
Volatility: Intensity of Choice = 1
Tax Rate
V
o
la
ti
li
ty
l l
l l
l
l
l
l l
l
l l
l
l
l
0 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.008 0.01
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
1
0
Volatility: Intensity of Choice = 50
Tax Rate
V
o
la
ti
li
ty
ll l
ll
ll
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
0 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.008 0.01
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
1
0
Volatility: Intensity of Choice = 100
Tax Rate
V
o
la
ti
li
ty
l
l ll l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
ll
l
ll
l
0 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.008 0.01
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
1
0
Volatility: Intensity of Choice = 600
Tax Rate
V
o
la
ti
li
ty
l l l l l l l l l l l
0 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.008 0.01
2
.9
3
.1
Kurtosis: Intensity of Choice = 1
Tax Rate
K
u
r
to
s
is
l l l l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
lll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
0 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.008 0.01
4
6
8
1
2
Kurtosis: Intensity of Choice = 50
Tax Rate
K
u
r
to
s
is
ll l
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
lll
l
lll
l
lll
l
llll
l
lll
l
lll
l
lll
0 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.008 0.01
1
0
3
0
5
0
Kurtosis: Intensity of Choice = 100
Tax Rate
K
u
r
to
s
is
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
0 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.008 0.01
1
0
3
0
5
0
7
0
Kurtosis: Intensity of Choice = 600
Tax Rate
K
u
r
to
s
is
0 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.008 0.01
0
.0
1
0
0
0
.0
1
2
0
Distortion: Intensity of Choice = 1
Tax Rate
D
is
to
r
ti
o
n
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
0 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.008 0.01
0
.0
0
.4
0
.8
Distortion: Intensity of Choice = 50
Tax Rate
D
is
to
r
ti
o
n
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l l ll ll ll ll
0 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.008 0.01
0
.0
0
.4
0
.8
Distortion: Intensity of Choice = 100
Tax Rate
D
is
to
r
ti
o
n
l
l
l
l
l
l l l l ll ll ll
0 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.008 0.01
0
.0
0
.4
0
.8
Distortion: Intensity of Choice = 600
Tax Rate
D
is
to
r
ti
o
n
Figure 4.7: Comparison of Tax Regimes and Diﬀerent Intensity-of-Choice Parame-
ters 훾
Notes: See Figure 4.4.
bution equals the one of the normal distribution on average for 훾 = 1, while the
kurtosis increases when the parameter 훾 takes higher values. Moreover, we ﬁgure
out more outliers for this statistic. Thus, higher values of the intensity-of-choice
measure might cause large trends and crashes in returns. This ﬁnding makes sense
since more agents switch to the most proﬁtable trading rule under a higher value
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of 훾. From this more aggressive trading behavior more turbulent and more quite
phases emerge, which summarizes in a more leptukurtic exchange rate return dis-
tribution. Moreover, we ﬁnd larger variations in the distortion measure and more
outliers, as indicated by the larger boxes and whiskers.
We conclude, that a more aggressive switching of agents between diﬀerent trad-
ing strategies destabilize the ﬁnancial market and lowers the eﬀectiveness of higher
transaction taxes, which is indicated by the shapes of the volatility response curve.
4.5.6 Proﬁt Discounting
Figure 4.8 contains a comparison of diﬀerent tax regimes for diﬀerent values of the
agents’ memory parameter 휃 ∈ {0, 0.5, 0.9, 0.98}. A higher value of this parameter 휃
indicates that past proﬁts are taken into account for the current strategy selection,
while a lower value of 휃 indicates that agents orientate only on recent proﬁts for
determining their investment strategy. When 휃 = 0, then agents consider the last
periods proﬁt only, hence, the agent will react abruptly to changes in the perfor-
mance measures. From ﬁgure 4.8 can be inferred, that volatility, kurtosis as well as
distortions are rising in the transaction tax rate for the case 휃 = 0. Thus, taxation
leads to a destabilization of the market, when agents are very aggressive and only
consider their short-term proﬁts for strategy selection.
When the memory parameter takes the value 휃 = 0.5 the proﬁts of the last days are
as well relevant for strategy selection. In this case, volatility, kurtosis and distortions
are as well increasing in the tax rate, while also the dispersion of these statistics is
increasing in the tax rate as indicated by the larger boxes and whiskers. Hence, there
is increasing variability over several simulation runs. For tax rates near 1 percent
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Figure 4.8: Comparison of Tax Regimes for Diﬀerent Memory Parameters 휃
Notes: See Figure 4.4.
there are large outliers of distortions and kurtosis indicating erratic ﬂuctuations for
some simulation runs.
For the case of a memory parameter 휃 = 0.9 traders’ performance measure takes
even the proﬁts some weeks ago into account. In this case volatility is declining for
tax rates below 0.3 percent, while this decline is not signiﬁcant for higher tax rates
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which can be inferred from the larger boxes which indicate a larger variability of this
statistic. From the larger whiskers can be inferred, that there are a lot of simulation
runs in which volatility is increasing for higher transaction tax rates. A similar result
can be found for the kurtosis measure. Here, the number of outliers is increasing
for tax rates around 0.3 percent indicating that this regime can be destabilizing.
The variation in the average distortions are increasing in the tax rate as well as
indicated by the larger boxes and whiskers. As a result, higher tax rates lead to
larger deviations from the fundamental values for a large part of our simulation
runs.
For a memory parameter 휃 = 0.98 only the tax rate 0.1 percent seems to have
stabilizing power, while higher tax rates lead to large variations of this statistic.
We conclude, that for a large part of our simulations volatility seems to increase in
the tax rate. A similar result can be found for distortions, although a large number
of outliers can even be found for a 0.1 percent tax. The results indicate that agents’
discounting of past proﬁts plays a role for the stabilizing impact of transaction taxes.
Although taxation works on average, when agents take a large part of past proﬁts
into account, we ﬁnd in a signiﬁcant part of our simulations that taxation can also
have destabilizing eﬀects. We conclude from the shape of the volatility response
curve to taxation that taxation becomes more eﬀective the longer the memory of
the traders is.
4.5.7 Risk Aversion
Figure 4.9 contains a comparison of diﬀerent tax regimes for diﬀerent degrees of
risk aversion. A larger value of this parameter indicates that agents are more
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Figure 4.9: Comparison of Tax Regimes under Diﬀerent Degrees of Risk Aversion 휇
Notes: See Figure 4.4.
careful and place smaller orders. Hence, agents that are less risk averse tend to
be more aggressive, since they tend to trade larger orders. We analyze the cases
휇 ∈ {20, 90, 150, 200}. For 휇 = 200 we ﬁnd the 푢-shaped volatility response curve,
which diminishes for lower values of this parameter. In more detail, we ﬁnd that
volatility is smaller on average for tax rates above 0.7 percent, when agents are less
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risk averse. Hence, higher transaction taxes seems to be more eﬀective, when agents
are less risk averse. When traders have a higher degree of risk aversion, we ﬁnd
larger outliers in the kurtosis measure. Moreover, we ﬁnd less outliers for smaller
taxes, when traders are less risk averse. We ﬁnd a 푢-shaped distortions response
curve on average, when traders are risk averse (휇 = 200), while distortions decrease
in magnitude for higher tax rates, when traders are less risk averse.
Thus, higher transaction taxes are more eﬀective as indicated by the ﬂatter volatility
response curve, when traders are less risk averse. This result adds important insights
into the working of ﬁnancial market taxes, since the curvature of the volatility as well
as the distortions response curve might depend on the agents degree of risk aversion.
We conclude that taxation becomes more eﬀective the less risk averse traders are.
4.6 Conclusion and Outlook
Recent agent-based ﬁnancial market models came to the result that taxing ﬁnancial
transactions does not per se increase ﬁnancial stability and that the response of
volatility and distortions to rising tax rates seem to be 푢-shaped. Moreover, greed
and the risk appetite of traders are often blamed for ﬁnancial instability and there is
no evidence how behavioral patterns aﬀect the eﬀectiveness of regulations in ﬁnancial
markets. We aim to ﬁll this gap in the literature by analyzing how diﬀerent degrees
of risk aversion and aggressiveness of traders aﬀect the working of transaction taxes
within an agent-based framework.
We introduce ﬁnancial market taxes into the model proposed by DeGrauwe and
Grimaldi (2006), which explicitly assumes risk averse traders. Moreover, we expand
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the original model by structural stochastic volatility as proposed by Franke and
Westerhoﬀ (2009), Westerhoﬀ (2008a) and Westerhoﬀ and Dieci (2006), since it is
an important generator of volatility clusters (Franke and Westerhoﬀ 2009).
Within the model the following results emerged: (i) The tax rate 0.1 percent seems
to demarcate the stabilizing tax regime from the destabilizing tax regime. (ii) The
shapes of the volatility-response-curve and the distortion-response-curve depend on
the agents risk aversion. Both are 푢-shaped when agents are highly risk averse, while
the curves become ﬂatter the less risk averse agents are. From these results we can
conclude that transaction taxes are more eﬀective the less risk averse traders are.
(iii) More aggressive fundamental trading makes ﬁnancial market taxes more eﬀec-
tive, which is indicated by a ﬂatter volatility response curve. (iv) More aggressive
chartists makes small taxes less eﬀective. This results can be inferred from the ﬂatter
volatility response curve for lower degrees of chartists’ aggressiveness. (v) The more
agents switch to the most proﬁtable trading rule, the steeper the response curves
are for higher tax rates. We conclude that transaction taxes are less eﬀective the
higher this parameter is. (vi) Longer memory in the performance measures makes
transaction taxes more eﬀective as indicated by a ﬂatter response curves for lower
values of this parameter.
Further research should concentrate on behavioral heterogeneity in risk aversion.
We ﬁnd that transaction taxes are more eﬀective the less risk-averse traders are.
This ﬁnding might depend on a conﬁguration with more fundamentalists compared
to chartists and might not be valid under a conﬁguration with less fundamentalists
than chartists. We should expect that markets with less risk-averse fundamentalists
and more risk-averse chartists are more stable compared to markets with more risk-
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averse fundamentalists and less risk-averse chartists. Moreover, transaction taxes
should be more eﬀective in markets with more aggressive fundamentalists. The
reason lies in the fact that less risk-averse fundamentalists place larger orders against
a mispricing compared to a less risk-averse ones, while more risk-averse chartists
places smaller orders to a given trend segment compared to a less risk- averse ones.
Hence, introducing heterogeneity in risk aversion might give additional insights to
the working of ﬁnancial markets and the eﬀectiveness of regulations.
This heterogeneity in risk aversion of chartists and fundamentalists might have im-
portant implications for the implementation of regulations. As highlighted in the
introduction, Menkhoﬀ and Schmidt (2005) ﬁnds that buy-&-hold traders behave
fundamentally oriented and risk averse, while momentum traders are less risk averse
and follow aggressively the trend. Hence, policy measures for ensuring ﬁnancial
stability should delimit the risk-exposure of chartists, while they should allow fun-
damentalists to aggressively arbitrage away mispricings. Therefore, additional reg-
ulations should concentrate on the traders’ responsibilities for their risk-exposure.
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4.A Appendix: Stability Properties
For analyzing the stability properties of the steady-state we set all shocks to zero
and concentrate on the deterministic skeleton of the model. The system is described
by the following state equations
푠푡 = 푠푡−1 + Θ퐹푡 휅퐹 (푠
퐹
푡−1 − 푠푡−1) + Θ퐶푡 휅퐶(푠푡−1 − 푠푡−2) (4.30)
Θ퐶푡 ≡
푤퐶푡 /풱퐶푡 (푠푡+1)
푤퐶푡 /풱퐶푡 (푠푡+1) + 푤퐹푡 /풱퐹푡 (푠푡+1)
(4.31)
Θ퐹푡 ≡
푤퐹푡 /풱퐹푡 (푠푡+1)
푤퐶푡 /풱퐶푡 (푠푡+1) + 푤퐹푡 /풱퐹푡 (푠푡+1)
(4.32)
푤퐹푡 =
exp{훾휋퐹푡−1}
1 + exp{훾휋퐹푡−1}+ exp{훾휋퐶푡−1}
(4.33)
푤퐶푡 =
exp{훾휋퐹푡−1}
1 + exp{훾휋퐹푡−1}+ exp{훾휋퐶푡−1}
(4.34)
푤퐼푡 =
1
1 + exp{훾휋퐹푡−1}+ exp{훾휋퐶푡−1}
(4.35)
휋푖푡 = (푠푡 − 푠푡−1)푥푖푡−1 − 휏(푠푡 + 푠푡−1)∣푥푖푡−1∣+ 휃휋푖푡−1. (4.36)
Case 1: No Taxes Levied. Since we assume 풱퐹푡 (푠푡+1) = 풱퐶푡 (푠푡+1) = 휔 and zero
transaction taxes (휏 = 0), the system reduces to
푠푡 = 푠푡−1 + 푤퐹푡 휅퐹 (푠
퐹
푡−1 − 푠푡−1) + 푤퐶푡 휅퐶(푠푡−1 − 푠푡−2) (4.37)
푤퐹푡 =
exp{훾휋퐹푡−1}
1 + exp{훾휋퐹푡−1}+ exp{훾휋퐶푡−1}
(4.38)
푤퐶푡 =
exp{훾휋퐹푡−1}
1 + exp{훾휋퐹푡−1}+ exp{훾휋퐶푡−1}
(4.39)
푤퐼푡 =
1
1 + exp{훾휋퐹푡−1}+ exp{훾휋퐶푡−1}
(4.40)
휋푖푡 = (푠푡 − 푠푡−1)푥푖푡−1 + 휃휋푖푡−1. (4.41)
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The stability of the fundamental steady-state can be inferred from the eigenvalues
of the Jacobian matrix evaluated at the steady-state. By deﬁning 푦푡−1 ≡ 푠푡−2, we
arrive at the following partial derivatives evaluated at the long-term solution (LTS)
∂푠푡
∂푠푡−1
∣∣∣
퐿푇푆
= 1 +
1
2
(휅퐶 − 휅퐹 ) (4.42)
∂푠푡
∂푦푡−1
∣∣∣
퐿푇푆
= −1
2
휅퐶 (4.43)
∂푠푡
∂휋푡−1
∣∣∣
퐿푇푆
= 휅퐶(푠푡−1 − 푦푡−1)∂Θ
퐶
푡
∂휋퐶푡
∣∣∣
퐿푇푆
+ 휅퐹 (푠
퐹
푡−1 − 푠푡−1)
∂Θ퐹푡
∂휋퐹푡
∣∣∣
퐿푇푆
= 0,(4.44)
since 푠퐹 = 푠 = 푦 at the long-term steady-state.
Moreover, we get the following derivatives which are comparable to those calculated
in the appendix of Westerhoﬀ and Dieci (2006)
∂휋퐹푡
∂푠푡−1
∣∣∣
퐿푇푆
= 0 (4.45)
∂휋퐶푡
∂푠푡−1
∣∣∣
퐿푇푆
= 0 (4.46)
∂휋퐶푡
∂푦푡−1
∣∣∣
퐿푇푆
= 0 (4.47)
since 푥푖 = 0 at the long-term steady-state.
Furthermore, we have
∂휋퐹푡
∂휋퐹푡−1
∣∣∣
퐿푇푆
=
∂휋퐶푡
∂휋퐶푡−1
∣∣∣
퐿푇푆
= 휃, (4.48)
while
∂휋퐼푡
∂휋퐼푡−1
∣∣∣
퐿푇푆
=
∂휋퐼푡
∂푠푡−1
∣∣∣
퐿푇푆
= 0. (4.49)
All remaining derivatives with respect to 푦푡−1 are zero.
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Under the restriction 훼 = 훽 = 0 the model has a similar, but has an even simpler
structure compared to the model of Westerhoﬀ and Dieci (2006), since Westerhoﬀ
and Dieci (2006) analyze a model with two markets and we have only one market
here. Note that the analysis of the stability properties in the original DeGrauwe and
Grimaldi (2006) model are much more complicated due to the the risk-assessment
of agents 풱 푖푡(푠푡+1), which we restrict to a constant. Following the derivations in the
appendix of Westerhoﬀ and Dieci (2006) we can exploit the block structure of the
Jacobian matrix
퐽 =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
∂푠푡
∂푠푡−1
∂푠푡
∂푦푡−1
∂푠푡
∂휋퐶푡−1
∂푠푡
∂휋퐹푡−1
∂푦푡
∂푠푡−1
∂푦푡
∂푦푡−1
∂푦푡
∂휋퐶푡−1
∂푦푡
∂휋퐹푡−1
∂휋퐶푡
∂푠푡−1
∂휋퐶푡
∂푦푡−1
∂휋퐶푡
∂휋퐶푡−1
∂휋퐶푡
∂휋퐹푡−1
∂휋퐹푡
∂푠푡−1
∂휋퐹푡
∂푦푡−1
∂휋퐹푡
∂휋퐶푡−1
∂휋퐹푡
∂∂휋퐹푡−1
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
=
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1 + 1
2
(휅퐶 − 휅퐹 ) −12휅퐶 0 0
1 0 0 0
0 0 휃 0
0 0 0 휃
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
(4.50)
and compute the eigenvalues of the blocks separately in our model as well. Two
eigenvalues are equal to 휃 and therefore less than one by construction. The compu-
tation of the remaining eigenvalues can be calculated from the submatrix 푄 of the
Jacobian matrix as shown in Westerhoﬀ and Dieci (2006)
푄 =
⎡⎢⎣1 + 12(휅퐶 + 휅퐹 ) −12휅퐶
1 0
⎤⎥⎦ . (4.51)
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Hence, the stability conditions in the absence of transaction costs reduce to
1− Tr(푄) + Det(푄) = 1
2
휅퐹 > 0 (4.52)
1 + Tr(푄) + Det(푄) = 2 +
1
2
휅퐹 > 0 (4.53)
Det(푄) =
1
2
휅퐹 < 1 (4.54)
Thus, when these conditions are met, the fundamental steady-state will stable in
the absence of transaction taxes.
Case 2: Transaction Taxes Levied.
In case of transaction costs the performance measures change to
휋푖푡 = (푠푡 − 푠푡−1)푥푖푡−1 − 휏(푠푡 + 푠푡−1)∣푥푖푡−1∣+ 휃휋푖푡−1. (4.55)
In this case we cannot analyze the stability properties of the model by analyzing
the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix at the steady state, since this equation is
not diﬀerentiable due to the non-diﬀerentiability of the absolute value function. We
can only draw intuitive conclusions by comparing the proﬁts of chartists, funda-
mentalists and inactive traders. Note, that the demand of fundamentalist, chartists
and inactive traders are zero within the steady-state, while it is diﬀerent from zero
for chartists and fundamentalists in the vicinity of the long-term solution. In the
case, when the transaction cost of trading on an expected mean reversion are higher
compared to the transaction costs of using this trading rule, while the chartist rule
and being inactive is less proﬁtable, the market will be dominated by fundamentalist
traders. Hence, the fundamental steady-state will be attracting. In case where the
transaction cost of using the fundamentalist trading rule is higher compared to the
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returns of using this rule, while the after tax returns of using the trend-chasing rule
will be more proﬁtable, the market might be dominated by chartist traders. This
will lead to a destabilization of the ﬁnancial market by making the fundamental
equilibrium repelling. We will get a clearer picture of the stabilizing or destabi-
lizing nature of ﬁnancial market taxes by calculating volatility response curves and
misalignment response curves with respect to transaction taxes by Monte-Carlo sim-
ulation methods. Our simulations show, that the exchange rate can be decoupled
from its fundamental value under suﬃciently high tax rates.
5 Speculative Bimodality in Real
Exchange Rates: Estimation,
Testing and Forecasting
Abstract. We estimate stochastic diﬀerential equations with with a cubic-drift
for modeling and forecasting ﬁnancial instability. Bimodal distributions emerge
from this type of diﬀerential equation for a certain interval of the models’ parame-
ters. We estimate these models for 14 monthly real exchange rates taken from the
ECB’s database covering the time from 1993:01 to 2009:02. Parameter estimates
give evidence for bimodal exchange rate distributions for fourteen exchange rates,
two cubic-drift models and two estimation periods. Forecasts of the exchange rate
density predict the exchange rate to be in the vicinity of one of the two attractors
for most of the time. However, there are periods, in which both attractors are cov-
ered with probability mass indicating uncertainty about the equilibrium exchange
rate. The models identify the beginning of the Exchange Rate Mechanism II and
the introduction of the Euro as two major phase transitions. Based on tests on un-
conditional and conditional predictive accuracy we ﬁnd that the cubic-drift models
outperform the random walk in out-of-sample forecasting for one out of fourteen real
exchange rates. We conclude that bimodality is a good description of real exchange
rates.
Key Words: Exchange Rate Distributions, Fokker-Planck Equation, Forecasting,
Real Exchange Rates, Speculative Dynamics
JEL Classiﬁcation: C51, C53, F31, F37
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5.1 Introduction
Asset prices are excessively volatile (Shiller 1981, LeRoy and Porter 1981) due to
speculative bubbles and crashes. Several ﬁnancial crises in the recent past indicate
historical evidence for ﬁnancial instability, which could not be predicted by linear
econometric models. Hence, econometric modeling and forecasting of ﬁnancial in-
stabilities is demanding.
Going back to the famous critique of Meese and Rogoﬀ (1983) there is no evidence
that linear structural exchange rate models outperform a random walk in forecasting
exchange rates. The assumption that the exchange rate is exclusively driven by
one single equilibrium, which is determined by economic fundamentals, cannot not
explain large movements in asset prices or even ﬁnancial instabilities. However, the
recent literature, especially the second generation of currency crises models (Jeanne
1997) and the stochastic behavioral asset pricing models (Lux 2005, 2009a; Lux and
Marchesi 1999, 2000), model ﬁnancial instability by multiple equilibria.
Jeanne (1997) suggests a model of a currency crash. He assumes a zone of multiple
equilibria, in which market participants do not share a consensus about the true
equilibrium exchange rate, whereas agents know the fundamental equilibrium outside
this interval. He concludes that exchange rates are most vulnerable to expectations
within this zone of multiple equilibria. A similar rationale arises from Gennotte
and Leland’s (1990) model of the October 1978 stock market crash. Cremer and
Salehi-Isfahani (1989) develop a multiple equilibrium model for the oil market with
a backward-bending supply curve. A crash occurs as a jump between equilibria.
The stochastic behavioral asset pricing models of Lux (1995) and Lux and Marchesi
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(1999, 2000) are characterized by one stable fundamental equilibrium for certain
parameter values, while two additional stable speculative equilibria emerge around
the now unstable fundamental one for a diﬀerent parameter set. Hence, a zone of
instability emerges.
Multiple equilibria and discrete jumps in asset prices are nonlinear phenomena.
Creedy et al. (1996) suggested to model a ﬁnancial crash as a jump between two
modes of the asset price distribution. They suggest the generalized normal distri-
bution (see Cobb et al. 1983, Lye and Martin 1999), which they derive by solving
a cubic continuous time diﬀusion process under the assumption that the parame-
ters are time-varying functions of the economic fundamentals. Hence, fundamental
variables might cause a crash by changing the distributional shape from unimodal
(unique equilibrium) to bimodal (three equilibria).1
Nonlinear stochastic diﬀerential equations which lead to bimodal distributions have
a wide array of applications in ﬁnancial economics. Examples are Aı¨t-Sahalia (1996,
1999), Conley et al. (1997), Gallant and Tauchen (1998) and Chan et al. (1992),
who assume interest rate processes to have a cubic drift which leads to a bimodal
interest rate distribution. Inspired by the oil market model of Cremer and Salehi-
Isfahani (1989), Ja¨ger (2008) estimates a stochastic diﬀerential equation with a
cubic drift for modeling jumps and crashes in oil prices. Lux (2006, 2009b) and Lux
and Ghonghaze (2008) estimate nonlinear stochastic diﬀerential equations for the
dynamics of market sentiment indices, which lead to bimodal distributions. Bimodal
sentiment distributions imply no consensus among agents and herding behavior as
1A related literature models jumps between diﬀerent regimes by a latent Markov-process (Engle
1994 and Engle and Hamilton 2000). However, these models do not signiﬁcantly outperform
a random walk in out-of-sample forecasting (Engel 1994, Martin et al. 1997 and Koh et al.
2007).
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implied by the models of Kirman (1993), Lux (1995, 2009a) and Lux and Marchesi
(1999, 2000).
The aim of this paper is to model zones of instability in exchange rates by the cubic-
drift model, which can be interpreted as a reduced form of the behavioral asset
pricing models of Lux (2005) and Lux and Marchesi (1999, 2000). We use the nu-
merical solution to the Kolmogorov forward equation for estimation and forecasting
as suggested in Lux (2006, 2009b) and applied in Ghonghaze and Lux (2009), since
the transition densities from this approach contain more information compared to
the stationary approach of Creedy et al. (1996). We estimate these models for 14
real exchange rates taken from the ECB’s database covering the time from 1993:01
to 2009:02.
Within this paper the following results emerge: (i) The parameter estimates give
evidence for bimodality in exchange rates for two cubic-drift models. Bimodality
cannot be rejected for fourteen real exchange rates for the period 1993:01 to 2009:02
as well as for the period 1993:01 to 2003:12 for both models. (ii) Our density
forecasts identify phase transitions in exchange rates. We identify two major phase
transitions as the beginning of ERM II and the introduction of the Euro. (iii) We
ﬁnd most exchange rates closer to their attractors and conﬁdence regions becoming
smaller after the beginning of ERM II. Moreover, bimodal distributions ﬁt exchange
rates better in the period before the introduction of the Euro, while unimodality
is more evident afterwards. (iv) Statistical tests on equal unconditional predictive
accuracy as well as on equal conditional predictive accuracy lead to the result that
the cubic-drift models outperform the random walk prediction for seven of fourteen
real exchange rates.
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The remainder of this essay is structured as follows. The next section introduces
the nonlinear model and analyzes its dynamics and distributional properties. The
following parts contain a description of the numerical solution to the Fokker-Planck
equation as well as a description of the approximate maximum likelihood estimation.
After that, we present estimation results and the results of our forecasting exercise.
The last section concludes.
5.2 The Nonlinear Diﬀusion Process for Speculative
Dynamics
5.2.1 The Structural Model
Lux (1995) suggests a stochastic behavioral model of herd behavior and contagion in
ﬁnancial markets which serves as an economic foundation to bimodality in exchange
rates. This model explains the emergence of speculative bubbles as a self-organizing
process of contagion among heterogeneous speculators.
Lux (1995) assumes 2푁 speculative traders, who can be subdivided into 푛+ op-
timistic traders and 푛− pessimistic traders. By deﬁning 푛 ≡ (푛+ − 푛−)/2 and
푥 ≡ 푛/푁 ∈ [−1, 1], we arrive at an index for the market opinion. For 푥 > 0 the
market is dominated by optimistic agents, while the market is dominated by pes-
simistic agents for 푥 < 0. For 푥 = 0 there are equal numbers of optimists and
pessimists, while the market is completely dominated by optimists for 푥 = 1, while
it is completely dominated by chartists for 푥 = −1.
Lux (1995) deﬁnes the transition probabilities from optimism to pessimism 푝+− and
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from pessimism to optimism 푝−+ as a function of the change in the asset price
푠˙ = 푑푠/푑푡 and the opinion-index 푥
푝+− = 푣 exp{푎1푠˙/푣 + 푎2푥}, and 푝−+ = 푣 exp{−푎1푠˙/푣 − 푎2푥}, (5.1)
where 푣 is a variable for the speed of change, 푎1 measures how much information
agents draw from price changes, while 푎2 measures how strong agents respond to
the behavior of others as measured by the opinion index 푥.
Under this assumption for the transition rates, the dynamics of the mean value of
the opinion-index 푥˙ = 푑푥/푑푡 become
푥˙ =
1
푁
{
(푁 − 푛)푝+− − (푁 + 푛)푝−+
}
(5.2)
= (1− 푥)푣 exp{푎1푠˙/푣 + 푎2푥} − (1 + 푥)푣 exp{−푎1푠˙/푣 − 푎2푥} (5.3)
= 2푣
(
Tanh(푎1푠˙/푣 + 푎2푥)− 푥
)
Cosh
(
푎1푠˙/푣 + 푎2푥
)
. (5.4)
Lux (1995) divides the excess demand of speculators into the excess demand of
optimists 푛+푡푁 and the excess demand of pessimists 푛−푡푁 , where 푡푁 is a ﬁxed
amount of the asset which the traders may either buy or sell. Hence, net excess
demand 퐷푁 is given by
퐷푁 = 푛+푡푁 − 푛−푡푁 = 2푛푡푁 . (5.5)
From the deﬁnition of the opinion index follows 푛 = 푁푥 which can be used to
express net excess demand as
퐷푁 = 2푁푥푡푁 = 푥푇푁 , with 푇푁 ≡ 2푁푡푁 . (5.6)
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The group of fundamental traders determine their excess demand proportional to
the diﬀerence between the fundamental price 푠푓 and and the actual price
퐷퐹 = 푇퐹 (푠푓 − 푠), (5.7)
where 푇퐹 is a measure for the trading volume of fundamentalists.
Lux (1995) assumes that a market maker adjusts prices in response to the sum of
fundamentalists’ and speculators’ excess demand
푑푠
푑푡
= 훽(퐷푁 +퐷퐹 ) = 훽(푥푇푁 + 푇퐹 (푠푓 − 푠)), (5.8)
where 훽 is the market maker’s price-adjustment.
Hence, we arrive at the following dynamic system
푥˙ = 2푣
(
Tanh(푎1푠˙/푣 + 푎2푥)− 푥
)
Cosh
(
푎1푠˙/푣 + 푎2푥
)
(5.9)
푠˙ = 훽(푥푇푁 + 푇퐹 (푠푓 − 푠)). (5.10)
Proposition 2 of Lux (1995) describes the dynamic behavior of the system:
(i) For 푎2 ≤ 1 there exists a unique equilibrium 퐸0(0, 푠푓 ), which is attracting if
2(푎1훽푇푁 +푣(푎2−1))−훽푇퐹 < 0. Otherwise all trajectories converge to a stable
limit cycle.
(ii) For 푎2 > 0 three equilibria 퐸+ = (푥+, 푠+), 퐸0 = (0, 푠푓 ) and 퐸− = (푥−, 푠−)
exists with 푥− = −푥+ and 푠푓 − 푠− = 푠+ − 푠푓 . The two speculative equilibria
퐸+ and 퐸− are attracting, while the fundamental equilibrium 퐸0 is repelling.
In the following line we present a simple cubic-drift model, which is characterized
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by a similar dynamics and which can be interpreted as a reduced form to the model
of Lux (1995). The cubic-drift model is a reduced form, since we cannot identify the
parameters of the model of Lux (1995) from the cubic drift model. However, we are
able to estimate and to test the existence of multiple speculative equilibria against
a single fundamental equilibrium by a simple statistical test, which will provide
empirical evidence for the speculative dynamics described in Lux (1995).
5.2.2 The Cubic-Drift Model as a Reduced Form
The double-well potential model of Aı¨t-Sahalia (1999) is a simple cubic model for
the drift term and is given by the following nonlinear diﬀerential equation
푑푠푡 = (훼푠푡 − 푠3푡 )푑푡, (5.11)
which summarizes the dynamics of the model of Lux (1995) in a simple reduced
form. However, it cannot describe the stable limit cycle. The equilibria 푠푗 of the
process can be derived by setting the mean value dynamics to zero
푠(훼− 푠2) = 0, (5.12)
which yields
푠− = −
√
훼, 푠0 = 0, 푠+ = +
√
훼. (5.13)
For parameter values 훼 ≤ 0 there is one unique equilibrium 푠0 = 0, while it exhibits
three equilibria 푠+ = +
√
훼, 푠0 = 0 and 푠− = −
√
훼 for parameter values 훼 > 0.
We allow only real-valued solutions. Otherwise, multiple equilibria with complex
numbers are possible under 훼 ≤ 0. The critical value 훼푐 = 0 is called the bifurcation
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threshold. In order to compare these equilibria to the ones of the model of Lux
(1995) we have to determine their stability properties ﬁrst.
5.2.3 Stationary Points and Distributional Features
The potential function 푉 (푠푡; 휃) is deﬁned as the primitive of a vector ﬁeld. A function
푉 (푠푡; 휃) that satisﬁes ∂푉 (푠푡; 휃)/∂푠푡 = −휇(푠푡; 휃) is called a potential of 휇(푠푡; 휃). The
potential contains all information about steady-states, the stability of steady-states
and the dynamics of the state variable 푠푡. All trajectories of 푠푡 are graphs on 푉 (푠푡; 휃).
Minima of the potential correspond to stable states, while maxima correspond to
unstable states. In order to get information about the stability of the stationary
points of the process we have to calculate the derivatives of the drift function with
respect to 푠푡 evaluated at each of the stationary points 푠푗. Note, that 휃 = 훼 here.
For 푠0 we get
∂휇(푠푡, 훼)
∂푠푡
∣∣∣
푠=0
= 훼, (5.14)
which is a minimum for 훼 < 0 (hence a stable state) and a maximum for 훼 > 0
(hence an unstable state). The remaining equilibria 푠+ and 푠− are only existent
when 훼 ≥ 0. They are stable, since
∂휇(푠푡;훼)
∂푠푡
∣∣∣
푠=−√훼
= −2훼. (5.15)
and
∂휇(푠푡, 훼)
∂푠푡
∣∣∣
푠=+
√
훼
= −2훼. (5.16)
As a result, the lower and the higher equilibria are stable states, while the equilibrium
between them is a repelling equilibrium. Thus, the interval [−√훼,√훼] deﬁnes the
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zone of instability for the state space of the exchange rate 푠푡. Multiple equilibria
and the zone of instability only emerge, when the parameter 훼 exceeds the threshold
value 훼푐 = 0.
Figure 5.1 shows the features of our model as a function of the parameter 훼. The
upper ﬁgure contains the potential as a function of 훼 in a 3D-plot, while the lower
subﬁgure shows the stationary points as a function of 훼 in a so-called bifurcation
plot. The bifurcation plot is just a projection of the stationary states of the potential
into (푠, 훼)-space.
Figure 5.2 shows characteristics of the cubic-drift model for the case 훼 ≤ 0 in a
stochastic environment. The upper subﬁgure contains the drift 휇(푠푡; 휃) = (훼푠푡 −
푠3푡 )푑푡, while the lower subﬁgure contains a histogram of realizations of this process
푑푠푡 = (훼푠푡 − 푠3푡 )푑푡 + 휎푑푊푡 together with the kernel density estimate. From the
phase plot can be inferred that the process is characterized by one single attractor
located at 푠 = 0 for our example with 훼 = 0. The drift is positive for values of
the state variable which are smaller compared to the attractor, while it is negative
for values greater than the attractor. Hence, the dynamics revert to the attractor
after the system is shocked. In a stochastic environment, where the state variable
is continuously hit by shocks, the process should be located in the vicinity of this
attractor for most of the time. Hence, a unimodal distribution emerges as can be
seen in the histogram in the lower subﬁgure.
Figure 5.3 contains a phase diagram of the drift for 훼 = 0.5 as well as a histogram
and the kernel density of a simulation of this process. From the phase diagram can
be inferred that the process is characterized by three stationary points located at
푠− = −
√
0.5, 푠0 = 0 and 푠+ = +
√
0.5. The process is repelled by 푠2 = 0, and
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Figure 5.1: Stationary Points of the Cubic-Drift Model
Notes: The upper ﬁgure shows the potential as a function of the parameter 훼. The lower bi-
furcation diagram is just a projection of the stationary points of the potential into (푠, 훼)-space.
attracted by the stationary points −√0.5 and +√0.5. As can be seen from the
histogram and the kernel density estimate, a bimodal distribution emerges, since
the process will be in the vicinity of the two attractors for most of the time, while
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Figure 5.2: Drift and Emergent Distribution for 훼 = 0
Notes: The phase diagram contains the drift of 푑푠푡 = −푠3푡 + 0.3푑푊푡, while the lower ﬁgure
contains a histogram and a kernel density estimate generated by a simulation of size 10000 of the
diﬀerential equation.
it will visit the repellor less frequently. The modes of the distribution correspond to
the attractors for 휎 = 1, while they will be located closer to the repellor for 휎 < 1
as in this example here.
Distributional Dynamics
The stochastic diﬀerential equation 푑푠푡 = 휇(푠푡; 휃)푑푡+휎(푠푡; 휃)푑푊푡 fully describes the
evolution of 푠푡 over each inﬁnitissimal time increment 푑푡. However, the derivation
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Figure 5.3: Drift and Emergent Distribution for 훼 = 0.5
Notes: The phase diagram contains the drift of 푑푠푡 = 0.5푠푡 − 푠3푡 + 0.3푑푊푡, while the lower ﬁgure
contains a histogram and a kernel density estimate generated by a simulation of size 10000 of the
diﬀerential equation.
of the conditional density of 푠푡+Δ푡 given 푠푡 cannot be given in closed form except for
some simple cases (Aı¨t-Sahalia 1999). Closed form solutions for the transient density
can only be given in closed form for the Black and Scholes (1973) model, the Vasicek
(1977) model and the Cox, Ingersoll and Ross (1985) model. Aı¨t-Sahalia (1998) de-
velops closed form approximations for the unknown transitional density of nonlinear
diﬀusion processes, while Lo (1988), Lux (2006, 2009a) and Poulsen (1999) and
Pederson (1995) propose numerical solutions to the Fokker-Planck equation, which
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is a parabolic diﬀerential equation for the dynamics of the transition density of a
diﬀerential equation and which we introduce in the following lines. Honore (1997),
Santa-Clara (1995) approximate the transition density by simulating numerous fu-
ture paths of the state variable as also applied in derivative pricing.
The transition density 푓푡 of a stochastic diﬀerential equation follows the Kolmogorov
forward equation, which is also called Fokker-Planck equation (see Lo 1988, Ait-
Salahia 1999, Poulsen 1999 amd Lux 2009b)
∂푓
∂푡
= −∂(휇푡푓푡)
∂푠푡
+
1
2
∂2(휎2푡 푓푡)
∂푠2푡
. (5.17)
Solutions to this deterministic diﬀerential equation for the time development of the
density function cannot be given in closed except for very simple expressions for the
drift and the diﬀusion term. However, the evolution of the transitional density ends
in a stationary or equilibrium density 푓 ∗(푠) when there is no stochasticity. Following
Creedy and Martin (1994), the closed-form solution to the stationary density is given
by
푓 ∗(푠) = exp
{
−
∫ 푠
−∞
[
2휇(푤) + 푑휎2(푤)/푑푤
휎2(푤)
]
푑푤 − 휂
}
, (5.18)
where
휂 = log
∫ ∞
−∞
[
−2휇(푤) + 푑휎
2(푤)/푑푤
휎2(푤)
푑푤
]
푑푠 (5.19)
is a normalizing constant, which is determined by the boundary conditions of the
Fokker-Planck equation. This density has two modes and one antimode due to the
cubic form of the drift function.
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Testing Bimodality
Tests for bimodality of the asset price distribution against a unimodal distribution
can be performed by estimating the model via a maximum likelihood procedure
푑푠푡 = (훼푠푡 − 푠3푡 )푑푡+ 휎푑푊푡. (5.20)
Since the model nests unimodality as a special case, we formulate the null and the
alternative hypothesis as
퐻0 : Unimodality: 훼 ≤ 0 versus
퐻1 : Bimodality: 훼 > 0.
(5.21)
This test can be performed as a simple t-test due to the asymptotic normality of
the maximum likelihood estimator, which even holds under multimodality (Poulsen
1999).
5.2.4 The Generalized Cubic-Drift Model
Another way to model exchange rates and multiple equilibria is suggested by Ja¨ger
(2008) and Ja¨ger and Kostina (2005, 2006), which Ja¨ger (2008) calls generalized
mean-reversion
휇(푠푡; 휃) = (푥퐿 − 푠푡)(푥푀 − 푠푡)(푥퐻 − 푠푡), (5.22)
with equilibria 푥퐿 ≤ 푥푀 ≤ 푥퐻 and 휃 = (푥퐿, 푥푀 , 푥퐻)′. The drift is a known function
up to the parameters 휃 = (푥퐿, 푥푀 , 푥퐻)
′. This process has three stationary points 푥퐿,
푥푀 and 푥퐻 to which the exchange rate can be attracted or repelled. This formulation
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of the drift term is as well a polynomial of order three and, hence, has two stable
states and one unstable state between them
∂휇(푠푡; 휃)
∂푠푡
∣∣∣
푠푡=푥퐿
= −(푥퐿 − 푥퐻)(푥퐿 − 푥푀) < 0 (5.23)
∂휇(푠푡; 휃)
∂푠푡
∣∣∣
푠푡=푥푀
= −(푥푀 − 푥퐻)(푥푀 − 푥퐿) > 0 (5.24)
∂휇(푠푡; 휃)
∂푠푡
∣∣∣
푠푡=푥퐻
= −(푥퐻 − 푥푀)(푥퐻 − 푥퐿) < 0. (5.25)
The formal derivation can be found in the appendix. Hence, the zone of instability
is deﬁned by the region [푥퐿, 푥퐻 ] in the state space of the exchange rate.
This model nests the simple double well potential as a special case. However, it is
less restrictive, since the attractors are not restricted to have equal distance to the
antimode. Moreover, the antimode is not restricted to be equal to zero. Under the
restriction 푥퐿 = −
√
훼, 푥푀 = 0 and 푥퐻 = +
√
훼 this model collapses to
휇(푠푡; 휃) = −푠푡(푠푡 +
√
훼)(푠푡 −
√
훼) = −푠푡(푠2푡 − 훼) = 훼푠푡 − 푠3푡 . (5.26)
Hence, a test of the double well potential model against the nonlinear mean-reversion
model can be performed by testing the following hypotheses
퐻0 : Double Well Potential: 푥퐿 = −
√
훼, 푥푀 = 0, 푥퐻 = +
√
훼 versus
퐻1 : Generalized Mean Reversion: 푥퐿, 푥푀 , 푥퐻 ∈ ℛ
.
(5.27)
The resulting likelihood-ratio statistic is
LR = 2 ⋅ (log퐿(푠푡∣푥퐿 = −
√
훼, 푥푀 = 0, 푥퐻 = +
√
훼)− log퐿(푠푡∣푥퐿, 푥푀 , 푥퐻)) ∼ 휒2(3)
(5.28)
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and is 휒2-distributed with three degrees of freedom, since we have three restrictions
under the null hypothesis.
We apply bifurcation theory in order to derive a statistical test on the shape of the
exchange rate distribution. Under the restriction 푥퐿 = 푥푀 = 푥퐻 = 푥 the drift
function collapses to
휇(푠푡, 휃) = (푥− 푠푡)3, (5.29)
which is the case of one single equilibrium. Note that the generalized mean-reversion
model does not nest the linear mean-reversion as a special case, since the drift
function is still a polynomial of order three. A test of one single equilibrium against
multiple equilibria in exchange rates can be done via a likelihood-ratio statistic of
the null hypothesis
퐻0 : Unimodality: 푥퐿 = 푥푀 = 푥퐻 = 푥 versus
퐻1 : No Unimodality: 푥퐿, 푥푀 , 푥퐻 ∈ ℛ
. (5.30)
The resulting likelihood-ratio statistic is
LR = 2 ⋅ (log퐿(푠푡∣푥퐿 = 푥푀 = 푥퐻 = 푥)− log퐿(푠푡∣푥퐿, 푥푀 , 푥퐻)) ∼ 휒2(2) (5.31)
and is 휒2-distributed with two degrees of freedom, since we have two restrictions
under the null hypothesis. When the value of the LR-statistic exceeds the criti-
cal value 5.99 we are able to reject the null hypothesis of one single equilibrium.
However, this model is characterized by a richer dynamics compared to the simple
cubic-drift model, since it nests the cases of two as well as of three equilibria. A
formal derivation of the existence and the stability properties can be found in the
appendix.
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5.3 Approximate Maximum Likelihood Estimation
5.3.1 Numerical Solution to the Fokker-Planck Equation
Aı¨t-Sahalia (1996, 1999) and Lux (2009b) suggest to use approximate solutions
of the Fokker-Plank equation for maximum likelihood estimation. These authors
argue that continuous-time diﬀusion processes are Markov processes. Since this
property applies to any discrete subsample from the continuous-time path, the like-
lihood function can be derived as the product of the transitional densities calculated
from the Fokker-Planck equation (Aı¨t-Sahalia 1999). While Aı¨t-Sahalia (1999) de-
rives approximate closed-form solutions of the Fokker-Planck equation, Lux (2009b)
suggests to approximate the diﬀerentials by ﬁnite-diﬀerences and to calculate the
approximate solution numerically.
Following Aı¨t-Sahalia (1999), two approaches for calculating approximate solutions
to the Fokker-Planck equation exist. (i) Numerical solutions of this partial diﬀer-
ential equation as done in Lo (1988) and Lux (2006, 2009b), and (ii) simulation
of a large number of sample paths of the process as done in Honore (1997) and
Santa-Clara (1995). As noted by Aı¨t-Sahalia (1999) as well, both approaches do not
produce expressions to be maximized over the parameter 휃. Hence, all calculations
have to be done for every value of 휃 until convergence of the maximum likelihood
estimator is achieved.
The Kolmogorov Forward equation or Fokker-Planck equation is given by
∂푓푡
∂푡
= −∂(휇푡푓푡)
∂푠푡
+
1
2
∂2(휎푡푓푡)
∂푠2푡
, (5.32)
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where 푓푡 is the unknown density, while 휇푡 = 휇(푠푡; 휃) and 휎푡 = 휎(푠푡; 휃) are the drift
and diﬀusion, which are known up to a parameter vector 휃, which we intent to
estimate via maximum likelihood.
We construct the space grid on the interval [푠푚푖푛, 푠푚푎푥]× [푡, 푡+ 1] on which we eval-
uate the approximate solution as suggested by Lux (2009b). The space dimension
contains 푁푥 = (푠푚푎푥−푠푚푖푛)/ℎ equidistant grid points with distance ℎ. These points
are calculated as
푥푗 = 푥0 + 푗 ⋅ ℎ, with 푗 = 0, 1, ..., 푁푥, (5.33)
and 푥0 = 푠푚푖푛, 푥푁푥 = 푠푚푎푥. Moreover, we decompose the interval [푡, 푡 + 1] of the
observed data points into 푁푡 + 1 equidistant points with distance 푘 = 1/푁푡
푡푖 = 푖 ⋅ 푘, with 푖 = 0, ..., 푁푡. (5.34)
For calculating the approximate solution to the Fokker-Planck equation by numerical
methods, we have to discretize this law of motion by the method proposed in Lux
(2009b). Hence, we substitute the time diﬀerential by the following ﬁnite diﬀerence
approximation
∂푓푡
∂푡
≈ 푓
푖+1
푗 − 푓 푖푗
푘
, (5.35)
while we substitute the ﬁrst and second derivatives by
∂(휇푡푓푡)
∂푠푡
≈ 휇푗+1푓
푖
푗+1 − 휇푗푓 푖푗
ℎ
, (5.36)
and
∂2(휎푡푓푡)
∂푠2
≈ 휎푗+1푓
푖
푗+1 − 2휎푗푓 푖푗 + 휎푗−1푓 푖푗−1
ℎ2
. (5.37)
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There are three possible discretization schemes which diﬀer in accuracy and stability.
The ﬁrst possible discretization scheme is the forward discretization or explicit
method which approximates the Fokker-Planck equation with the following expres-
sion
푓 푖+1푗 − 푓 푖푗
푘
=
휇푗+1푓
푖
푗+1 − 휇푗푓 푖푗
ℎ
+
1
2
휎푗+1푓
푖
푗+1 − 2휎푗푓 푖푗 + 휎푗−1푓 푖푗−1
ℎ2
, (5.38)
where 푓 푖푗 = 푓(푗ℎ, 푖푘), 휇푗 = 휇(푗ℎ; 휃) and 휎푗 = 휎(푗ℎ; 휃) while 휃 is the parameter vector
which we intend to estimate. This method uses the known points 푓 푖푗−1, 푓
푖
푗 and 푓
푖
푗+1
as well as the points 휇푗+1, 휇푗 and 휎푗+1, 휎푗, 휎푗−1 to calculate the subsequent density
푓 푖+1푗 . Hence, this discretization scheme is a closed form solution for the law of motion
of the density function from which 푓 푖+1푗 can be solved explicitly. A shortcoming of
the forward discretization is that one has to consider stability properties (Lux 2006).
In contrast to the explicit method the backward discretization scheme is an implicit
method and uses the points 푓 푖+1푗−1, 푓
푖+1
푗 and 푓
푖+1
푗+1 as well as the points 휇푗+1, 휇푗 and
휎푗+1, 휎푗, 휎푗−1 to calculate 푓 푖+1푗 . We get the backward discretization or implicit ﬁnite
diﬀerence scheme by replacing 푓 푖+1푗 − 푓 푖푗 with 푓 푖푗 − 푓 푖−1푗 (see Lux 2009b)
푓 푖푗 − 푓 푖−1푗
푘
=
휇푗+1푓
푖
푗+1 − 휇푗푓 푖푗
ℎ
+
1
2
휎푗+1푓
푖
푗+1 − 2휎푗푓 푖푗 + 휎푗−1푓 푖푗−1
ℎ2
. (5.39)
Leading this equation for one time step yields
푓 푖+1푗 − 푓 푖푗
푘
=
휇푗+1푓
푖+1
푗+1 − 휇푗푓 푖+1푗
ℎ
+
1
2
휎푗+1푓
푖+1
푗+1 − 2휎푗푓 푖+1푗 + 휎푗−1푓 푖+1푗−1
ℎ2
. (5.40)
This scheme is implicit, since the term 푓 푖+1푗 appears on both sides of the equation.
Hence, we do not have a closed form solution, but have to solve a system of equa-
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tions for calculating 푓 푖+1푗 . Although the approximate solution to the Fokker-Planck
equation is more complicated to calculate, the implicit method has the advantage
of being globally stable (Lux 2006).
Accuracy of the approximation can be achieved without high computational costs
by taking the average of the forward and backward approximation which is called
the Crank-Nicolson method (Poulsen 1999, Lux 2009b). This method is an implicit
method as can be seen from ﬁgure 5.4, since it uses the points 푓 푖+1푗−1, 푓
푖+1
푗 , 푓
푖+1
푗+1, 푓
푖
푗−1,
푓 푖푗 and 푓
푖
푗+1 as well as the points 휇푗+1, 휇푗 and 휎푗+1, 휎푗, 휎푗−1 to calculate 푓
푖+1
푗 in
order to approximate the density on artiﬁcial intermediate points (푖+ 1/2)푘 instead
of using the grid itself (Lux 2006).
Finally the fully-implicit ﬁnite-diﬀerence scheme with Chang-Cooper-correction
(Chang and Cooper 1970) guarantees a solution which is non-negative, which is
particle conserving in the absence of sources and sinks, and which gives an exact
representation of the analytic solution upon equilibration (Banks et al. 2009). This
scheme uses the monotonically decreasing correction factor
푓(휏) =
1
휏
− 1
exp{휏} − 1 , (5.41)
which has the properties
lim
휏→−∞
푓(휏) = 1 and lim
휏→∞
푓(휏) = 0. (5.42)
Following Banks et al. (2009) this scheme continuously shifts from a backward
diﬀerence to a central diﬀerence and to a forward diﬀerence
푓 푖+1푗+0.5 = 훿
푖+1
푗 푓
푖+1
푗+1 + (1− 훿푖+1푗 )푓 푖+1푗 . (5.43)
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with
훿푖+1푗 =
1
푤푖+1푗
− 1
exp{푤푖+1푗 } − 1
and 푤푖+1푗 = ℎ
휇푖+1푗+0.5 + 휎
′푖+1
푗+0.5
휎푖+1푗+0.5
. (5.44)
A formal derivation of the Crank-Nicolson ﬁnite-diﬀerence scheme and the Chang-
Cooper ﬁnite-diﬀerence scheme as well as the iteration rule for the approximate
Fokker-Plank equation can be found in the appendix.
Because we restrict our analysis to the ﬁnite interval [푠푚푖푛, 푠푚푎푥] we need boundary
conditions for preventing transitions to inaccessible states (see Ait-Salahia 1999 and
Lux 2006, 2009b). More precisely, we have to prevent a leakage of probability mass
to the points outside the support of the transitional density. Following Lux (2006)
these conditions are
푓 푖− 1
2
= 푓(−1
2
ℎ, 푗푘) = 0 (5.45)
and
푓 푖
푁푥+
1
2
= 푓(푁푥 +
1
2
ℎ, 푗푘) = 0. (5.46)
For the derivation of the density 푓(푠푡+1∣푠푡; 휃) we need 푠푡 as a starting value. Lux
(2006) and Poulsen (1999) suggest to approximate the initial condition (푓 00 , ..., 푓
0
푁푥
)′
by the Euler approximation (see Ait-Salahia 1999), which is a normal distribution
with density Φ(푠푡 − 휇(푠푡; 휃)푘, 휎(푠푡; 휃)푘) evaluated at the grid points 0, ..., 푁푥. The
values for the approximate density 푓(푠푡+1∣푠푡; 휃) can now be calculated by iterating
the Fokker-Planck equation up to 푁푡 and are given by the values 푓
푁푡
0 , ..., 푓
푁푡
푁푥
.
Figure 5.4 shows the time evolution of the density calculated by iterating the Fokker-
Planck equation. The 푥-axis of this 3D-plot represents the state space of the ex-
change rate, while the 푦-axis represents time. The density values can be inferred
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Figure 5.4: Evolution of the Transitional Density Function (a)
Notes: This ﬁgure shows the evolution of the density of the cubic drift model in the time interval
[푡, 푡+1]. When we start from a normal distribution, the density evolves to a bimodal distribution.
from the 푧-axis. As explained in the paragraph before, we start with a very steep
normal distribution around our starting value. After some iterations the single mode
of our initial condition diminishes and two modes arise. Figure 5.5 shows starting
values at the beginning of the time interval [푡, 푡 + 1] and the transition density at
the end of the time interval. From these ﬁgures can be inferred that the density at
푡 + 1 is bimodal for starting values around zero at time 푡, while we get a skewed
distribution at time 푡+ 1 for starting values away from zero at time 푡. Hence, when
the process is near the repellor at time 푡, a transition to the attractor at −√훼 and
+
√
훼 is equal likely. When the process in in the vicinity of one attractor at time 푡,
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Figure 5.5: Evolution of the Transitional Density Function (b)
Notes: This ﬁgure shows the evolution of the density for the cubic drift model in the time interval
[푡, 푡+ 1]. When we start from a normal distribution with a mean equal to the repellor, the density
evolves to a bimodal distribution, making both attractors equal likely. When we start in the
vicinity of an attractor, the density becomes skewd, making this attractor more likely compared
to the other attractor.
the process will be most likely be in the vicinity of this attractor at time 푡+ 1, while
the other attractor is less likely.
5.3.2 The Estimation Algorithm
The estimation algorithm suggested by Lux (2006) consists of the following steps
(i) Given starting values for the parameter vector 휃0 and the discrete observation
푠푡, evaluate starting values for the density at the grid points for the support of
the density 푓 00 , ...푓
0
푁푥
by the Euler approximation Φ(푠푡 − 휇(푠푡; 휃0)푘, 휎(푠푡; 휃0)푘).
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(ii) Calculate the transition density 푓(푠푡+1∣푠푡; 휃0) by iterating the Fokker-Planck
equation until the end of [푡, 푡+ 1]. Save the values 푓푁푡0 , ..., 푓
푁푡
푁푥
.
(iii) Search the corresponding value for the observation 푠푡+1 in the grid.
(iv) Extract the approximate value for 푓(푠푡+1∣푠푡; 휃0) from the values 푓푁푡0 , ..., 푓푁푡푁푥.
(v) Calculate the log-likelihood function by applying steps (i) to (vi) to all obser-
vations {푠푡}푇푡=0.
logℒ =
푇∑
푖=1
log 푓(푠푡+1∣푠푡; 휃0). (5.47)
(vi) Change values of 휃 and repeat steps (i) to (v) until the maximum of the likeli-
hood is reached.
We call 휃퐴푀퐿 = argmin logℒ the approximate maximum likelihood estimator.
As suggested in Bolker (2007, chapter 7), we use the Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-
Schanno-algorithm for maximization, which is built in R’s optim library2. This
quasi-Newton method for optimization can be use in our case, since the approxi-
mate likelihood is smooth and well behaved, which can be inferred by calculating
the approximate likelihood over a reasonable parameter space. Monte-Carlo simu-
lations showed that the method yields consistent and unbiased estimation results as
also proved in Poulsen (1999).
Poulsen (1999) and Pederson (1999) note, the approximate maximum likelihood
estimator follows a normal distribution even in the presence of nonlinear drifts.
Hence, asymptotic standard errors of the maximum likelihood estimator are given
by the square root of the diagonal elements of the inverse of the Hessian Matrix
evaluated at the approximate maximum likelihood estimates.
2See R Development Core Team (2009).
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5.4 Data and Estimation Results
The empirical research strategy consists of the following steps
(i) Model Identiﬁcation: By looking at the histogram and the kernel density es-
timate of the exchange rate data we determine if a unimodal or a bimodal
distribution might ﬁt the data better.
(ii) Estimation: Estimation of the model’s parameters via the methodology de-
scribed before.
(iii) Model Evaluation: We check signiﬁcance of the model’s parameters which de-
termine the shape of the distribution. We calculate the model’s stationary
points from the estimates and compare them to the modes and the antimodes
of the kernel density estimates. The parametric density might be misspeciﬁed,
while the non-parametric density estimate is robust against misspeciﬁcation.
The model might be misspeciﬁed, when modes and antimodes of the kernel
density estimate deviate signiﬁcantly from the estimated attractors and repel-
lors.
(iv) Forecasting and Forecast Evaluation: We compare the predictive accuracy of
our models in relation to a naive random walk prediction. We calculate two
predictors: the predicted mean of the distribution and the predicted mode.
The mean might evolve more sluggish, while the mode might switch between
attractors. Moreover, we calculate the 95% conﬁdence interval from the numer-
ically derived densities, by extracting the 2.5%- and 97.5%-quantiles. We test
on equal predictive accuracy by means of the tests proposed by Diebold and
Mariano (1995), Giacomini and White (2006) and Mitchell and Hall (2005),
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which we explain later on.
5.4.1 Exchange Rate Data
Time series of real exchange rates versus the European Area are taken from the
European Central Bank’s database. The dataset comprises 14 monthly real exchange
rates (real harmonized competitive indicators, CPI deﬂated) covering the Austrian
Shilling, the Belgian Franc, the Cyprus Pound, the German Mark, the Spanish
Peseta, the Finnish Markka, the French Franc, the Greek Drachma, the Irish Pound,
the Luxembourg Franc, the Netherland Guilder, the Portuguese Escudo, the Slovene
Tolar and the Slovak Koruna. All real exchange rate data series are given at a
monthly frequency and span the period 1993:01 to 2009:02. We use the subsample
1993:01 to 2003:12 for estimation, while we use the remaining observations from
2004:01 to 2009:02 for the evaluation of the out-of-sample forecasting performance
of our model. Hence, our out-of-sample period comprises 5 years, since we lose
one observation when calculating 푓(푠푡+1∣푠푡). Following Creedy et al. (1996) and
Aı¨t-Sahalia (1999), we standardize the data series by subtracting the unconditional
mean and dividing by the unconditional standard deviation. We can compare the
estimates of the attractors and repellors across diﬀerent real exchange rates, since
all of them are measured in standard units now. Time series plots and histograms
of the data series are given in ﬁgures 5.6 to 5.16 and will be discussed in section 4.3.
We experimented with diﬀerent grid sizes. We came to the result that the state
space of the grid has to be much larger compared to the minimum and the maximum
value of the data. Otherwise we ran into the trap of truncating the density, when
a data point lies near to a boundary of our grid, which leads to upward biases of
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the transition densities at the lower boundary and downward biases at the upper
boundary. A grid spanning [-6,+6] lefts reasonable space for avoiding these problems
at the boundaries. We also experimented with diﬀerent grid sizes like ℎ = 0.05,
ℎ = 0.02 and ℎ = 0.01. Note, that we apply the grid to the standardized exchange
rates. In case of the Austrian Shilling which has a standard deviation of 0.035 a
grid size ℎ = 0.05 applied to the standardized series means actually a grid of 0.0018
applied to the original data series, while a grid size ℎ = 0.01 means actually a grid
of 0.0004 applied to the original data. A grid size of ℎ = 0.05 implies 241 grid
points on our grid spanning [-6,+6], while a grid size ℎ = 0.01 implies 1201 grid
points on that grid. We found comparable coeﬃcient estimates for ℎ = 0.05 and
ℎ = 0.01. However, reducing the grid to the interval [-4,+4] leads to truncated
transition densities and thereby to biased estimates.
5.4.2 Parameter Estimates
Table 5.1 contains parameter estimates of the model 푑푠푡 = (훼푠푡 − 푠3푡 )푑푡 + 휎푑푊푡.
The estimates of the bifurcation parameter 훼 are positive and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero for all 14 real exchange rates indicating a bimodal long-run exchange rate
distribution over the estimation period 1993:01 to 2009:02 (panel a) as well as for
the estimation period 1993:01 to 2003:12 (panel b). The estimates of the diﬀusion
parameter are positive and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero as they should.
Table 5.2 and 5.3 contain estimation results for the less restrictive cubic model
푑푠푡 = (푥퐿−푠푡)(푥푀−푠푡)(푥퐻−푠푡)푑푡+휎푑푊푡 for the period 1993:01 to 2009:02 (table 5.2)
and for 1993:01 to 2003:12 (table 5.3). The estimates of the model indicate that one
stationary point is negative and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, while one stationary
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point is positive and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero for all 14 real exchange rates
and for both estimation periods. Hence, there is evidence from bimodality in real
exchange rates. We ﬁnd that the repellor located between the two stationary points
is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero for some exchange rates. However, this result
does not indicate that we have to reject bimodality, since it only indicates that the
repellor is located at zero or more precisely, we cannot reject the repellor to lie at
zero for some real exchange rates. Estimates of the diﬀusion parameter are positive
and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero for all 14 time series. Moreover, all estimates
lie in the range of estimates of the more restrictive double well potential model.
However, the algorithm did not converge for the Greek Drachma, the Slovene Tolar
and the Slovak Koruna, but remained in a local maximum of the likelihood, which
we inferred from the lower likelihood values compared to the less restrictive model.
The non-convergence might be caused by the persistent trends in these real exchange
rates.
5.5 Phase Transitions and Uncertainty about the
Equilibrium
Figure 5.6 to 5.16 contain the results of our forecasting exercise for 12 example
exchange rates. The ﬁgure in the upper left shows the exchange rate time series
together with the three estimated equilibria highlighted as broken horizontal lines.
The upper right contains a histogram of the time series together with a kernel den-
sity estimate of the unconditional exchange rate distribution. The kernel density
estimate is a non-parametric estimate, which can be interpreted as a smoothed his-
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Table 5.1: Parameter Estimates: Model 1
Model 1: 푑푠푡 = (훼푠푡 − 푠3푡 )푑푡+ 휎푑푊푡
(a) 1993:01 - 2009:02 (b) 1993:01 - 2003:12
Real Exchange Rate 훼ˆ 휎ˆ Log-L 훼ˆ 휎ˆ Log-L
Austrian Shilling 2.187∗∗ 0.271∗∗ -751.79 2.525∗∗ 0.330∗∗ -494.87
(t-statistic) (20.86) (2.58) (21.42) (8.24)
Belgian Franc 2.062∗∗ 0.232∗∗ -720.37 2.288∗∗ 0.273∗∗ -487.27
(t-statistic) (22.49) (9.60) (20.56) (8.55)
Cyprus Pound 1.535∗∗ 0.148∗∗ -657.14 0.940∗∗ 0.063∗∗ -408.01
(t-statistic) (18.83) (8.13) (48.89) (6.53)
German Mark 2.213∗∗ 0.232∗∗ -733.20 2.472∗∗ 0.269∗∗ -477.57
(t-statistic) (22.43) (8.47) (24.19) (8.52)
Spanish Peseta 1.688∗∗ 0.189∗∗ -684.75 1.064∗∗ 0.061∗∗ -400.90
(t-statistic) (19.63) (9.47) (33.54) (7.30)
Finnish Markka 2.178∗∗ 0.999∗∗ -837.38 3.052∗∗ 0.951∗∗ -572.50
(t-statistic) (9.26) (6.18) (13.15) (6.72)
French Franc 2.241∗∗ 0.408∗∗ -780.56 2.725∗∗ 0.425∗∗ -528.83
(t-statistic) (16.70) (8.12) (17.83) (8.21)
Greek Drachma 2.004∗∗ 0.248∗∗ -722.82 1.620∗∗ 0.182∗∗ -485.78
(t-statistic) (20.96) (9.81) (14.32) (6.16)
Irish Pound 1.728∗∗ 0.203∗∗ -696.51 1.046∗∗ 0.064∗∗ -414.60
(t-statistic) (19.10) (8.61) (44.28) (6.37)
Luxembourg Franc 1.798∗∗ 0.190∗∗ -703.34 1.343∗∗ 0.093∗∗ -431.23
(t-statistic) (18.85) (6.16) (24.02) (7.69)
Netherland Guilder 1.354∗∗ 0.090∗∗ -712.01 2.038∗∗ 0.385∗∗ -525.70
(t-statistic) (48.32) (7.50) (12.41) (5.33)
Portogese Escudo 1.597∗∗ 0.112∗∗ -618.76 1.225∗∗ 0.086∗∗ -420.22
(t-statistic) (26.43) (10.22) (27.81) (8.00)
Slovene Tolar 1.497∗∗ 0.202∗∗ -819.27 1.432∗∗ 1.913∗∗ -576.95
(t-statistic) (12.50) (5.56) (2.29) (3.04)
Slovak Koruna 1.750∗∗ 0.225∗∗ -708.25 0.900∗∗ 0.022∗∗ -342.64
(t-statistic) (18.79) (8.60) (102.71) (6.34)
Notes: ∗/∗∗ denotes signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcient estimate at the 5%/1% level. Standard errors are
calculated from the inverse of the Hessian matrix evaluated at the point estimates. Real exchange
rate data is taken from the ECB’s database (www.ecb.int).
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Table 5.2: Parameter Estimates: Model 2 (a)
Model 2: 푑푠푡 = (푥퐿 − 푠푡)(푥푀 − 푠푡)(푥퐿 − 푠푡)푑푡+ 휎푑푊푡
1993:01 - 2009:02
Country 푥퐿 푥푀 푥퐻 휎 Log-L
Austrian Shilling -1.306∗∗ 0.115 1.643∗∗ 0.281∗∗ -741.97
(t-statistic) (-25.54) (1.62) (30.89) (8.88)
Belgian Franc -1.593∗∗ -0.122 1.263∗∗ 0.211∗∗ -707.48
(t-statistic) (-35.38) (-1.94) (27.85) (9.48)
Cyprus Pound -1.013∗∗ 0.244∗∗ 1.448∗∗ 0.131∗∗ -628.52
(t-statistic) (-35.43) (3.26) (36.98) (9.88)
German Mark -1.440∗∗ 0.025 1.562∗∗ 0.235∗∗ -730.37
(t-statistic) (-29.86) (0.40) (34.13) (8.80)
Spanish Peseta -1.027∗∗ 0.286∗∗ 1.589∗∗ 0.134∗∗ -635.88
(t-statistic) (-35.37) (5.33) (42.69) (10.17)
Finnish Markka -1.147∗∗ 0.551∗∗ 2.074∗∗ 0.612∗∗ -803.00
(t-statistic) (19.81) (4.42) (21.10) (7.25)
French Franc -1.941∗∗ -0.365∗∗ 0.973∗∗ 0.200∗∗ -681.72
(t-statistic) (-41.67) (-5.30) (28.69) (8.91)
Greek Drachma -1.348∗∗ 0.051∗∗ 1.488∗∗ 0.242∗∗ -720.92
(t-statistic) (-29.34) (0.79) (29.54) (9.64)
Irish Pound -1.036∗∗ 0.257∗∗ 1.587∗∗ 0.169∗∗ -661.30
(t-statistic) (-30.25) (4.30) (31.08) (10.13)
Luxembourg Franc -1.179∗∗ 0.206∗∗ 1.571∗∗ 0.183∗∗ -683.79
(t-statistic) (-34.75) (3.46) (31.84) (9.71)
Netherlands Guilder -1.742∗∗ -0.457∗∗ 1.028∗∗ 0.191∗∗ -672.88
(t-statistic) (-28.64) (-6.41) (33.45) (9.24)
Portuguese Escudo — — — — —
(t-statistic) — — — —
Slovene Tolar -2.160∗∗ -0.674∗∗ 1.063∗∗ 0.444∗∗ -763.75
(t-statistic) (-23.81) (-6.37) (25.40) (8.34)
Slovak Koruna -1.165∗∗ -0.074∗∗ 1.316∗∗ 0.103∗∗ -611.63
(t-statistic) (-36.92) (-1.49) (61.24) (9.87)
Notes: ∗/∗∗ denotes signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcient estimate at the 5%/1% level. Standard errors are
calculated from the inverse of the Hessian matrix evaluated at the point estimates. Real exchange
rate data is taken from the ECB’s database (www.ecb.int).
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Table 5.3: Parameter Estimates: Model 2 (b)
푑푠푡 = (푥퐿 − 푠푡)(푥푀 − 푠푡)(푥퐿 − 푠푡)푑푡+ 휎푑푊푡
1993:01 - 2003:12
Country 푥퐿 푥푀 푥퐻 휎 Log-L
Austrian Shilling -1.441∗∗ 0.159 1.717∗∗ 0.311∗∗ -488.29
(t-statistic) (-28.70) (1.89) (31.65) (8.80)
Belgian Franc -1.628∗∗ -0.145 1.319∗∗ 0.238∗∗ -479.39
(t-statistic) (-33.38) (-1.90) (24.37) (8.42)
Cyprus Pound -1.056∗∗ -0.310∗∗ 0.616∗∗ 0.048∗∗ -393.52
(t-statistic) (-55.45) (-7.66) (31.90) (7.23)
German Mark -1.506∗∗ 0.075 1.631∗∗ 0.264∗∗ -475.83
(t-statistic) (-32.05) (0.95) (34.35) (8.63)
Spanish Peseta -1.111∗∗ -0.381∗∗ 0.364∗∗ 0.025∗∗ -381.50
(t-statistic) (-31.12) (-5.71) (5.91) (7.01)
Finnish Markka -1.232∗∗ 0.449∗∗ 2.265∗∗ 0.595∗∗ -538.37
(t-statistic) (-22.63) (3.78) (26.37) (7.53)
French Franc -1.965∗∗ -0.393∗∗ 1.072∗∗ 0.219∗∗ -466.13
(t-statistic) (-41.22) (-5.30) (24.82) (8.39)
Greek Drachma — — — — —
(t-statistic) — — — —
Irish Pound -1.177∗∗ -0.414∗∗ 0.675∗∗ 0.032∗∗ -384.19
(t-statistic) (-48.06) (-11.24) (14.32) (6.97)
Luxembourg Franc -1.321∗∗ 0.341∗∗ 0.433∗∗ 0.034∗∗ -370.23
(t-statistic) (-34.75) (3.46) (31.84) (9.71)
Netherlands Guilder -1.821∗∗ -0.639∗∗ 0.683∗∗ 0.167∗∗ -465.71
(t-statistic) (-24.01) (-7.28) (13.00) (7.78)
Portuguese Escudo -1.253∗∗ -0.340∗∗ 0.748∗∗ 0.043∗∗ -392.72
(t-statistic) (-53.38) (-13.00) (78.28) (7.65)
Slovene Tolar — — — — —
(t-statistic) — — — —
Slovak Koruna — — — — —
(t-statistic) — — — —
Notes: ∗/∗∗ denotes signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcient estimate at the 5%/1% level. Standard errors are
calculated from the inverse of the Hessian matrix evaluated at the point estimates. Real exchange
rate data is taken from the ECB’s database (www.ecb.int).
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togram. We plot the estimated equilibria into the histogram in order to compare
them to the non-parametric estimate of the modes of the exchange rate distribu-
tion. This plot might indicate possible mispeciﬁcations of our model, since the
non-parametric density estimate is robust against mispeciﬁcation. We will present
a test on misspeciﬁcation in section 6.
The ﬁgure in the lower left shows the one-month-ahead forecast of the exchange rate
distribution calculated by iterating the Fokker-Planck equation of the estimated
diﬀerential equation. Probabilities are given in a temperature plot. Light colors
represent regions with high probability, while dark colors represent regions with
low probability. Moreover, light colors indicate that the distribution is very steep
indicating that the exchange rate will only ﬂuctuate in a narrow region around its
actual value, while light blue indicates that the distribution is narrow indicating
that a large region of the state space in covered by probability mass. Hence, larger
ﬂuctuations of the exchange rate are predicted by light blue regions. The estimated
equilibria are given as broken horizontal lines.
The ﬁgure in the lower right contains the actual time series highlighted through
circles, together with the predicted average exchange rate highlighted as a solid
line as well as a forecast of the mode of the exchange rate distribution highlighted
as dots. The average exchange rate and the mode need not necessarily be equal
in nonlinear models. When the mode lies above the expected value, then values
above the average are more likely, which indicates an upward trend. Conversely,
a downward trend is more likely, when the mode of the distribution lies below the
expected value. However, when the exchange rate distribution becomes bimodal, the
expected value has less probability compared to the two modes indicating that there
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is uncertainty about the equilibrium exchange rate. Conﬁdence bands are calculated
by extracting the 2.5- and the 97.5-percentiles of the density. The upper and the
lower conﬁdence bounds are given as broken lines.
Austrian Shilling:
Figure 5.6 contains our results for the Austrian Shilling. We identify three phases
in the exchange rate by just eyeballing the time series (upper left subﬁgure). In
the ﬁrst phase around 1995 we ﬁnd the exchange rate to ﬂuctuate in the vicinity of
the attractor 푥퐻 . Approximately when Sweden has entered EMU in 1995 a second
periods starts which is characterized by an downward trend and a phase transition
to the lower attractor. The exchange rate reaches the attractor at 푥퐿 in 1999 when
the Exchange Rate Mechanism II applies. After the introduction of the Euro in 2002
the exchange rate ﬂuctuates in the vicinity of 푥푀 .
The histogram as well indicates the existence of three modes, while two of them are
located in the vicinity of the estimates of the attractors 푥퐻 and 푥퐿. The ﬁrst mode
is due to the ﬂuctuations of the Shilling around the upper attractor, while the lower
mode is caused by the ﬂuctuations around the lower one. Moreover, there seems to
be a mode below zero. This one is due to exchange rate ﬂuctuations around zero
after the introduction of the Euro. When we split the sample into the period before
the introduction of the Euro and a period after the introduction of the Euro, we ﬁnd
evidence for bimodality before 2002 and evidence for unimodality after 2002.
The temperature plot of the predicted density values indicates a steep exchange
rate distribution around 푥퐻 before Sweden has entered the EMU in 1995. Hence,
the model does not predict large exchange rate movements during this time period.
Around 1995, the distribution seems to cover the whole interval [푥퐿, 푥퐻 ] between the
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Figure 5.6: One-Step-Ahead Forecast: Austrian Shilling
Notes: Upper left: The exchange rate (solid line) and its three equilibria (broken lines). Solid
horizontal lines indicate the beginning of the Exchange Rate Mechanism II in 1999 and the in-
troduction of the Euro in 2002. Upper right: Histogram, kernel density estimate and estimated
equilibria of the exchange rate (broken lines). Lower left: Density forecast of the exchange rate.
Light colors indicate high probability values, while dark colors indicate low probability values.
Lower right: Actual exchange rate (circle), mean forecast (solid line) and mode forecast (dots).
The 95% conﬁdence interval is given by the broken lines. Equilibria are given by the horizontal
broken lines.
attractors as indicated by the light gray region. Hence, the model predicts uncer-
tainty about the equilibrium exchange rate here. The model predicts the exchange
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Figure 5.7: One-Step-Ahead Forecast: Belgian Franc
Notes: See notes of ﬁgure 5.6.
rate to be in the vicinity of this attractor until the introduction of the Euro as
indicated by the steep distribution indicated by yellow colors. The exchange rate
distribution becomes narrow between the introduction of the Euro and today as in-
dicated by the light blue color of the temperature plot. Again, the probability mass
covers the whole area [푥퐿, 푥퐻 ].
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Figure 5.8: One-Step-Ahead Forecast: Cyprus Pound
Notes: See notes of ﬁgure 5.6.
As indicated by the lower right ﬁgure, the model predicts switches between both
attractors after the Euro as indicated by the modes, while the predicted average
tracks the data quite well. This result might indicate that the exchange rate dis-
tribution has become unimodal after the introduction of the Euro, which indicates
some kind of stabilization. Although we ﬁnd that the predicted average exchange
rate seems to track the data quite well, we ﬁnd that in periods when the exchange
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Figure 5.9: One-Step-Ahead Forecast: German Mark
Notes: See notes of ﬁgure 5.6.
rate rises above the upper attractor or falls below the lower one, the model loses its
forecasting power, since it predicts the exchange rate to be near the attractors. All
in all, the cubic drift model seems to be a good representation of the data.
Belgian Franc:
Figure 5.7 contains our results for the Belgian Franc. The Franc is characterized
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Figure 5.10: One-Step-Ahead Forecast: Spanish Peseta
Notes: See notes of ﬁgure 5.6.
by three large swings. The ﬁrst one is an upward trend to the attractor 푥퐻 which
endures until 1995. There is a phase transition from the higher attractor to the
lower attractor 푥퐿 which spans the period from 1995 to 2002. After 2002 we infer a
phase transition back to the attractor 푥퐻 .
The kernel density estimate provides evidence for bimodality. The estimate of the
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Figure 5.11: One-Step-Ahead Forecast: Finnish Markka
Notes: See notes of ﬁgure 5.6.
lower attractor corresponds to the lower mode of the density, while the second mode
does not correspond to the higher attractor. It lies nearer to the repellor located at
-0.122. However, the estimate of the mode located at 1.263 corresponds to a spike
of the histogram. Nevertheless, we conclude that the cubic drift model is a good
representation of the data.
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Figure 5.12: One-Step-Ahead Forecast: French Franc
Notes: See notes of ﬁgure 5.6.
The temperature plot of the density predicts periods of uncertainty around 1993,
1997, 1999 and after 2002. However, density values are high, when the exchange
rate is near the attractors. The large uncertainty around the exchange rate might
be due to large ﬂuctuations and short-run trends in the Belgian Franc.
The mean predictor tracks the data quite well, while the model predictors switch
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Figure 5.13: One-Step-Ahead Forecast: Irish Pound
Notes: See notes of ﬁgure 5.6.
often between attractors but predict trends and phase transitions quite well. There
are some data points which lie outside the conﬁdence bounds when the exchange
rate crosses the attractors.
Cyprus Pound:
Figure 5.8 contains our results for the Cyprus Pound. The kernel density plot
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Figure 5.14: One-Step-Ahead Forecast: Luxembourg Franc
Notes: See notes of ﬁgure 5.6.
provides evidence for a bimodal exchange rate distribution here. The estimates of
the attractors lie in the vicinity of the estimated modes, while the estimate of the
repellor corresponds to the estimate of the antimode. We conclude that the cubic
drift model is a good representation of the data.
The Cyprus Pound is characterized by two phases. The ﬁrst one reaches until the
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Figure 5.15: One-Step-Ahead Forecast: Netherland Guilder
Notes: See notes of ﬁgure 5.6.
introduction of the Euro, where the Cyprus Pound ﬂuctuates erratically around the
lower attractor. After the introduction of the Euro a phase transition occurs in
which the real exchange rate is attracted by the attractor located at 1.288. The
model predicts this phase transition quite well as can be inferred from the small
conﬁdence intervals, while the predicted modes indicate a regime shift.
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Figure 5.16: One-Step-Ahead Forecast: Portuguese Escudo
Notes: See notes of ﬁgure 5.6.
German Mark:
The kernel density estimate of the German Mark real exchange rate indicates three
modes (Figure 5.9). When we split the sample into a pre-Euro period and a post-
Euro period we get the result that the histogram is bimodal for the period before
the introduction of the Euro, while it is unimodal after the introduction of the
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Euro. However, the density plot indicates that our estimates of the two attractors
correspond to the modes of the exchange rate distribution.
The time series plot indicates that the exchange rate ﬂuctuates in the vicinity of
the attractor 푥퐻 in the period before 1995, while a phase transition to the lower
attractor located at 푥퐿 occurs thereafter. This downward trend endures until the
introduction of the Euro in 2002. After that the German Mark seems to be attracted
by a state near zero, which can also be seen from the histogram. The results indicate
that bimodality might be evident in the period before the introduction of the Euro,
while unimodality might be a better representation of the German Mark after the
introduction of the Euro.
The temperature plot of the density predicts the exchange rate to be in the vicinity
of 푥퐻 in the period around 1995. After that a period of uncertainty occurs during
which both attractors are covered with probability mass. During this period of
uncertainty a phase transition from the attractor 푥퐻 to the attractor 푥퐿 occurs.
The lower right ﬁgure indicates this uncertainty as well. Although the predicted
average exchange rate tracks the data quite well, the mode of the exchange rate dis-
tribution switches between both attractors indicating uncertainty about the equilib-
rium exchange rate. After the introduction of the Euro we ﬁnd the same phenomenon
that the modes switch between both attractors. These phase transitions might be
due to a misspeciﬁcation of the model due to a structural break in 2002, since the
histogram is unimodal after the introduction of the Euro.
Spanish Peseta:
The histogram of the Spanish Peseta looks bimodal (Figure 5.10), where the lower
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mode in the vicinity of -1 is visited more frequently compared to the mode located
at around +1. The estimates of the model indicate attractors located at -1.027 and
+1.589. The cubic drift model seems to be a good representation of the data.
When we look at the time series and the estimated attractors we ﬁnd a sharp phase
transition from 푥퐻 to 푥퐿 after 1993 and a phase transition from 푥퐿 to 푥퐻 after the
introduction of the Euro. The Spanish Peseta ﬂuctuates in the vicinity of 푥퐿 in
the period between 1993 and 2002. There is less uncertainty concerned with this
exchange rate, since the 95% conﬁdence interval contains only one attractor at the
same time. Hence, phase transitions are unlikely. However, there is a time period of
uncertainty in 1995 as found in other exchange rates as well, where the conﬁdence
interval become more narrow. However, the mode prediction does not indicate a
phase transition.
The ﬁgure in the lower right indicates that the predicted average exchange rate tracks
the data quite well inside the zone of instability, while the predicted modes indicate
phase transitions correctly and do not indicate false alarms. However, the model
loses its forecasting power in 2007, when the exchange rate crosses the attractor
푥퐻 . The diminishing forecasting power might be caused by events of the current
ﬁnancial crisis.
Finnish Markka:
By looking at the time series of the Finish Markka and the histogram it is not easy
to judge if a unimodal distribution or a bimodal distribution ﬁts the data better
(ﬁgure 5.11). However, the kernel density estimate indicates two small modes in the
vicinity of the estimates of the attractors. This uncertainty is due to the fact that
the Finnish Markka is characterized by erratic ﬂuctuations and several short-term
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trends. The uncertainty about possible attractors are as well manifested in the two
lower plots which indicate large uncertainty concerned with this exchange rate. Here,
both attractors are covered with probability mass for several periods. Moreover, the
mode of the exchange rate distribution switches between the two attractors.
When we split the sample into the time before 2002 and the time after the intro-
duction of the Euro, we ﬁnd evidence for bimodality in the ﬁrst time period, while
a unimodal distribution seems to ﬁt better in the second one as indicated by the
kernel density estimate.
French Franc:
A bimodal distribution seems to characterized the behavior of the French Franc
quite well as indicated by the kernel density estimate (ﬁgure 5.12). The estimate of
the lower attractor ﬁts the lower mode, while the estimate of the second attractor
is higher compared to the second mode. Moreover, the estimate of the repellor is
larger compared to the antimode.
The behavior of the Franc is characterized by a long trend from the upper attractor
located at 푥퐻 to the lower attractor located at 푥퐿. There is a period of uncertainty
around 1998, when both attractors are covered with probability mass. However, a
stabilization occurs in the period between ERM II and the introduction of the Euro,
during which period only one attractor is covered with probability mass. However,
there is a period of uncertainty in 2006, while the modes predict the exchange rate
to be near 푥퐻 .
The predicted modes indicate phase transitions quite well. Modes are near 푥퐻 in the
period before ERM II, while they lie near 푥퐿 in the period between 1999 and 2002.
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After 2002 the modes predict a phase transition to 푥퐻 , in whose vicinity they lie up
to now. Although the predicted modes track the data not so well compared to the
predicted mean, they contain important information about regime shifts. Therefore,
we regard the bimodal model as validated for the French Franc.
Irish Pound:
The kernel density estimate and the histogram indicate that the Irish Pound is
characterized by a bimodal distribution (ﬁgure 5.13). The estimate of the repellor ﬁts
the antimode quite well, while the estimates of the attractors are larger in absolute
value compared to the modes of the distribution.
The Pound ﬂuctuates quite erratically in the period before ERM II, is attracted by
푥퐿 in the period between ERM II and 2002, while a phase transition to 푥퐻 occurs
after the introduction of the Euro. The density forecasts indicate certainty about
the equilibria, since only one attractor is covered with probability mass for most of
the time. There is just one period with a larger conﬁdence region in 1997.
The predicted means track the data quite well, while the predicted modes indicate
the phase transition after the introduction of the Euro quite well. Moreover, the
predicted modes do not give false alarms.
Luxembourg Franc:
The Luxembourg Franc is characterized by short-term trends in the period before
ERM II, while it is attracted by the stable state 푥퐿 after ERM II and attracted by the
stable state 푥퐻 after the introduction of the Euro (ﬁgure 5.14). This phase transition
has more the character of a longer term trend than that of a phase transition. There
is no clear-cut picture of bimodality in the plot of the kernel density estimate due
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to the longer term trend and the short-term ﬂuctuations. While there is one mode
in the vicinity of the estimate of the lower attractor, there is no equivalent to the
repellor and the second attractor in the estimate of the exchange rate distribution.
Although the model seems to be not well speciﬁed, the predicted means track the
data quite well, while the predicted modes indicate medium-run trends. However,
there is larger uncertainty as indicated by the larger conﬁdence region.
Netherland Guilder:
The Netherland Guilder seems to have a bimodal distribution as indicated by the
kernel density estimate and the histogram (ﬁgure 5.15). The positive attractor lies
in the range of the positive mode, while the estimate of the repellor lies in the range
of the antimode. However, the estimate of the negative attractor under predicts the
negative mode.
Similar to other exchange rates there is a period of erratic ﬂuctuations before ERM
II, while the guilder is attracted by the stable state 푥퐿 during ERM II and is attracted
by 푥퐻 after the introduction of the Euro. The density forecast indicates uncertainty
in 1994 as well as 1997 and around 1999. However, after ERM II only one attractor
is covered by probability mass at the same time. The mean predictor seems to track
the data quite well, while the mode predictor indicates trends timely.
Portoguese Escudo:
The estimate of the kernel density indicates bimodality of the distribution of the
Portoguese Escudo (ﬁgure 5.16). The estimate of the positive attractor lies in the
vicinity of the positive mode, while the estimate of the repellor lies in the vicinity
of the antimode. However, the estimate of the negative attractor under predicts the
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negative mode of the real exchange rate distribution.
The Escudo has a similar time development compared to other real exchange rates.
There is a period of erratic ﬂuctuations before ERM II, an attraction to 푥퐿 after
ERM II as well as an attraction to 푥퐻 after the introduction of the Euro. However,
the model predicts less uncertainty concerned with this exchange rate, since only
one attractor is covered with probability mass at the same time. The mean predictor
and the mode predictor under predict the exchange rate before ERM II, while both
seem to track the data quite well after ERM II. Even the phase transition after
the introduction of the Euro is tracked by both predictors with more or less equal
accuracy.
5.6 Forecast Evaluation
The forecast evaluation consists of (i) tests for biased forecasts, and (ii) the com-
parison of the losses through prediction errors between diﬀerent models (Elliot and
Timmerman 2008).
5.6.1 Forecast Eﬃciency Regressions
Predictions of uncertain future realizations of the real exchange rates should be
unbiased, which means that the predictions should be right on average. Moreover,
the forecast errors should be uncorrelated with any information available up to the
time the forecast is made (see Elliot and Timmerman 2008, p. 34). Unbiasedness is
CHAPTER 5. SPECULATIVE BIMODALITY IN REAL EXCHANGE RATES:
ESTIMATION, TESTING AND FORECASTING 218
usually tested by applying the regression proposed by Mincer and Zarnowitz (1969)
푠푡 = 훽0 + 훽1푠ˆ푡∣푡−1 + 푣푡, (5.48)
where 푠푡 is the realization of the real exchange rate, while 푠ˆ푡∣푡−1 is the forecast of the
exchange rate using information available at time 푡− 1. The error of this regression
is denoted by 푣푡. Under the null hypothesis of unbiasedness the restriction 훽0 = 0
and 훽1 = 1 should hold (Elliot and Timmerman 2008, p. 34). The null hypothesis
can simply be tested by applying an F-test.
Table 5.4: Forecast Eﬃciency Regression: Model 1 (a)
Test Equation: 푠푡 = 훽0 + 훽1푠ˆ푡∣푡−1 + 푣푡
Null hypothesis: 퐻0 : 훽0 = 0 and 훽1 = 1
Model 1: 푑푠푡 = (훼푠푡 − 푠3푡 )푑푡+ 휎푑푊푡
Mean Predictor Mode Predictor
훽0
♣ 훽1 ♣ 푅2 퐻0 ♠ 훽0 ♣ 훽1 ♣ 푅2 퐻0 ♠
Austrian 0.055∗∗ 1.095∗∗ 0.933 13.50∗∗ 0.122∗∗ 0.822∗∗ 0.800 28.84∗∗
Shilling (2.97) (51.49) (0.00) (3.76) (27.63) (0.00)
Belgian -0.036∗ 1.065∗∗ 0.942 7.62∗∗ -0.114∗∗ 0.758∗∗ 0.802 49.93∗∗
Franc (-2.05) (55.80) (0.00) (-3.52) (27.78) (0.00)
Cyprus 0.079∗∗ 1.041∗∗ 0.946 12.93∗∗ 0.110∗∗ 0.890∗∗ 0.913 32.09∗∗
Pound (4.72) (58.10) (0.00) (5.11) (44.65) (0.00)
German 0.029 1.052∗∗ 0.947 5.58∗∗ 0.108∗∗ 0.690∗∗ 0.733 62.27∗∗
Mark (1.77) (58.38) (0.00) (2.88) (22.91) (0.00)
Spanish 0.076∗∗ 1.070∗∗ 0.952 17.98∗∗ 0.119∗∗ 0.857∗∗ 0.896 41.10∗∗
Peseta (4.77) (61.37) (0.00) (5.09) (40.56) (0.00)
Finnish 0.091∗∗ 2.165∗∗ 0.895 237.11∗∗ 0.100∗ 0.735∗∗ 0.650 28.43∗∗
Markka (3.87) (40.36) (0.00) (2.32) (18.83) (0.00)
French -0.061∗∗ 1.260∗∗ 0.942 69.70∗∗ -0.218∗∗ 0.724∗∗ 0.752 76.57∗∗
Franc (-3.52) (55.55) (0.00) (-5.90) (24.09) (0.00)
Notes: The real exchange rate data were taken from the ECB’s statistical database (www.ecb.int).
The dataset covers the period 1993:01 to 2009:02. ♣: Values of the t-statistic given in parenthesis.
∗/∗∗ indicate signiﬁcance at the 5%/1% level. ♠: Values of the F-statistic. Marginal signiﬁcance
levels given in parenthesis. ∗/∗∗ indicate signiﬁcance at the 5%/1% level.
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Table 5.5: Forecast Eﬃciency Regression: Model 1 (b)
Test Equation: 푠푡 = 훽0 + 훽1푠ˆ푡∣푡−1 + 푣푡
Null hypothesis: 퐻0 : 훽0 = 0 and 훽1 = 1
Model 1: 푑푠푡 = (훼푠푡 − 푠3푡 )푑푡+ 휎푑푊푡
Mean Predictor Mode Predictor
훽0
♣ 훽1 ♣ 푅2 퐻0 ♠ 훽0 ♣ 훽1 ♣ 푅2 퐻0 ♠
Greek 0.026 1.087∗∗ 0.940 10.54∗∗ 0.035 0.748∗∗ 0.799 44.19∗∗
Drachma (1.49) (54.63) (0.00) (1.07) (27.57) (0.00)
Irish 0.080∗∗ 1.085∗∗ 0.954 23.69∗∗ 0.156∗∗ 0.846∗∗ 0.893 57.04∗∗
Pound (5.18) (63.04) (0.00) (6.50) (39.99) (0.00)
Luxembourg 0.045∗∗ 1.066∗∗ 0.949 10.28∗∗ 0.029 0.832∗∗ 0.866 25.92∗∗
Franc (2.78) (59.83) (0.00) (1.08) (35.19) (0.00)
Netherland -0.078∗∗ 1.074∗∗ 0.923 11.45∗∗ -0.086∗∗ 0.967∗∗ 0.892 7.92∗∗
Guilder (-3.87) (47.74) (0.00) (-3.61) (39.67) (0.00)
Portoguese 0.064∗∗ 0.989∗∗ 0.956 9.42∗∗ 0.106∗∗ 0.870∗∗ 0.919 41.80∗∗
Escudo (4.21) (64.26) (0.00) (5.10) (46.49) (0.00)
Slovene -0.043 1.240∗∗ 0.890 29.84∗∗ -0.054 0.899∗∗ 0.793 6.32∗∗
Tolar (-1.78) (39.24) (0.00) (-1.64) (27.02) (0.00)
Slovak 0.112∗∗ 1.121∗∗ 0.970 67.13∗∗ 0.188∗∗ 0.852∗∗ 0.852 75.32∗∗
Koruna (8.83) (78.07) (0.00) (8.26) (42.44) (0.00)
Notes: The real exchange rate data were taken from the ECB’s statistical database (www.ecb.int).
The dataset covers the period 1993:01 to 2009:02. ♣: Values of the t-statistic given in parenthesis.
∗/∗∗ indicate signiﬁcance at the 5%/1% level. ♠: Values of the F-statistic. Marginal signiﬁcance
levels given in parenthesis. ∗/∗∗ indicate signiﬁcance at the 5%/1% level.
Tables 5.4 and 5.5 contains the Mincer-Zarnowitz regression for the predictions pro-
duced by model 1 푑푠푡 = (훼푠푡 − 푠3푡 )푑푡 + 휎푑푊푡. We diﬀerentiate between the mean
predictor and the mode predictor. When the forecast is unbiased the constant term
훽0 of the forecast accuracy regression should not be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
For the predicted mean values we ﬁnd unbiasedness only in the case of the German
Mark, the Greek Drachma and the Slovene Tolar, while the coeﬃcients are signiﬁ-
cantly diﬀerent from zero for the remaining exchange rates. We ﬁnd the coeﬃcient
훽0 of the test equation to be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero for the mode predictor
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in all cases but the Greek Drachma, the Luxembourg Franc and the Slovene Tolar.
This bias results from the fact that the model has problems in forecasting values
outside the zone of instability, since most of the probability mass is concentrated
in the vicinity of the attractors. Hence, the distribution is heavily skewed there,
which causes systematic over- and under predictions of these extreme values. For
the German Mark, the Greek Drachma, the Luxembourg Franc and the Slovene
Tolar we ﬁnd less values lying outside the zone of instability compared to the other
real exchange rates, which reduces the bias in forecasting these exchange rates.
The estimates of 훽1 are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero and in the range of one
indicating that the forecast is able to explain the actual data. The only exception
is the Finnish Markka, whose time evolution is characterized by more volatile ﬂuc-
tuations compared to the other exchange rates. Hence, we ﬁnd an estimate of 훽1
in the range of two here, indicating that the forecasts are less volatile compared to
the actual data. The values of 훽1 are smaller for the mode predictor compared to
the values of 훽1 for the mean predictor. These results are in line with our visual
inspections of ﬁgures 5.6 to 5.16, where we can see that the mode predictor is more
volatile compared to the mean predictor, since it frequently jumps between the two
attractors.
The goodness-of-ﬁt measures are in the range of 0.9 in all cases. Although the ex-
planatory power seems to be very high, we ﬁnd smaller values for the mode predictor
which is due to the fact that the mode predictor frequently jumps between both at-
tractors, while the mean predictor is closer to the actual data. However, we reject
the joint hypothesis of 퐻0 : 훽0 = 0 and 훽1 = 1 in all cases.
Table 5.6 and 5.7 contains the results of the Mincer-Zarnowitz regression for model 2
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푑푠푡 = (푥퐿−푠푡)(푥푀 −푠푡)(푥퐿−푠푡)푑푡+휎푑푊푡. The results are more or less comparable
of those we got for model 1 in table 5.4 and 5.5. We ﬁnd the coeﬃcient 훽0 to be
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero except as for the Cyprus Pound, the German Mark,
the Spanish Peseta, the Irish Pound and the Luxembourg Franc. Hence, model 2
leads to unbiased forecasts of the real exchange rate for more cases compared to
model 1 which can be due to the fact that model 2 is less restrictive compared to
model 1. Moreover, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of unbiasedness for the
Belgian Franc, the Cyprus Pound, the Greek Drachma, the Irish Pound and the
Luxembourg Franc in case of the mode predictor. The goodness-of-ﬁt measures are
again in the range of 0.9 for the mean predictor and lower for the mode predictor,
since it is more volatile compared to the mean predictor. This higher volatility is
again reﬂected in the lower values of 훽1 in the test regression. However, we reject
the joint null hypothesis 퐻0 : 훽0 = 0 and 훽1 = 1 in all cases.
5.6.2 Forecasting Performance
As Elliot and Timmerman (2008) note, forecast do not have any intrinsic value. They
are only helpful in improving economic and ﬁnancial decisions. Hence, the value of a
forecast depends on how costly prediction errors are. Let 푢푡+ℎ ≡ 푠푡+ℎ− 푠푡+ℎ∣푡 be the
forecast error associated by the ℎ-step ahead point forecast 푠푡+ℎ∣ℎ. The loss generated
by this sequence of forecast errors is deﬁned as 퐿(푢푡+ℎ). Typical loss functions are
the squared loss 퐿(푢푡+ℎ) = (푢푡+ℎ)
2 and the absolute loss 퐿(푢푡+ℎ) = ∣푢푡+ℎ∣. Forecasts
are often evaluated over certain time periods. Prominent loss measures over a certain
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Table 5.6: Forecast Eﬃciency Regression: Model 2 (a)
Test Equation: 푠푡 = 훽0 + 훽1푠ˆ푡∣푡−1 + 푣푡
Null hypothesis: 퐻0 : 훽0 = 0 and 훽1 = 1
Model 2: 푑푠푡 = (푥퐿 − 푠푡)(푥푀 − 푠푡)(푥퐻 − 푠푡) + 휎푑푊푡
Mean Predictor Mode Predictor
훽0
♣ 훽1 ♣ 푅2 퐻0 ♠ 훽0 ♣ 훽1 ♣ 푅2 퐻0 ♠
Austrian -0.045∗∗ 1.163∗∗ 0.954 42.23∗∗ 0.155∗∗ 0.736∗∗ 0.757 56.86∗∗
Shilling (-2.89) (63.03) (0.00) (4.30) (24.50) (0.00)
Belgian 0.042∗∗ 1.116∗∗ 0.950 22.536∗∗ -0.065 0.754∗∗ 0.790 41.68∗∗
Franc (2.63) (60.46) (0.00) (-1.95) (26.81) (0.00)
Cyprus -0.002 0.923∗∗ 0.935 9.55∗∗ 0.007 0.870∗∗ 0.919 24.31∗∗
Pound (-0.08) (52.57) (0.00) (0.36) (46.59) (0.00)
German -0.010 1.077∗∗ 0.953 9.80∗∗ 0.096∗ 0.679∗∗ 0.724 63.62∗∗
Mark (-0.66) (61.87) (0.00) (2.53) (22.38) (0.00)
Spanish 0.014 0.904∗∗ 0.927 14.15∗∗ 0.026∗∗ 0.836∗∗ 0.897 33.07∗∗
Peseta (0.74) (49.26) (0.00) (-10.86) (41.55) (0.00)
Finnish -0.256∗∗ 1.805∗∗ 0.900 191.96∗∗ 0.184∗∗ 0.695∗∗ 0.586 42.53∗∗
Markka (-10.86) (41.55) (0.00) (3.84) (16.44) (0.00)
French 0.221∗∗ 1.278∗∗ 0.957 166.77∗∗ -0.084∗∗ 0.828∗∗ 0.827 25.12∗∗
Franc (14.40) (65.37) (0.00) (-2.78) (30.23) (0.00)
Notes: The real exchange rate data were taken from the ECB’s statistical database (www.ecb.int).
The dataset covers the period 1993:01 to 2009:02. ♣: Values of the t-statistic given in parenthesis.
∗/∗∗ indicate signiﬁcance at the 5%/1% level. ♠: Values of the F-statistic. Marginal signiﬁcance
levels given in parenthesis. ∗/∗∗ indicate signiﬁcance at the 5%/1% level.
out-of-sample time period [푇0, 푇1] are the root mean squared error (RMSE)
RMSE =
1
푇1 − 푇0
푇1−ℎ∑
푡=푇0−ℎ
(푠푡+ℎ − 푠푡+ℎ∣푡)2 (5.49)
and the mean absolute error (MAE)
MAE =
1
푇1 − 푇0
푇1−ℎ∑
푡=푇0−ℎ
∣푠푡+ℎ − 푠푡+ℎ∣푡∣. (5.50)
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Table 5.7: Forecast Eﬃciency Regression: Model 2 (b)
Test Equation: 푠푡 = 훽0 + 훽1푠ˆ푡∣푡−1 + 푣푡
Null hypothesis: 퐻0 : 훽0 = 0 and 훽1 = 1
Model 2: 푑푠푡 = (푥퐿 − 푠푡)(푥푀 − 푠푡)(푥퐻 − 푠푡) + 휎푑푊푡
Mean Predictor Mode Predictor
훽0
♣ 훽1 ♣ 푅2 퐻0 ♠ 훽0 ♣ 훽1 ♣ 푅2 퐻0 ♠
Irish 0.022 0.891∗∗ 0.920 17.18∗∗ 0.033 0.825∗∗ 0.894 37.55∗∗
Pound (1.06) (46.70) (0.00) (1.40) (40.22) (0.00)
Luxembourg 0.013 0.926∗∗ 0.926 7.83∗∗ 0.021 0.811∗∗ 0.869 34.97∗∗
Franc (0.66) (49.01) (0.00) (0.79) (35.53) (0.00)
Netherland 0.056∗∗ 1.296∗∗ 0.963 135.61∗∗ -0.062∗ 0.841∗∗ 0.840 21.07∗∗
Guilder (4.02) (70.90) (0.00) (-2.13) (31.70) (0.00)
Portoguese — — — — — — — —
Escudo — — — — — —
Slovene 0.370∗∗ 1.786∗∗ 0.963 588.09∗∗ -0.098∗∗ 0.720∗∗ 0.653 32.48∗∗
Tolar (24.83) (70.17) (0.00) (-2.29) (18.97) (0.00)
Slovak 0.084∗∗ 0.923∗∗ 0.930 20.00∗∗ 0.089∗∗ 0.898∗∗ 0.921 26.15∗∗
Koruna (4.38) (50.47) (0.00) (4.37) (47.21) (0.00)
Notes: The real exchange rate data were taken from the ECB’s statistical database (www.ecb.int).
The dataset covers the period 1993:01 to 2009:02. ♣: Values of the t-statistic given in parenthesis.
∗/∗∗ indicate signiﬁcance at the 5%/1% level. ♠: Values of the F-statistic. Marginal signiﬁcance
levels given in parenthesis. ∗/∗∗ indicate signiﬁcance at the 5%/1% level.
In order to determine if model 1 predicts future exchange rates more accurate com-
pared to model 2, the RMSE and the MAE can be used. Since a comparison of
RMSE and MAE depends on a certain sample only, Diebold and Mariano (1995)
propose a statistical test on equal predictive accuracy. The authors suggest to test
the null of equal predictive accuracy against the alternative hypothesis of unequal
predictive accuracy
퐻0 : equal predictive accuracy 퐸[퐿(푢
1
푡+ℎ)] = 퐸[퐿(푢
2
푡+ℎ)]
퐻1 : unequal predictive accuracy 퐸[퐿(푢
1
푡+ℎ)] ∕= 퐸[퐿(푢2푡+ℎ)]
(5.51)
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based on the diﬀerence between the quadratic loss (QL) of model 1 and the loss of
model 2
푑푄퐿푡 = 퐿(푢
1
푡+ℎ)− 퐿(푢2푡+ℎ). (5.52)
Hence, null and alternative hypotheses can transformed to
퐻0 : equal predictive accuracy 퐸[푑
푄퐿
푡 ] = 0
퐻1 : unequal predictive accuracy 퐸[푑
푄퐿
푡 ] ∕= 0
. (5.53)
The Diebold-Mariano test-statistic for the quadratic-loss function (QL-DM) is com-
puted as
QL-DM =
푑푄퐿√
ˆ푎푣푎푟(푑푄퐿)
=
푑푄퐿√
ˆ퐿푅푉 푑/푇
퐻0∼ 풩 (0, 1), (5.54)
with
푑푄퐿 =
1
푇1 − 푇0
푇1∑
푡=푇0
푑푄퐿푡 (5.55)
and
LRV푑 = 푉 푎푟(푑
푄퐿
푡 ) + 2
∞∑
푗=1
퐶표푣(푑푄퐿푡 , 푑
푄퐿
푡−푗) (5.56)
as a consistent estimate of the long-run variance of 푑푄퐿. For our application we
chose a truncation based on Andrew’s (1991) heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation
consistent (HAC) variance-covariance estimator. This variance estimator is used,
since the loss diﬀerential are serially correlated due to overlapping time windows.
We calculate the QL-DM-test-statistic as the 푡-statistic of the estimate of a regression
of the loss diﬀerential on a constant with Andrew’s (1991) HAC-estimator. Hence,
the null of equal predictive accuracy can be rejected on a 5%-level if ∣QL-DM∣>1.96.
The evaluation of point predictions using the Diebold-Mariano-framework implies
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the following decision rule for discriminating between competing forecasting models
푑푄퐿푡 < 0 : use model 1 for forecasting 푠푡+1
푑푄퐿푡 = 0 : equal predictive accuracy
푑푄퐿푡 > 0 : use model 2 for forecasting 푠푡+1,
(5.57)
since 푑푄퐿푡 < 0, when model 2 leads to larger losses compared to model 1 and vice
versa.
A diﬀerent concept for forecast comparison is the Kullback-Leibler information cri-
terion (KLIC) which is more appropriate in case of density forecasts. Mitchell and
Hall (2005) suggest a test on equal predictive accuracy of two competing density
forecasts, which is related to the Berkowitz (2001) likelihood-ratio test for the sta-
tistical adequacy of an individual density forecast. Following the suggestions of Bao
et al. (2004), Mitchel and Hall (2005) re-interpret the Berkowitz LR-test as a test
on a zero KLIC distance between the true and unknown density and the forecast
density. The KLIC distance between the true density 푔푡(푠푡) and the density forecast
푓푡(푠푡) is deﬁned as
KLIC푡 =
∫
푔푡(푠푡) ln
{
푔푡(푠푡)
푓푡(푠푡)
}
푑푠푡 = 퐸[ln 푔푡(푠푡)− ln 푓푡(푠푡)], (5.58)
while the expected value is evaluated using the probabilities from the true density
푔푡(푠푡). The sample equivalent is given by
KˆLIC =
1
푇1 − 푇0
푇1∑
푡=푇0
[ln 푔푡(푠푡)− ln 푓푡(푠푡)]. (5.59)
Mitchell and Hall (2005) propose the following test on equal predictive accuracy of
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two competing density forecast 푓 1푡 (푠푡) and 푓
2
푡 (푠푡)
푑퐾퐿퐼퐶푡 = [ln 푔푡(푠푡)− ln 푓 1푡 (푠푡)]− [ln 푔푡(푠푡)− ln 푓 2푡 (푠푡)] (5.60)
= ln 푓 2푡 (푠푡)− ln 푓 1푡 (푠푡). (5.61)
The second equation might be more convenient, since is avoids assumptions of a true
density 푔푡(푠푡) (Mitchell and Hall 2005). The null hypothesis is following Mitchell
and Hall (2005)
퐻0 : equal predictive accuracy 퐸[푑
퐾퐿퐼퐶
푡 ] = 0→ KLIC = 0
퐻1 : unequal predictive accuracy 퐸[푑
퐾퐿퐼퐶
푡 ] ∕= 0→ KLIC > 0.
. (5.62)
Following the framework of Diebold and Mariano (1995), this test is equivalent to
regressing 푑퐾퐿퐼퐶푡 on a constant and calculating the t-statistic by using Andrews
(1991) HAC variance covariance estimator.
From the KLIC-DM-test on equal predictive accuracy follows the following predictor
decision rule
푑퐾퐿퐼퐶푡 < 0 : use model 1 for forecasting 푠푡+1
푑퐾퐿퐼퐶푡 = 0 : equal unconditional predictive accuracy
푑퐾퐿퐼퐶푡 > 0 : use model 2 for forecasting 푠푡+1,
(5.63)
since 푑퐾퐿퐼퐶푡 < 0, when model 2 produces larger losses compared to model 1.
The tests we proposed here are unconditional tests on equal predictive accuracy, since
they provide answers to the question which forecast was more accurate on average.
Giacomini and White (2006) propose the concept of conditional predictive accuracy.
This framework provides answers to the question if we can predict which forecast
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will be more accurate on a future date. While the unconditional method makes a
statement on forecasting models, the second one makes a statement about forecasting
methods (Giacomini and White 2006). Hence, we change the null hypothesis to
퐻0 : equal predictive accuracy 퐸푡[퐿(푢
1
푡+ℎ)] = 퐸푡[퐿(푢
2
푡+ℎ)]
퐻1 : unequal predictive accuracy 퐸푡[퐿(푢
1
푡+ℎ)] ∕= 퐸푡[퐿(푢2푡+ℎ)],
(5.64)
where 퐸푡 is the conditional expectation operator based on the information available
up to time 푡. In terms of the loss diﬀerential 푑푡, which can either be a loss diﬀerential
based on a MSE or MAE as in Diebold and Mariano (1995) or it can be a loss
diﬀerential based on the KLIC as in Mitchell and Hall (2005)
퐻0 : equal predictive accuracy 퐸[푑
퐾퐿퐼퐶
푡 ∣ℎ푡−1] = 퐸[ℎ푡−1푑퐾퐿퐼퐶푡 ] = 0
퐻1 : unequal predictive accuracy 퐸[푑
퐾퐿퐼퐶
푡 ∣ℎ푡−1] = 퐸[ℎ푡−1푑퐾퐿퐼퐶푡 ] ∕= 0
, (5.65)
where ℎ푡−1 = (1, 푑푡−1)′ is the test function applied in Giacomini and White (2006).
Hence, we can simply estimate an AR(1)-model for the loss diﬀerential
푑퐾퐿퐼퐶푡 = 훼0 + 훼1푑
퐾퐿퐼퐶
푡−1 + 휀푡, (5.66)
and test the null hypothesis 훼0 = 훼1 = 0. Following Giacomini and White (2006),
the resulting test statistic is a simple Wald statistic
GW = 푇
(
1
푇
푇∑
푡=2
ℎ푡−1푑퐾퐿퐼퐶푡
)
Σˆ−1
(
1
푇
푇∑
푡=2
ℎ푡−1푑퐾퐿퐼퐶푡
)
∼ 휒2(2) (5.67)
and
Σˆ =
1
푇1 − 푇0
푇1∑
푡=푇0
(ℎ푡−1푑퐾퐿퐼퐶푡 )× (ℎ푡−1푑퐾퐿퐼퐶푡 )′ (5.68)
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is a robust HAC estimator under the null-hypothesis of equal unconditional predic-
tive accuracy (see Giacomini and White 2006, p. 1553).
Note, that the GW-statistic is a squared test-statistic. Hence, a value of GM>5.99
just implies that we reject the null of equal conditional predictive accuracy. It does
not imply a decision rule. The decision rule can be derived via our AR(1)-model
which predicts which of the two forecasting models will be more precise in the next
month
푑ˆ퐾퐿퐼퐶푡+1 = 훼ˆ0 + 훼ˆ1푑
퐾퐿퐼퐶
푡 . (5.69)
When 푑ˆ퐾퐿퐼퐶푡+1 > 0, then we predict forecasting model 1 to produce larger losses in
the future, while when 푑ˆ퐾퐿퐼퐶푡+1 < 0, we predict forecasting model 2 to produce larger
losses in the future. Following Giacomini and While (2006) we obtain the following
predictor decision rule
푑ˆ퐾퐿퐼퐶푡+1 < 0 : use model 1 for forecasting 푠푡+1
푑ˆ퐾퐿퐼퐶푡+1 = 0 : equal conditional predictive accuracy
푑ˆ퐾퐿퐼퐶푡+1 > 0 : use model 2 for forecasting 푠푡+1,
(5.70)
since 푑ˆ퐾퐿퐼퐶푡+1 < 0 predicts model 2 to produce larger losses in 푡+1 compared to model
1.
Table 5.8 and 5.9 contains the out-of-sample point prediction performance of the
mean and the mode predictor of model 1 푑푠푡 = (훼푠푡 − 푠3푡 )푑푡 + 휎푑푊푡 (panel (a))
and model 2 푑푠푡 = (푥퐿 − 푠푡)(푥푀 − 푠푡)(푥퐻 − 푠푡)푑푡 + 휎푑푊푡 (panel (b)) as well as
for the random walk prediction for the quadratic loss function. Moreover, table 5.8
and 5.9 contains the Diebold-Mariano test statistic on the null hypothesis of equal
predictive accuracy between the models and the random walk prediction. For the
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Table 5.8: Out-of-Sample Forecasting: Quadratic Loss (a)
Estimation Period: 1993:01 - 2003:12
Out-of-Sample Period: 2004:01 - 2009:02
Decision Rule: QL-DM(M푖, M푗) <0 (>0), then M푖 ≻ (≺) M푗 ♣
(a) Model 1: 푑푠푡 = (훼푠푡 − 푠3푡 )푑푡+ 휎푑푊푡
RMSE QL-DM(M푖, M푅푊 )-Test
♣
Mean Mode RW Mean Mode
Austrian Shilling 0.130 1.013 0.117 1.049 (0.29) 17.904∗∗ (0.00)
Belgian Franc 0.161 0.710 0.156 0.387 (0.70) 3.582∗∗ (0.00)
Cyprus Pound 0.995 0.365 0.134 1.739 (0.08) 1.578 (0.11)
German Mark 0.154 0.993 0.121 1.894 (0.06) 22.227∗∗ (0.00)
Spanish Peseta 0.409 0.395 0.086 1.489 (0.14) 1.563 (0.12)
Finnish Markka 0.238 1.065 0.192 1.303 (0.19) 13.713∗∗ (0.00)
French Franc 0.165 0.906 0.165 -0.010 (0.99) 4.990∗∗ (0.00)
Greek Drachma 0.337 0.367 0.107 1.286 (0.20) 2.630∗ (0.01)
Irish Pound 0.426 0.411 0.108 1.359 (0.17) 1.343 (0.18)
Luxembourg Franc 0.383 0.395 0.123 1.379 (0.17) 1.730 (0.08)
Netherland Guilder 0.197 0.336 0.138 2.311∗ (0.02) 2.613∗ (0.01)
Portuguese Escudo 0.275 0.249 0.106 1.746 (0.08) 1.649 (0.10)
Slovene Tolar 0.656 0.309 0.097 3.120∗∗ (0.00) 1.610 (0.11)
Slovak Koruna 0.486 0.490 0.056 1.503 (0.13) 1.465 (0.14)
Note: ♣: QL-DM is the value of the Diebold-Mariano-statistic based on the quadratic-loss diﬀeren-
tial 푑푄퐿푡 . Marginal signiﬁcance levels in parenthesis.
∗/∗∗ denotes rejection of the null hypothesis of
equal predictive accuracy at the 5%/1% level. The QL-DM-statistic is calculated by the Andrews
HAC-variance estimator.
mean predictor of model 1 we can reject the null of equal predictive accuracy only in
cases of the Netherland Guilder and the Slovene Tolar, for which the random walk
prediction produces smaller quadratic losses on average. In all other cases we cannot
reject the null-hypothesis of equal predictive accuracy for the point prediction based
on the quadratic loss function. However, we reject the null-hypothesis in favor of the
random walk for the mode prediction of the Austrian Shilling, the Belgian Franc, the
German Mark, the Finnish Markka, the French Franc and the Netherland Guilder.
The random walk outperforms model 2 signiﬁcantly in eleven of fourteen cases as
indicated by the Diebold-Mariano statistic (panel (b)). A reason might be that
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Table 5.9: Out-of-Sample Forecasting: Quadratic Loss (b)
Estimation Period: 1993:01 - 2003:12
Out-of-Sample Period: 2004:01 - 2009:02
Decision Rule: QL-DM(M푖, M푗) <0 (>0), then M푖 ≻ (≺) M푗 ♣
(b) Model 2: 푑푠푡 = (푥퐿 − 푠푡)(푥푀 − 푠푡)(푥퐻 − 푠푡)푑푡+ 휎푑푊푡
RMSE QL-DM(M푖, M푅푊 )-Test
♣
Mean Mode RW Mean Mode
Austrian Shilling 0.142 0.938 0.117 2.681∗ (0.01) 9.974∗∗ (0.00)
Belgian Franc 0.182 0.606 0.156 1.021 (0.31) 3.521∗∗ (0.00)
Cyprus Pound 0.635 0.609 0.134 2.804∗ (0.01) 2.582∗ (0.01)
German Mark 0.164 0.972 0.121 3.272∗∗ (0.00) 13.589∗∗ (0.00)
Spanish Peseta 0.290 0.376 0.086 5.067∗∗ (0.00) 3.164∗∗ (0.00)
Finnish Markka 0.298 0.950 0.192 2.470∗∗ (0.00) 4.655∗∗ (0.00)
French Franc 0.235 0.471 0.165 2.126∗ (0.03) 3.045∗ (0.01)
Greek Drachma — — — — — — —
Irish Pound 0.655 0.630 0.108 1.903 (0.06) 1.809 (0.07)
Luxembourg Franc 0.694 0.625 0.123 1.959 (0.05) 1.724 (0.08)
Netherland Guilder 0.595 0.417 0.138 4.440∗∗ (0.00) 2.770∗∗ (0.00)
Portuguese Escudo 0.522 0.482 0.106 2.396∗ (0.02) 2.165∗ (0.03)
Slovene Tolar — — — — — — —
Slovak Koruna — — — — — — —
Note: ♣: QL-DM is the value of the Diebold-Mariano-statistic based on the quadratic-loss diﬀeren-
tial 푑푄퐿푡 . Marginal signiﬁcance levels in parenthesis.
∗/∗∗ denotes rejection of the null hypothesis of
equal predictive accuracy at the 5%/1% level. The QL-DM-statistic is calculated by the Andrews
HAC-variance estimator.
although model 2 is less restrictive compared to model 1, there is more parameter
estimation uncertainty concerned with model 2. In light of the results of Meese and
Rogoﬀ (1983), who found that the random walk outperforms linear exchange rate
models, we conclude from our results that the cubic drift model seems to represent
the data quite well in numerous cases.
Table 5.10 and 5.11 contains out-of-sample density forecasting performance compar-
isons between competing models based on the KLIC-loss. We calculate the Diebold-
Mariano statistic based on the KLIC (KLIC-DM) by regressing 푑퐾퐿퐼퐶푡 on a constant
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Table 5.10: Out-of-Sample Forecasting: KLIC-Loss (a)
Estimation Period: 1993:01 - 2003:12
Out-of-Sample Period: 2004:01 - 2009:02
퐻0: Equal Unconditional Forecast Accuracy
M1: 푑푠푡 = (훼푠푡 − 푠3푡 )푑푡+ 휎푑푊푡
M2: 푑푠푡 = (푥퐿 − 푠푡)(푥푀 − 푠푡)(푥퐻 − 푠푡)푑푡+ 휎푑푊푡
RW: 푑푠푡 = 푐푑푡+ 휎푑푊푡
Decision Rule: KLIC-DM(M푖, M푗)<0 (>0), then M푖 ≻ (≺) M푗 ♣
(a) M1 vs. RW (b) M2 vs. RW ∣ (c) M1 vs. M2
Mean Mode Mean Mode Mean Mode
Austrian Shilling 34.182∗∗ 4.822∗∗ 22.625∗∗ 3.297∗∗ 0.101 4.246∗∗
(p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.92) (0.00)
Belgian Franc 1.898 -1.288 1.238 -1.445 7.203∗∗ 1.393
(p-value) (0.06) (0.20) (0.22) (0.15) (0.00) (0.16)
Cyprus Pound 2.719∗ 2.665∗ 3.941∗∗ 3..919∗∗ -1.954 -1.960
(p-value) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.05)
German Mark 30.023∗∗ 1.393 24.973∗∗ 0.581 0.295 2.479∗
(p-value) (0.00) (0.16) (0.00) (0.56) (0.77) (0.01)
Spanish Peseta 2.190∗ 2.014∗ 0.926∗∗ -0.850 2.056∗ 2.323∗
(p-value) (0.03) (0.04) (0.00) (0.40) (0.04) (0.02)
Finnish Markka 29.045∗∗ 19.005∗∗ 14.789∗∗ 6.705∗∗ 1.861 11.794∗∗
(p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.00)
French Franc 10.138∗∗ 3.439∗∗ 5.728∗∗ -0.054 15.340∗∗ 1.942
(p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.96) (0.00) (0.05)
Note: ♣: KLIC-DM is the Diebold-Mariano statistic based on the KLIC-loss diﬀerential 푑퐾퐿퐼퐶푡 .
The statistic is calculated using Andrew’s HAC variance-covariance-matrix estimator.
and by calculating the t-statistic using Andrew’s HAC variance-covariance-matrix
estimator. We calculate this statistic for model 1: 푑푠푡 = (훼푠푡− 푠3푡 )푑푡+휎푑푊푡, model
2: 푑푠푡 = (푥퐿 − 푠푡)(푥푀 − 푠푡)(푥퐻 − 푠푡)푑푡 + 휎푑푊푡 and the random walk prediction:
푑푠푡 = 푐푑푡+휎푑푊푡. Although the random walk is a very simple model we calculate its
density predictions using the same ﬁnite-diﬀerence scheme as we employ for models
1 and 2 in order to guarantee a comparison of the three models under otherwise
same conditions. From the KLIC-DM statistic in panel (a) can be inferred that
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Table 5.11: Out-of-Sample Forecasting: KLIC-Loss (b)
Estimation Period: 1993:01 - 2003:12
Out-of-Sample Period: 2004:01 - 2009:02
퐻0: Equal Unconditional Forecast Accuracy
M1: 푑푠푡 = (훼푠푡 − 푠3푡 )푑푡+ 휎푑푊푡
M2: 푑푠푡 = (푥퐿 − 푠푡)(푥푀 − 푠푡)(푥퐻 − 푠푡)푑푡+ 휎푑푊푡
RW: 푑푠푡 = 푐푑푡+ 휎푑푊푡
Decision Rule: KLIC-DM(M푖, M푗)<0 (>0), then M푖 ≻ (≺) M푗 ♣
(a) M1 vs. RW (b) M2 vs. RW ∣ (c) M1 vs. M2
Mean Mode Mean Mode Mean Mode
Greek Drachma 1.144 0.024 — — — —
(p-value) (0.25) (0.98) — — — —
Irish Pound 2.636∗ 2.488∗ 6.747∗∗ 6.744∗∗ -5.961∗∗ -6.013∗∗
(p-value) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Luxembourg Franc -3.337∗∗ -3.727∗∗ 5.941∗∗ 5.854∗∗ -7.011∗∗ -7.002∗∗
(p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Netherland Guilder 13.851 6.040∗∗ 10.191∗∗ 8.552∗∗ 7.028∗∗ -4.214∗∗
(p-value) (0.39) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Portoguese Escudo 3.485∗∗ 3.107∗∗ 5.654∗∗ 5.644∗∗ -4.952∗∗ -5.013∗∗
(p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Slovene Tolar 7.682∗∗ 4.041∗∗ — — — —
(p-value) (0.00) (0.00) — — — —
Slovak Koruna 5.818∗∗ 5.828∗∗ — — — —
(p-value) (0.00) (0.00) — — — —
Note: ♣: KLIC-DM is the Diebold-Mariano statistic based on the KLIC-loss diﬀerential 푑퐾퐿퐼퐶푡 .
The statistic is calculated using Andrew’s HAC variance-covariance-matrix estimator.
model 1 outperforms the random walk signiﬁcantly only for the Luxembourg Franc,
since the KLIC-DM is negative and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero in this case.
For the Belgian Franc, the Greek Drachma and the Netherland Guilder we cannot
reject the null of equal predictive accuracy. From panel (b) we can infer that that
the random walk outperforms model 2 in all cases, except for the Belgian Franc for
which we cannot reject the null of equal predictive accuracy. Moreover, we ﬁnd that
model 1 outperforms model 2 in cases of the Irish Pound, the Luxembourg Franc,
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the Netherland Guilder and the Portoguese Escudo, while model 2 is superior for
the Belgian Franc, the German Mark, the Spanish Peseta as well as the Finnish
Markka. These results are in line with the ﬁndings of Meese and Rogoﬀ (1983) that
it is diﬃcult to beat a random walk in out-of-sample forecasting of exchange rates.
Table 5.12: Giacomini-White-Test: Equal Conditional Predictive Accuracy (a)
Estimation Period: 1993:01 - 2003:12
Out-of-Sample Period: 2004:01 - 2009:02
퐻0: Equal Conditional Forecast Accuracy
M1: 푑푠푡 = (훼푠푡 − 푠3푡 ) + 휎푑푊푡
M2: 푑푠푡 = (푥퐿 − 푠푡)(푥푀 − 푠푡)(푥퐻 − 푠푡)푑푡+ 휎푑푊푡
RW: 푑푠푡 = 푐푑푡+ 휎푑푊푡
Decision Rule: 퐸푡[KLIC푡+1(M푖, M푗)]<0 (>0), then M푖 ≻ (≺) M푗
(a) M1 vs. RW (b) M2 vs. RW ∣ (c) M1 vs. M2
Mean Mode Mean Mode Mean Mode
Austrian Shilling ♣ 59.792∗∗ 45.524∗∗ 59.662∗∗ 28.220∗∗ 17.428∗∗ 27.691∗∗
% (퐸푡[KLIC푡+1 <0])
♠ 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 42.61% 0.00%
Belgian Franc ♣ 29.566∗∗ 38.903∗∗ 12.847∗∗ 45.745∗∗ 30.970∗∗ 29.968∗∗
% (퐸푡[KLIC푡+1 <0])
♠ 0.00% 83.61% 0.00% 81.97% 0.00% 22.95%
Cyprus Pound ♣ 10.804∗∗ 10.505∗∗ 10.929∗∗ 10.828∗∗ 3.156 3.177
% (퐸푡[KLIC푡+1 <0])
♠ 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 100.00%
German Mark ♣ 59.583∗∗ 23.218∗∗ 59.623∗∗ 21.590∗∗ 11.460∗∗ 21.718∗∗
% (퐸푡[KLIC푡+1 <0])
♠ 0.00% 26.23% 0.00% 0.00% 36.07% 14.75%
Spanish Peseta ♣ 4.802∗ 4.140∗ 14.904∗∗ 12.148∗∗ 4.275 5.499
% (퐸푡[KLIC푡+1 <0])
♠ 0.00% 0.00% 24.59% 77.05% 0.00% 0.00%
Finnish Markka ♣ 59.490∗∗ 59.414∗∗ 59.555∗∗ 45.531∗∗ 22.251∗∗ 54.584∗∗
% (퐸푡[KLIC푡+1 <0])
♠ 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
French Franc ♣ 58.900∗∗ 39.267∗∗ 54.231∗∗ 24.369∗∗ 55.428∗∗ 23.534∗∗
% (퐸푡[KLIC푡+1 <0])
♠ 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 60.66% 0.00% 0.00%
Note: ♣: Value of the Giacomini-White statistic GW∼ 휒2(2) as deﬁned in equation (56). */**
denote rejection of the null hypothesis of equal conditional predictive accuracy at the 5%/1% level.
Critical values for GW are 5.99/9.21. ♠: Percentage number of 퐸푡[KLIC푡+1] >0 within the period
2004:02 - 2009:02.
Table 5.12 and 5.13 contains results of the Giacomini-White tests on equal condi-
tional predictive accuracy. Its null hypothesis states that we should not be able
to predict which model will perform better in the next month. We calculated this
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Table 5.13: Giacomini-White-Test: Equal Conditional Predictive Accuracy (b)
Estimation Period: 1993:01 - 2003:12
Out-of-Sample Period: 2004:01 - 2009:02
퐻0: Equal Conditional Forecast Accuracy
M1: 푑푠푡 = (훼푠푡 − 푠3푡 ) + 휎푑푊푡
M2: 푑푠푡 = (푥퐿 − 푠푡)(푥푀 − 푠푡)(푥퐻 − 푠푡)푑푡+ 휎푑푊푡
RW: 푑푠푡 = 푐푑푡+ 휎푑푊푡
Decision Rule: 퐸푡[KLIC푡+1(M푖, M푗)]<0 (>0), then M푖 ≻ (≺) M푗
(a) M1 vs. RW (b) M2 vs. RW ∣ (c) M1 vs. M2
Mean Mode Mean Mode Mean Mode
Greek Drachma ♣ 15.896∗∗ 36.567∗∗ — — — —
% (퐸푡[KLIC푡+1 <0])
♠ 0.00% 59.02% — — — —
Irish Pound ♣ 11.128∗∗ 10.441∗ 29.406∗∗ 29.406∗∗ 25.133∗∗ 25.377∗∗
% (퐸푡[KLIC푡+1 <0])
♠ 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Luxembourg Franc ♣ 19.783∗∗ 22.028∗∗ 25.411∗∗ 25.131∗∗ 27.557∗∗ 27.593∗∗
% (퐸푡[KLIC푡+1 <0])
♠ 96.72% 96.72% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Netherland Guilder ♣ 59.015∗∗ 54.831∗∗ 51.965∗∗ 49.882∗∗ 27.038∗∗ 13.495∗∗
% (퐸푡[KLIC푡+1 <0])
♠ 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00%
Portoguese Escudo ♣ 10.225∗ 8.405∗ 59.634∗∗ 57.933∗∗ 20.945∗∗ 21.267∗∗
% (퐸푡[KLIC푡+1 <0])
♠ 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Slovene Tolar ♣ 58.207∗∗ 40.671∗∗ — — — —
% (퐸푡[KLIC푡+1 <0])
♠ 0.00% 29.51% — — — —
Slovak Koruna ♣ 39.632∗∗ 39.629∗∗ — — — —
% (퐸푡[KLIC푡+1 <0])
♠ 0.00% 0.00% — — — —
Note: ♣: Value of the Giacomini-White statistic GW∼ 휒2(2) as deﬁned in equation (56). */**
denote rejection of the null hypothesis of equal conditional predictive accuracy at the 5%/1% level.
Critical values for GW are 5.99/9.21. ♠: Percentage number of 퐸푡[KLIC푡+1] >0 within the period
2004:02 - 2009:02.
statistic again based on the KLIC-loss together with the percentage number of out
performances of model 푖 versus model 푗 over the out-of-sample horizon 2004:01 to
2009:02. Note, that GW>5.99 just implies that we reject the null of equal conditional
predictive accuracy. However, e.g. %퐸푡[KLIC푡+1 < 0] = 30% implies, that model
1 outperformed model 2 in 30% of the months in the out-of-sample period. Our
results indicate that we can reject the null hypothesis of equal conditional predictive
accuracy in all cases. The reason lies in the fact that the null of equal conditional
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predictive accuracy places one additional restriction compared to the null of equal
unconditional predictive accuracy. Panel (a) of table 5.10 contains a comparison of
model 1 against the random walk. The decision rule suggest to prefer model one
over the random walk for the Belgian Franc in 83.61 percent of all months of the
out-of-sample period for the mode predictor of model 1, while it prefers model 1 in
26.23 percent of all months for the German Mark. Moreover, model 1 outperforms
the random walk in 96.72% of all cases under this criterion for the Luxembourg
Franc and in 29.51 percent of all months for the Slovene Tolar. The mode predic-
tor of model 2 outperforms the random walk in 77.05 percent of all months for the
Spanish Peseta and in 60.66 percent of all months for the French Franc.
Summing up, our forecasting exercise gives evidence that models from which bimodal
distributions emerge have at least for some time periods forecasting power for real
exchange rates, while various test only gave evidence that these models signiﬁcantly
outperform the random walk in out-of-sample predictions for one out of fourteen
real exchange rates.
5.7 Conclusion and Outlook
In this paper we estimate nonlinear diﬀusion processes for modeling exchange rate
dynamics. Following the empirical ﬁnance literature we assume a cubic drift-term
from which a bimodal exchange rate distribution emerges (Creedy et al. 1993, Aı¨t-
Sahalia 1999). Hence, large swings and crashes in exchange rates are modeled as
jumps between attractors (Creedy et al. 1996). The economic interpretation of
bimodality is that there is no consensus in the market about the true equilibrium
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exchange rate as proposed in the model of Jeanne (1997). When exchange rates lie
within a zone of multiple equilibria, they are vulnerable to self-fulﬁlling expectations
(Koh et al. 2007). This approach wants to overcome the diﬃculties arising in linear
exchange rate models in explaining and forecasting exchange rates.
Within this paper the following results emerged:
(i) The parameter estimates give evidence for bimodality in exchange rates for
both cubic-drift models. Bimodality could not be rejected for fourteen real
exchange rates over the period 1993:01 to 2009:02 as well as for the period
1993:01 to 2003:12 for both models.
(ii) Our density forecasts identify phase transitions in exchange rates during which
the distribution changes its shape from unimodal to bimodal. We identify two
major phase transitions as the beginning of ERM II and the introduction of
the Euro.
(iii) We ﬁnd exchange rates closer to their attractors and conﬁdence regions becom-
ing smaller after the beginning of ERM II. Moreover, bimodal distributions ﬁt
exchange rates better in the period before the introduction of the Euro, while
unimodality is more evident afterwards.
(iv) Statistical tests on equal unconditional predictive accuracy as well as on equal
conditional predictive accuracy lead to the result that the cubic-drift models
outperform the random walk prediction for one out of fourteen real exchange
rates.
Estimation of and forecasting with nonlinear stochastic diﬀerential equations might
as well have applications in other areas of ﬁnancial economics. Since linear models
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cannot predict periods of ﬁnancial instability, nonlinear econometrics seems to be a
promising ﬁeld in empirical ﬁnance. However, a test of the performance of Value-at-
Risk under these more ﬂexible distributions might be of importance for addressing
ﬁnancial risk.
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5.A Appendix
5.A.1 Properties of the Generalized Cubic Drift Model
(a) Three Stationary Points:
The generalized cubic-drift model is given by the following equation
휇(푠; 휃) = (푥퐿 − 푠)(푥푀 − 푠)(푥퐻 − 푠) (5.71)
= (푥퐿 − 푠)(푥푀푥퐻 − 푠푥퐻 − 푠푥푀 + 푠2) (5.72)
= −(푠3 − 푠2(푥퐻 + 푥푀 + 푥퐿) + 푠(푥퐻푥퐿 + 푥푀푥퐿 + 푥푀푥퐻)− 푥퐿푥푀푥퐻),
with equilibrium points 푥퐿 ≤ 푥푀 ≤ 푥퐻 and 휃 = (푥퐿, 푥푀 , 푥퐻)′. Since attractors and
repellors are minima and maxima of the potential 푉 , which is deﬁned as
∂푉
∂푠
= −휇(푠; 휃), (5.73)
we derive the stability properties by calculating the ﬁrst derivative of the negative
drift and evaluate it at the stationary points 푥퐿, 푥푀 and 푥퐻 . The ﬁrst derivative of
the negative drift with respect to the state variable 푠 is given by
−∂휇(푠; 휃)
∂푠
= 3푠2 − 2(푥퐿 + 푥푀 + 푥퐻)푠+ (푥푀푥퐻 + 푥푀푥퐿 + 푥퐿푥퐻). (5.74)
For the special case 푥퐿 = −
√
훼, 푥푀 = 0 and 푥퐻 = +
√
훼 this derivative collapses to
−∂휇(푠; 휃)
∂푠
= 3푠2 − 2(−√훼 +√훼)푠+ 훼 = 3푠2 + 훼, (5.75)
which is the ﬁrst derivative of the double-well potential.
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The curvature of the potential at the lower stationary point is
−∂휇(푠; 휃)
∂푠
∣∣∣
푠=푥퐿
= 3푥2퐿 − 2(푥퐿 + 푥푀 + 푥퐻)푥퐿 + (푥푀푥퐻 + 푥푀푥퐿 + 푥퐿푥퐻)(5.76)
= 푥2퐿 − 푥푀푥퐿 − 푥퐿푥퐻 + 푥푀푥퐻 (5.77)
= (푥퐿 − 푥퐻)(푥퐿 − 푥푀) > 0, (5.78)
which indicates a minimum of the potential function and, hence, a stable state.
The curvature of the potential at the higher stationary point is
−∂휇(푠; 휃)
∂푠
∣∣∣
푠=푥퐻
= 3푥2퐻 − 2(푥퐿 + 푥푀 + 푥퐻)푥퐻 + (푥푀푥퐻 + 푥푀푥퐿 + 푥퐿푥퐻)(5.79)
= 푥2퐻 − 푥퐿푥퐻 − 푥푀푥퐻 + 푥푀푥퐿 (5.80)
= (푥퐻 − 푥푀)(푥퐻 − 푥퐿) > 0, (5.81)
which indicates a minimum of the potential function and, hence, a stable state.
The curvature of the potential at the stationary point between both attractors is
−∂휇(푠; 휃)
∂푠
∣∣∣
푠=푥푀
= 3푥2푀 − 2(푥퐿 + 푥푀 + 푥퐻)푥푀 + (푥푀푥퐻 + 푥푀푥퐿 + 푥퐿푥퐻)(5.82)
= 푥2푀 − 푥푀푥퐿 − 푥푀푥퐻 + 푥퐿푥퐻 (5.83)
= (푥푀 − 푥퐻)(푥푀 − 푥퐿) < 0, (5.84)
which indicates a maximum of the potential function and, hence, an unstable state.
(b) Two Stationary Points:
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In case of two equilibria 푥퐿 < 푥퐻 we get the following drift
휇(푠; 휃) = −(푠− 푥퐿)2(푠− 푥퐻) (5.85)
= −(푠3 − (2푥퐿 + 푥퐻)푠2 + (푥2퐿 + 2푥퐿푥퐻)푠+ 푥2퐿푥퐻). (5.86)
The derivative of the negative drift with respect to the state variable is given by
−∂휇(푠; 휃)
∂푠
= 3푠2 − (4푥퐿 + 2푥퐻)푠+ (푥2퐿 + 2푥퐿푥퐻). (5.87)
The curvature of the potential at the stationary point 푥퐿 is given by
−∂휇(푠; 휃)
∂푠
∣∣∣
푠=푥퐿
= 3푥2퐿 − 4푥2퐿 + 2푥퐿푥퐻 + 푥2퐿 + 2푥퐿푥퐻 (5.88)
= 0. (5.89)
while the curvature of the potential at the stationary point between both attractors
is
−∂휇(푠; 휃)
∂푠
∣∣∣
푠=푥퐻
= 3푥2퐻 − 4푥퐿푥퐻 − 2푥2퐻 + 푥2퐿 + 2푥퐿푥퐻 (5.90)
= 푥2퐻 − 2푥퐿푥퐻 + 푥2퐿 (5.91)
= (푥퐻 − 푥퐿)2 > 0 (5.92)
which indicates a minimum of the potential function and, hence, a stable state.
Alternatively, we might have
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휇(푠; 휃) = −(푠− 푥퐻)2(푠− 푥퐿) (5.93)
= −(푠2 − 2푥퐻푠+ 푥2퐻)(푠− 푥퐿) (5.94)
= −(푠3 − (2푥퐻 + 푥퐿)푠2 + (푥2퐻 + 2푥퐿푥퐻)푠+ 푥2퐻푥퐿). (5.95)
The derivative of the negative drift with respect to the state variable is given by
−∂휇(푠; 휃)
∂푠
= 3푠2 − (4푥퐿 + 2푥퐻)푠+ (푥2퐿 + 2푥퐿푥퐻). (5.96)
The curvature of the potential at the stationary point 푥퐿 is given by
−∂휇(푠; 휃)
∂푠
∣∣∣
푠=푥퐿
= 3푥2퐿 − 4푥2퐿 + 2푥퐿푥퐻 + 푥2퐿 + 2푥퐿푥퐻 (5.97)
= 0. (5.98)
while the curvature of the potential at the stationary point between both attractors
is
∂휇(푠; 휃)
∂푠
∣∣∣
푠=푥퐻
= 3푥2퐻 − 4푥퐿푥퐻 − 2푥2퐻 + 푥2퐿 + 2푥퐿푥퐻 (5.99)
= 푥2퐻 − 2푥퐿푥퐻 + 푥2퐿 (5.100)
= (푥퐻 − 푥퐿)2 > 0 (5.101)
which indicates a minimum of the potential function and, hence, a stable state.
(c) One Stationary Point:
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In case of one equilibrium the drift collapes to
휇(푠; 휃) = −(푠− 푥)3 (5.102)
= −(푠3 − 3푥푠2 + 3푠푥2 − 푥3) (5.103)
The curvature of the potential at the unique stationary point
−∂휇(푠; 휃)
∂푠
∣∣∣
푠=푥
= 3푥2 − 6푥2 + 3푥2 = 0 (5.104)
which indicates a ﬂat potential function at 푠 = 푥. However, we have 휇(푠; 휃) > 0 for
푠 < 푥 and 휇(푠; 휃) < 0 for 푠 > 0. Hence, the unique equilibrium is attracting.
5.A.2 Crank-Nicolson Discretization Scheme
The similar derivation of the Crank-Nicolson Discretization of the Fokker-Plank
equation can also be found in the appendix of Lux (2009c).
The Fokker-Planck equation for the density 푓(푠푡; 휃) of the state variable 푠푡 is given
by
∂푓(푠푡; 휃)
∂푡
=
∂(휇(푠푡; 휃)푓(푠푡; 휃))
∂푠
+
∂2휎(푠푡; 휃)푓(푠푡; 휃)
∂푠2
, (5.105)
which is deﬁned up to a parameter vector 휃 ∈ 푅푛, which we suppress in order to
ease notation.
Lux (2009c) deﬁnes the probability ﬂux 퐹 (푠푡) and writes the Fokker-Planck equation
as
∂푓(푠푡)
∂푡
=
∂퐹 (푠푡)
∂푠
, (5.106)
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with
퐹 (푠푡) = 휎(푠푡)
∂푓(푠푡)
∂푠
+ (휇(푠푡) +
∂휎(푠푡)
∂푠
)푓(푠푡). (5.107)
The Crank-Nicolson approximation substitutes the diﬀerential by the following cen-
tral diﬀerences
∂푓(푠푡)
∂푡
≈ 푓
푖+1
푗 − 푓 푖푗
푘
(5.108)
∂퐹 (푠푡)
∂푠
≈ 1
ℎ
(
퐹 푖+1푗+0.5 + 퐹
푖
푗+0.5
2
− 퐹
푖+1
푗−0.5 + 퐹
푖
푗−0.5
2
)
. (5.109)
Hence, we get the following ﬁnite diﬀerence approximation to the Fokker-Planck
equation
푓 푖+1푗 − 푓 푖푗
푘
=
1
ℎ
(
퐹 푖+1푗+0.5 + 퐹
푖
푗+0.5
2
− 퐹
푖+1
푗−0.5 + 퐹
푖
푗−0.5
2
)
(5.110)
and
퐹 푖푗 = 휎(푠푗)
푓 푖푗+0.5 − 푓 푖푗−0.5
ℎ
+
(
휇(푠푗) + 휎
′(푠푗)
)
푓 푖푗 . (5.111)
By plugging the second equation into the ﬁrst we arrive at
푓 푖+1푗 − 푓 푖푗
푘
=
1
2ℎ2
휎푗+0.5
(
푓 푖+1푗+1 − 푓 푖+1푗 + 푓 푖푗+1 − 푓 푖푗
)
(5.112)
− 1
2ℎ2
휎푗−0.5
(
푓 푖+1푗 − 푓 푖+1푗−1 + 푓 푖푗 − 푓 푖푗−1
)
(5.113)
+
1
4ℎ
(휇푗+0.5 + 휎
′
푗+0.5)
(
푓 푖+1푗+1 + 푓
푖+1
푗 + 푓
푖
푗+1 + 푓
푖
푗
)
(5.114)
− 1
4ℎ
(휇푗−0.5 + 휎′푗−0.5)
(
푓 푖+1푗 + 푓
푖+1
푗−1 + 푓
푖
푗 + 푓
푖
푗−1
)
(5.115)
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By deﬁning 푣 = 푘/ℎ2 we obtain
푓 푖+1푗 − 푓 푖푗 = 0.5푣
[
휎푗+0.5
(
푓 푖+1푗+1 − 푓 푖+1푗 + 푓 푖푗+1 − 푓 푖푗
)
(5.116)
− 휎푗−0.5
(
푓 푖+1푗 − 푓 푖+1푗−1 + 푓 푖푗 − 푓 푖푗−1
)
(5.117)
+ 0.5ℎ(휇푗+0.5 + 휎
′
푗+0.5)
(
푓 푖+1푗+1 + 푓
푖+1
푗 + 푓
푖
푗+1 + 푓
푖
푗
)
(5.118)
− 0.5ℎ(휇푗−0.5 + 휎′푗−0.5)
(
푓 푖+1푗 + 푓
푖+1
푗−1 + 푓
푖
푗 + 푓
푖
푗−1
)]
(5.119)
Putting all variables indexed by 푖+ 1 to the left-hand-side (LHS)
LHS = 푓 푖+1푗 − 0.5푣
[
휎푗+0.5
(
푓 푖+1푗+1 − 푓 푖+1푗
)
− 휎푗−0.5
(
푓 푖+1푗 − 푓 푖+1푗−1
)
(5.120)
+ 0.5ℎ(휇푗+0.5 + 휎
′
푗+0.5)
(
푓 푖+1푗+1 + 푓
푖+1
푗
)
− 0.5ℎ(휇푗−0.5 + 휎′푗−0.5)
(
푓 푖+1푗 + 푓
푖+1
푗−1
)]
and all variables indexed by 푖 to the right-hand-side (RHS) we arrive at
RHS = 푓 푖푗 + 0.5푣
[
휎푗+0.5
(
푓 푖푗+1 − 푓 푖푗
)
− 휎푗−0.5
(
푓 푖푗 − 푓 푖푗−1
)
(5.121)
+ 0.5ℎ(휇푗+0.5 + 휎
′
푗+0.5)
(
푓 푖푗+1 + 푓
푖
푗
)
− 0.5ℎ(휇푗−0.5 + 휎′푗−0.5)
(
푓 푖푗 + 푓
푖
푗−1
)]
We deﬁne the left-hand side as
LHS = 푎푗푓
푖+1
푗−1 + 푏푗푓
푖+1
푗 + 푐푗푓
푖+1
푗+1, (5.122)
with
푎푗 = 0.5푣(휎푗−0.5 + 0.5ℎ(휇푗−0.5 + 휎′푗−0.5))
푏푗 = 1 + 0.5푣((휎푗+0.5 + 휎푗−0.5)− 0.5ℎ(휇푗+0.5 − 휇푗−0.5 + 휎′푗+0.5 − 휎′푗−0.5))
푐푗 = −0.5푣(휎푗+0.5 − 0.5ℎ(휇푗+0.5 + 휎′푗+0.5)). (5.123)
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The right hand side can be written as
RHS = 푘푗푓
푖
푗−1 + 푙푗푓
푖
푗 +푚푗푓
푖
푗+1, (5.124)
with
푘푗 = 0.5푣(휎푗−0.5 − 0.5ℎ(휇푗−0.5 + 휎′푗−0.5))
푙푗 = 1− 0.5푣((휎푗+0.5 + 휎푗−0.5) + 0.5ℎ(휇푗+0.5 − 휇푗−0.5 + 휎′푗+0.5 − 휎′푗−0.5))
푚푗 = 0.5푣(휎푗+0.5 − 0.5ℎ(휇푗+0.5 + 휎′푗+0.5)). (5.125)
Boundary conditions have to be imposed in order to guaranty that all probability
mass is conserved within the state space (see Lux 2009). These can be imposed as
퐹 푖−0.5 = 퐹
푖
푁푥+0.5 = 0, ∀ 푖 (5.126)
This changes the values of the coeﬃcients at 푗 = 0 to
푎푗 = 0 (5.127)
푏푗 = 1 + 0.5푣((휎푗+0.5 + 휎푗−0.5)− 0.5ℎ(휇푗+0.5 + 휎′푗+0.5)) (5.128)
푐푗 = −0.5푣(휎푗+0.5 − 0.5ℎ(휇푗+0.5 + 휎′푗+0.5)) (5.129)
푘푗 = 0 (5.130)
푙푗 = 1− 0.5푣((휎푗+0.5 + 0.5ℎ(휇푗+0.5 + 휎′푗+0.5)) (5.131)
푚푗 = 0.5푣(휎푗+0.5 − 0.5ℎ(휇푗+0.5 + 휎′푗+0.5)), (5.132)
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and at 푗 = 푁푥 to
푎푗 = 0.5푣(휎푗−0.5 + 0.5ℎ(휇푗−0.5 + 휎′푗−0.5)) (5.133)
푏푗 = 1 + 0.5푣((휎푗−0.5)− 휇푗−0.5 − 휎′푗−0.5)) (5.134)
푐푗 = 0 (5.135)
푘푗 = 0.5푣(휎푗−0.5 − 0.5ℎ(휇푗−0.5 + 휎′푗−0.5)) (5.136)
푙푗 = 1− 0.5푣((휎푗−0.5) + 0.5ℎ(−휇푗−0.5 − 휎′푗−0.5)) (5.137)
푚푗 = 0. (5.138)
All equations can be summarized in a system of equations of the form
Vf 푖+1 = Wf 푖, (5.139)
with
f 푖 = (푓 푖0, ..., 푓
푖
푁푥)
′, (5.140)
and coeﬃcient matrices
V =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
푏0 푐0 0 . . . 0 0 0
푎1 푏1 푐1 . . . 0 0 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
0 0 0 . . . 푎푁푥−1 푏푁푥−1 푐푁푥−1
0 0 0 . . . 0 푎푁푥 푏푁푥
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
(5.141)
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and
W =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
푗0 푚0 0 . . . 0 0 0
푘1 푙1 푚1 . . . 0 0 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
0 0 0 . . . 푘푁푥−1 푙푁푥−1 푚푁푥−1
0 0 0 . . . 0 푘푁푥 푙푁푥
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
. (5.142)
Hence, we can calculate the transition densities f 푖+1 by means of the following iter-
ation rule
f 푖+1 ←− V−1Wf 푖. (5.143)
5.A.3 Implicit Discretization Scheme with Chang-Cooper
Correction
For a similar derivation see also Banks et al. (2009). The Chang-Cooper scheme
replaces
퐹 푖푗 = 휎(푠푗)
푓 푖푗+1 − 푓 푖푗
ℎ
+
(
휇(푠푗) + 휎
′(푠푗)
)
푓 푖푗 . (5.144)
by
퐹 푖푗 = 휎(푠푗)
푓 푖푗+1 − 푓 푖푗
ℎ
+
(
휇(푠푗) + 휎
′(푠푗)
)(
휏푗푓
푖
푗+1 + (1− 휏푗)푓 푖푗
)
, (5.145)
with
휏푗 =
1
푤푗
− 1
exp{푤푗} − 1 , (5.146)
and 푤푗 is deﬁned as
푤푗 = ℎ
휇푗 + 휎
′
푗
휎푗
, (5.147)
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By using the following deﬁnition of the probability ﬂux
푓 푖+1푗 − 푓 푖푗
푘
=
퐹 푖+1푗+1 − 퐹 푖+1푗
ℎ
, (5.148)
and rearraing it to
푓 푖+1푗 −
푘
ℎ
(퐹 푖+1푗+1 − 퐹 푖+1푗 ) = 푓 푖푗 (5.149)
and plugging in the deﬁnition of the deﬁnition of 퐹 푖푗 under the Chang-Cooper corec-
tion we arrive at
푓 푖푗 = 푓
푖+1
푗 −
푘
ℎ
(
휎푗+1
푓 푖+1푗+1 − 푓 푖+1푗
ℎ
− (휇푗+1 + 휎′푗+1)(휏푗+1푓 푖+1푗+1 + (1− 휏푗+1푓 푖+1푗 ))
)
(5.150)
+
푘
ℎ
(
휎푗
푓 푖+1푗 − 푓 푖+1푗−1
ℎ
+ (휇푗 + 휎
′
푗)(휏푗푓
푖+1
푗 + (1− 휏푗)푓 푖+1푗−1)
)
. (5.151)
Sorting terms yields
푓 푖푗 = −
푘
ℎ
(1
ℎ
휎푗+1 + (휇푗+1 + 휎
′
푗+1)(휏푗+1)
)
푓 푖+1푗+1 (5.152)
+ 푓 푖+1푗 +
푘
ℎ
(1
ℎ
휎푗+1 + (휇푗+1 + 휎
′
푗+1)(1− 휏푗+1)
)
푓 푖+1푗 (5.153)
+
푘
ℎ
(1
ℎ
휎푗 + (휇푗 + 휎
′
푗)휏푗
)
푓 푖+1푗 (5.154)
− 푘
ℎ
(1
ℎ
휎푗푓
푖+1
푗−1 + (휇푗 + 휎
′
푗)((1− 휏푗)
)
푓 푖+1푗−1). (5.155)
Using the deﬁnitions of 푤푗 and 휏푗 yields
푓 푖푗 = −
푘
ℎ
( 휇푗+1 + 휎′푗+1
exp{푤푗+1} − 1
)
푓 푖+1푗+1 (5.156)
+ 푓 푖+1푗 +
푘
ℎ
((휇푗+1 + 휎′푗+1) exp{푤푗+1}
exp{푤푗+1}
)
푓 푖+1푗 +
푘
ℎ
((휇푗 + 휎′푗)
exp{푤푗}
)
푓 푖+1푗 (5.157)
− 푘
ℎ
((휇푗−1 + 휎′푗−1) exp{푤푗−1}
exp{푤푗−1 − 1}
)
푓 푖+1푗−1). (5.158)
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Under the Chang-Cooper discretization scheme of the Fokker-Planck equation the
system of equations changes following e.g. Banks et al. (2009) to the following form
푎푗푓
푖+1
푗−1 + 푏푗푓
푖+1
푗 + 푐푗푓
푖+1
푗+1 = 푓
푖
푗 , (5.159)
with
푎푗 = −푣휎푗푤푗 ⋅ 1
exp{푤푗} − 1 (5.160)
푏푗 = 1 + 푣휎푗푤푗 ⋅ exp{푤푗}
exp{푤푗} − 1 + 푣휎푗+1푤푗+1 ⋅
1
exp{푤푗+1} − 1 (5.161)
푐푗 = −푣휎푗푤푗 ⋅ exp{푤푗}
exp{푤푗} − 1 . (5.162)
with boundary conditions at 푗 = 0
푎푗 = 0 (5.163)
푏푗 = 1 + 푣휎푗+1푤푗+1 ⋅ 1
exp{푤푗+1} − 1 (5.164)
푐푗 = −푣휎푗푤푗 ⋅ exp{푤푗}
exp{푤푗} − 1 . (5.165)
and 푗 = 푁푥+ 1
푎푗 = −푣휎푗푤푗 ⋅ 1
exp{푤푗} − 1 (5.166)
푏푗 = 1 + 푣휎푗푤푗 ⋅ exp{푤푗}
exp{푤푗} − 1 (5.167)
푐푗 = 0. (5.168)
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All equations can be summarized in a system of equations of the form
Vf 푖+1 = f 푖, (5.169)
with
f 푖 = (푓 푖0, ..., 푓
푖
푁푥)
′, (5.170)
and the coeﬃcient matrix
V =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
푏0 푐0 0 . . . 0 0 0
푎1 푏1 푐1 . . . 0 0 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
0 0 0 . . . 푎푁푥−1 푏푁푥−1 푐푁푥−1
0 0 0 . . . 0 푎푁푥 푏푁푥 .
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
(5.171)
Hence, we can calculate the transition densities f 푖+1 by means of the following iter-
ation rule
f 푖+1 ←− V−1Wf 푖. (5.172)

6 Conclusion and Outlook
Within this dissertation I aimed to meet the two goals of Colander et al.’ (2009)
proposal on economic modeling:
∙ Theoretical and empirical soundness of models applied to economic policy anal-
ysis. Models should be based on sound empirical assumptions about traders
behavior and they should ﬁnd support in the data by replicating the empirical
stylized facts.
∙ New time series models should be developed for detecting speculative bub-
bles and the emergence of non-fundamental equilibria for forecasting future
ﬁnancial instabilities.
I presented four papers, from which three papers deal with the analysis of transaction
taxes in agent-based ﬁnancial market models, while the last paper deals with the
econometric modeling and forecasting of ﬁnancial instabilities.
Within this dissertation work the following results emerged:
( i) The ﬁrst paper showed that the working of transaction taxes has complex ef-
fects within an artiﬁcial market which is populated by traders with diﬀerent
trading rules and diﬀerent investment horizons. I ﬁnd that although transac-
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tion taxes have the ability to reduce parts of the exchange rate volatility, they
increase the kurtosis of exchange rate returns and thereby lead to a diﬀerent
kind of risk. The second result is that the tax harms short-term speculation
in favor of longer term investments, while it also harms trading rules based
on economic fundamentals in favor of trend-extrapolating trading rules. The
increase in the kurtosis of the return distribution emerges from the fact that
short-term traders become long-term traders, who trade large orders less fre-
quently instead of trading small orders more frequently.
( ii) Within the second paper I ﬁnd that under suﬃciently small tax rates traders
abstain from short-term trading in favor of longer investment horizons. This
change in behavior leads to less volatility and less mispricings. When the tax
rate exceeds a certain threshold, however, mispricings increase as also found
in Westerhoﬀ (2003, 2008). This emergent property is due to the fact that
taxation reduces short-term ﬂuctuations and causes longer lasting trends in
the exchange rate. As a result, the longer term fundamentalist trading rule
becomes unpopular in favor of the longer term trend-chasing rule.
( iii) In the third paper on economic policy analysis with agent-based ﬁnancial mar-
ket models I addressed the fact that recent agent-based ﬁnancial market models
came to the result that taxing ﬁnancial transactions does not per se increase
ﬁnancial stability (Westerhoﬀ 2003a, 2008a; Demary 2008, 2010). I add to the
literature by analyzing how diﬀerent degrees of risk aversion and aggressiveness
of traders aﬀect the shape of the volatility response curve to taxation. My sim-
ulations indicate that a tax rate of 0.1 percent demarcates the stabilizing tax
regime from the destabilizing one. I ﬁgure out that the shape of the volatility
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and misalignment response curves to taxation depend on behavioral parame-
ters of the model. Transaction taxes are less eﬀective, either when chartists
trade more aggressively, fundamentalists trade less aggressively, agents switch
more frequently between trading strategies or only have short memory in their
ﬁtness measures. A lower risk aversion of agents, however, makes higher tax
rates more eﬀective as indicated by a ﬂatter volatility response curve.
( iv) The last paper deals with the econometric modeling and forecasting of ﬁnan-
cial instabilities. I estimate stochastic diﬀerential equations with a cubic drift
from which bimodal distributions emerge for a certain interval of the mod-
els’ parameters. Parameter estimates give evidence for bimodal exchange rate
distributions for fourteen exchange rates, two cubic-drift models and two es-
timation periods. Forecasts of the exchange rate density predict the exchange
rate to be in the vicinity of one of the two attractors for most of the time.
However, there are periods, in which both attractors are covered with proba-
bility mass indicating uncertainty about the equilibrium exchange rate. The
models identify the beginning of the Exchange Rate Mechanism II and the
introduction of the Euro as two major phase transitions. Based on tests on
unconditional and conditional predictive accuracy I ﬁnd that the cubic-drift
models outperform the random walk in out-of-sample forecasting for one out of
fourteen real exchange rates. I conclude that bimodality is a good description
of real exchange rates.
There are additional policy questions which can be dealt with by agent-based mod-
eling. Agent-based models can also be applied for addressing questions about the
consequences of asymmetric information in ﬁnancial markets. There is a current dis-
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cussion in the public media that hedge funds should provide information about their
trading strategies to the public. Agent-based models might handle the question if
this regulation will increase the eﬃciency of ﬁnancial markets. Another interesting
question might be what consequences the introduction of traders with market power
might have for ﬁnancial stability.
Within empirical economics there might be several applications of the cubic-drift
model. Inﬂation rates might have a bimodal distribution which results from two
diﬀerent long-term inﬂation targets. Periods in which both attractors are covered
with probability mass might indicate uncertainty about the inﬂation target of the
central bank. The bimodal model might also be evident for interest rates, again,
reﬂecting two diﬀerent monetary regimes or a structural break in the risk-premia
process.
Summing up, I presented applications of a growing ﬁelds of research that is con-
tributing to the understanding of the working of ﬁnancial markets and the potential
implications of diﬀerent regulatory measures.
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